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ABSTRACT
The purpose of th is  study 1s to examine the p o l i t ic a l  mythology 
of the Partido L1beraci6n Nacional (National Liberation Party) of 
Costa Rica. The principal objectives are to show (1) that p o l i t ic a l  
myths provide a useful perspective In the study o f p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re ,  
and (2) that specific  p o l i t ic a l  myths provide new insights into  
Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  values.
Beyond general agreement that p o l i t ic a l  culture is a useful 
concept, students of comparative p o lit ic s  disagree on I ts  meaning 
when applied to specific  research problems. A ll would agree that 
the p o l i t ic a l  culture of a country is a highly complex congery of 
psychological, normative, and perceptual properties. How best to 
meld th is  p o te n t ia l ly  enormous wealth o f information Into a coherent 
and accurate characterization o f a nation continues to divide  
specia lis ts  1n comparative p o l i t ic s .  One approach 1s to focus on 
a specific  group w ithin a specific  society and to id e n tify  cultura l 
aspects peculiar to the group. Another is to concentrate on a 
spec ific  cu ltura l phenomenon w ith in  a selected society. This study 
combines both approaches by examining a p a r t ic u la r  culture phenomenon 
of a specific  group 1n a selected society.
Simply defined, myths are the dramatic expressions of the way 
a group perceives and in terprets  I ts  existence and I ts  experiences. 
Myths exemplify a group's norms and mores and explain the group's
v
a c t iv i t ie s  and a f fa irs  1n terms of I ts  values and b e lie fs .  The 
p o l i t ic a l  myth in th is  study concerns the p o l i t ic a l  experiences of 
the group; 1t Is a group's preferred h istory . Defining p o l i t ic a l  
myth 1n th is  fashion narrows the scope of investigation to manage­
able proportions. Thus defined, p o l i t ic a l  myths contribute to the 
understanding of p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , i . e . ,  the a t t i tu d e s , b e l ie fs ,  
and values by which p o l i t ic a l  actors give meaning to th e ir  actions.
This study is divided into three parts. In the f i r s t  part ,  
the concept of p o l i t ic a l  myth and I ts  re la tio n  to p o l i t ic a l  culture  
are discussed. The second part is a description of selected aspects 
of Costa Rica's p o l i t ic a l  cu lture , includirg observations on values, 
t ra i ts , -a n d  especially  three ideas peculiar to Costa Rica - -  la  
leyenda blanca (the White Legend), la  m fstica , and l_a generacitin.
The th ird  part is an analysis of the p o l i t ic a l  mythology o f the 
Partido L1beracl6n Nacional that recounts the founding of the party ,  
referred to in th is  study as the Myth of the Revolution of 1948.
The mythic version and a lternate  versions of the events of the 
revolution are contrasted.
The Hyth of the Revolution 1s more than simply the preferred  
history of a p o l i t ic a l  party. What Liberacionlstas have chosen to 
emphasize, omit, and d is to r t  among the events and a c t iv i t ie s  leading 
to ,  during, and 1n the aftermath of the Revolution o f 1948 present 
a p a r t ic u la r  image of Llberaclon as a p o l i t ic a l  party. The re jec ­
tion of violence as an acceptable p o l i t ic a l  technique, a commitment 
to e lectora l p o l i t ic s ,  and the peaceful transfera l o f p o l i t ic a l  power 
are Costa Rican values that are affirmed 1n Llberaci^n myths. The
vi
party myths also conceal some of the less a t tra c t iv e  t r a i ts  that  
Costa Ricans are reputed to have* Including a tendency to be p o l i t i ­




The f ie ld  o f  comparative p o lit ic s  is re la t iv e ly  young. The 
rapid Increase of nation-states a f te r  World War I I  forced p o l i t ic a l  
scientis ts  to reconsider the le g a l is t ic -s tru c tu ra l  approach in compar­
ing the p o l i t ic a l  forms of one nation to another. As the substantive 
focus expanded to Include new nations, comparatlvlsts reappraised old 
assumptions about p o l i t ic a l  behavior and In s titu tio n s  in general and 
recognized that many conclusions about the long-studied nations of 
Europe and North America did not apply to the emerging nations of  
Asia and A fr ica . Indeed, comparatlvlsts began to take a fresh look 
a t Europe and the United States as w e ll .  At the same time, new 
research techniques and ana ly tica l tools such as psychoanalysis, sur­
vey research, and s ta t is t ic a l  tests became availab le  causing new con­
cepts and approaches to be devised.
An Important obstacle 1n comparative analysis was the lack of a 
general concept that would conjoin psychological and normative dimen­
sions o f p o l i t ic a l  society In link ing new methods of analysis to the 
vastly expanded range o f data from new and old sources. Such concepts 
as Ideology, public opinion, and national character seemed to be e ith er  
too vague, too sp e c if ic ,  or too encumbered with ethnocentric baggage
1
2
to be o f good use In the rap id ly  changing, resurgent f ie ld  of compara­
t iv e  p o l i t ic a l  a n a ly s is .1
Gabriel Almond can be large ly  credited fo r the conceptualization
of p o l i t ic a l  culture as an ana ly tica l connective especially  suited fo r
2
taking advantage of new data and research techniques. Although the 
concept of p o l i t ic a l  culture w i l l  be explored 1n d e ta il la te r ,  su ffice  
I t  fo r  now to say that the question addressed by Almond was, what makes 
one nation unique even though 1t may share any number of s im ila r i t ie s  
with another?
Costa Rica provides a good example fo r  analysis. This Central 
American nation d if fe rs  s ig n if ic a n t ly  from other Latin American coun­
t r ie s .  Many observers of Latin American p o li t ic s  have coumented on 
the s ta b i l i t y  and peacefulness of Costa Rican p o li t ic s  1n a region 
noted fo r violence and p o l i t ic a l  In s ta b i l i t y .  Textbooks on Latin  
American p o l i t ic s  and government r e f le c t  th is  a t t i tu d e  with such
chapter headings as "Costa Rica: A Progressing Democracy" and "Costa
3
R1ca: A Meaningful Democracy." V is its  to Central America uncover
an In trigu ing difference 1n atmosphere in Costa R1ca that 1s absent 
1n neighboring countries. Election day in Costa Rica Impresses one
Lucian  W. Pye, "Culture and P o l i t ic a l  Science: Problems in the
Evolution of the Concept of P o l i t ic a l  Culture," Social Science Quarterly  
53 (September 1972), p. 386.
2
Gabriel Almond, "Comparative P o l i t ic a l  Systems" in Comparative 
P o lit ic s :  Notes and Readings, 4th e d . f ed, Roy C. Macrldis and Bernard 
E. Brown (Homewood, I l l i n o is :  Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 296.
3
Harry Kantor, Patterns of P o lit ic s  and P o l i t ic a l  Systems 1n Latin  
America (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 187. Martin C. Needier, e d .,
P o l i t ic a l  Systems of Latin America, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand
Relnhold C o., 197077 p. 132.
3
with the earnestness, lightened by ga ie ty , with which the Ticos go
4
about selecting th e ir  public o f f ic ia ls .
Beyond general agreement that p o l i t ic a l  culture 1s a useful 
concept, students of comparative p o l i t ic s  continue to disagree on 
i ts  meaning when applied to spec ific  research problems. For example, 
no consensus exists  on the meaning of the term when re fe rr in g  to an 
internal p o l i t ic a l  system. All would agree that the p o l i t ic a l  culture  
of country X is a highly complex congery of psychological, normative, 
and perceptual properties. How best to meld th is  p o te n tia lly  enormous 
wealth of information Into a coherent and accurate characterization  
of country X continues to divide spec ia lis ts  1n comparative p o l i t ic s .  
The d i f f ic u l t y  is compounded a t  times by the need fo r  better  Informa­
tion on a specific  aspect of a part ic u la r  culture than Is ava ilab le .  
Lucian Pye suggests that the ultimate goal 1n defining the concept 
of p o l i t ic a l  culture Is to find "more e f fe c t iv e  ways o f  describing 
to ta l systems," thereby enhancing "our a b i l i t y  to understand and 1n a
5
lim ited  sense ‘ p red ic t ' system performance." He concedes th a t ,  as 
y e t,  the state of the a r t  has not advanced that fa r .
Whether or not grand theory bridging the m1cro-analys1s to macro­
analysis gap Is premature, research and analysis show progress on 
phenomena of a size and complexity w ithin reach.® We are s t i l l  a t  the
4
The term T1co 1s a nickname fo r  Costa Ricans used by the Costa 
Ricans themselves and other Central Americans. The word is not pejora­
t iv e  but stems from the propensity of Costa Ricans to add t lco  to words 
to make a diminutive, e .g . ,  poqultico from poco meaning a l i t t l e  b i t .
®Pye, "Culture and P o l i t ic a l  Science," p. 296.
6Ib 1 d ., pp. 288-290.
4
stage of gathering evidence on the less researched areas such as 
p o lit ic s  1n Central America. What 1s needed are ways of operationaliz ­
ing p o l i t ic a l  culture to f a c i l i t a t e  data gathering and reduce the scope 
of analysis to manageable leve ls . One way 1s to focus on a specific  
group w ith in  a specific  society and to Id e n tify  cu ltura l aspects 
peculiar to the group. Another l in e  o f  attack 1s to focus on a 
specific  cultura l phenomenon within a selected society. This study 
combines the two approaches. That i s . i t  examines a part ic u la r  c u l­
tural phenomenon of a specific  group 1n a selected soc1ety--the p o l i ­
t ic a l  mythology of the Partido L1beracl6n Nacional (National Liberation  
Party) of Costa R1ca.
The purpose is two-fold: (1) to show that p o l i t ic a l  myths pro­
vide a useful perspective In the study of p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , and (2) 
to use specific  p o l i t ic a l  myths to gain new insights Into the Costa 
Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu lture . The study of p o l i t ic s  lends I t s e l f  to con­
tinuous experimenting with new concepts and approaches to p o l i t ic a l  
questions. P o l i t ic a l  culture is as much a search fo r  fresh ways of 
confronting age-old problems as 1t is  a descriptive term fo r  observ­
able phenomena. P o li t ic a l  sc ientists  have been working with the 
concept of p o l i t ic a l  culture since the early  1950's, and the Idea of 
p o l i t ic a l  myth has an even longer h istory . This study I l lu s t ra te s  
the u t i l i t y  o f link ing  the two concepts. The conventional wisdom 
about Costa Rican p o l i t ic s  contains many untested assumptions which 
have led to equally unfounded conclusions. The second objective 1s 
to examine those comfortable assumptions and conclusions about specific  
p o l i t ic a l  matters In the l ig h t  of new Information and techniques.
5
This introductory chapter examines the concept o f p o l i t ic a l  
c u ltu re , conceptual and operational problems, and the place of 
p o l i t ic a l  myth 1n the overall conceptual framework o f the term. A 
discussion of p o l i t ic a l  culture 1n the study of Latin American 
p o lit ic s  1s followed by an explanation o f the approach used. A 
b r ie f  overview of Costa Rican h istory and geography highlights  
those aspects of special relevance to th is  study. An outline of 
the following chapters concludes the Introduction.
POLITICAL CULTURE
In 1972 a group of scholars spent several days discussing 
p o l i t ic a l  culture and how i t  might be employed 1n the study o f  
communist p o l i t ic a l  systems and concluded th a t ,  although everyone 
agreed on the u t i l i t y  and importance of the concept, they had not 
reached a consensus on exactly what p o l i t ic a l  culture means.7 This 
lack of consensus I l lu s t ra te s  the d i f f ic u l t y  of managing an elusive  
concept, yet the In te l le c tu a l richness that concepts l ik e  p o l i t ic a l  
culture can bring to comparative analysis.
Almond's use of the anthropological concept o f  culture 1n the 
study of p o lit ic s  marks the beginning of the conceptual debate on 
p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re . What forces lin k  together enormously diverse in ­
dividuals Into groups that are immediately recognizable by the members 
and outsiders as social en tit le s ?  The Idea o f culture conjures up 
Images of c lo th ing , speech, amusements, and a myriad of other d e ta ils
7Dorothy Knapp, David W. Paul, and Gerson Sher, "Digest o f  the 
Conference on P o li t ic a l  Culture and Comparative Communist Studies,"  
Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism 5 (May 1972), pp. 2-17.
6
tha t enable one to place himself and others In definable social cate­
gories such as fam ily , t r ib e ,  and n a t io n a lity .  When we v i s i t  another 
country we know that the inhabitants are as foreign to us as we are to 
them. I t  is th is  sense o f distinctness that the idea of culture  
addresses. The cu ltu ra l distinctness of societies applies equally to 
the area of p o l i t ic s .
When Almond linked culture  to p o l i t ic s ,  he was try ing to create 
an analytica l tool that would incorporate the Insights In to  individual 
behavior achieved by psychoanalysis and the new research techniques of 
surveys and quantita tive  analysis. In defining p o l i t ic a l  culture  
Almond has emphasized the psychological dimension o f  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i ty .  
P o lit ic a l  culture has been defined as *'a part ic u la r  pattern of orien ­
tations to p o l i t ic a l  action ,"  "a set o f a t t i tu d e s , b e l ie fs ,  and s e n t i­
ments," and a ". . . system o f empirical b e l ie fs ,  expressive symbols, 
and values which defines the situations in which p o l i t ic a l  action takes 
place." Two commonalities among the various d e fin it io n s  stand out: 1)
the emphasis on social psychological dimensions such as b e l ie f ,  orien­
ta t io n ,  and values, and 2} the e x p l ic i t  assumption that such psychologi­
cal t r a i t s  form r e la t iv e ly  persistent and Id e n t i f ia b le  patterns that can 
be used to d i f fe re n t ia te  and compare among p o l i t ic a l  systems. At th is  
level of genera lity  one finds l i t t l e  scholarly disagreement; deciding 
what data to Include and exclude from consideration when operationalizing
p
Almond, "Comparative P o l i t ic a l  Systems," p .39; In ternational 
Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences, s .v . "P o lit ic a l  Culture ," by 
Lucian Pye; Sidney Verba, "Comparative P o li t ic a l  Culture" In P o l i t ic a l  
Culture and P o l i t ic a l  Development. ed. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba 
(Princeton, N .J .:  Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.
7
the concept 1n specific  research projects raises a number of methodolog­
ical contentions. Of a l l  the a t t i tu d e s , o rien ta tions , b e l ie fs ,  and 
values people have v1s-a-v1s p o l i t ic s ,  which are the Important ones?
How are sod a ! psychological dimensions linked to action? What sources 
o f data are most re liab le?  The questions that can be asked about p o l i ­
t ic a l  culture as an analytica l device seem nearly as numerous as the 
questions that can be asked about culture i t s e l f .
Several ways of avoiding the more problematic theoretical con­
cerns of p o l i t ic a l  culture can be found in the l i t e r a tu r e ,  with the 
main concern being to get on with the business of research, leaving 
the perp lex it ies  of theory to be worked out in time.
Sidney Verba, fo r example, gets around theoretica l d i f f ic u l t ie s
by presenting p o l i t ic a l  culture as an approach to comparative analysis.
In his concluding essay to a co llec tion  o f  studies of ten d i f fe re n t
nations, he t r ie s  to set forth  some s ig n if ic a n t  dimensions of p o l i t ic a l
culture and " . . .  some propositions as to the relationship among them
g
rather than attempting an integrated theory of the concept." The 
u t i l i t y  of the p o l i t ic a l  culture approach 1s that i t  aids us in separat­
ing "the cultura l aspect of p o lit ic s  from other aspects," such as 
structure and behavior. The focus 1s on "belie fs  about patterns o f  
p o l i t ic a l  In teraction  and p o l i t ic a l  In s t i tu t io n s ."  The basic assump­
tion is that what men believe about p o l i t ic s  has an e f fe c t  on how they 
act p o l i t i c a l l y . 10
g
Verba, "Comparative P o l i t ic a l  Culture," pp. 526-527.
10Ib id . ,  pp. 514-516.
8
Considering the problems o f d e f in i t io n ,  much less the exigen­
cies o f  theory bu ild ing , Verba's contribution seems eminently p ra c tica l.  
Rather than getting entangled 1n conceptual and theoretica l concerns 
that may be unresolvable a t th is  time, he advocates moving ahead with  
research into questions of current relevance. P a r t ic u la r ly  important 
is the observation that several analytica l d is tinc tions  with regard to 
the object of research have to be made. One can distinguish between 
what men do and what they say about th e ir  actions fo r  purposes of 
analysis; the d is tinc tion  may not be as c lear in the minds o f the 
s u b jec ts .*1 The d is tin c tio n  between p o l i t ic a l  culture and the general
culture of a society is also a n a ly t ic a l .  Again the d is t in c t io n  may
12not be so c lear to the p o l i t ic a l  actor. The researcher of course
must also endeavor to keep his own p o l i t ic a l  presuppositions from
influencing the in te rp re ta tio n  o f the data.
Pye circumvents the conceptual debate by proposing that the
study o f p o l i t ic a l  culture proceed from a series o f hypotheses based
on observations of the behavior of a society. Those characteris tic
behavioral t r a i t s  tha t appear to make a society unique are used to
formulate hypotheses about what "values, sentiments, and o r ien ta tio n s”
13are " c r i t ic a l  in giving the c o l le c t iv i ty  i ts  d is t in c t iv e  character."
The danger here 1s that one's own p o l i t ic a l  orientations and be lie fs  
may lead one to make logical conclusions a t variance with the actual 
psychological dimensions of the object society. Pye points up a
n ib1d ., pp. 522-523.
l 2 Ib1d ., pp. 521-522.
13Pye, "Culture and P o l i t ic a l  Science," p. 293.
dilemma in the study o f p o l i t ic a l  culture a t the heart o f the u t i l i t y  
of the concept. Where does one begin? The concept was orig inated ,
1n p a rt , to l in k  "individual psychology to the performance of co llec ­
t iv e  e n t i t ie s ,"  or to close "the gap between micro-analysis and macro- 
analysis," to use more esoteric language. Unfortunately, Individuals  
persist in holding more thoughts and opinions about p o l i t ic a l  matters 
than they are w il l in g  to transform into s ig n if ic a n t p o l i t ic a l  actions.
Determining exactly which thoughts or orientations stimulate which
14actions is often exceedingly d i f f i c u l t .
Another p o ten tia lly  f r u i t f u l  approach lim its  investigation to 
". . . those human situations and contexts in which the observers 
can more d ire c t ly  observe cu ltura l operation going on." Culture is 
defined in th is  case as the process by which complex human phenomena 
are rendered communicable. This assumes " . . .  that there is some 
sort of orderly significance In a l l  human phenomena." Conmunlcation 
proceeds on three leve ls—meaning 1s conceived by those involved in 
the phenomena (perceptions and cognition ), transmitted to the "Indig­
enous novice" (s o c ia l iz a t io n ) ,  and derived by the observer (ana lys is ).  
Cultural operation 1s defined as "a succinct and orderly conjunction 
of elements," selected by the observer or the actor from the more compl 
and diverse t o t a l i t y  of experience fo r  the purpose of deriving meaning
from phenomena experienced. Series o f  operations read ily  observable
15are denominated "priv ileged operational zones o f cu ltu re ."
14Ib ld . ,  pp. 288-290.
15James A. Boon, "Further Operations o f  'Culture ' 1n Anthropology 
A Synthesis o f and fo r  Debate," Social Science Quarterly 53 (September 
1972). The above is a synthesis o f  pages 227-2lZ~.
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This approach offers  several advantages. By stressing culture  
as the cofimunlcation of meaning the observer 1s constantly aware that  
the "raw data" o f cultura l research " . . .  are not objective facts of  
observable behavior, but imperfect communications between sender and 
re c e iv e r ," *6 The observer must keep 1n mind that two levels o f meaning 
are a t work 1n any cultura l operation observed. F i r s t ,  the actors 
themselves derive meaning from the cu ltura l operation according to 
the place that that p a r t ic u la r  operation has in th e ir  cu ltu ra l con­
struction . Second, the observer attaches meaning to the operation 
in terms o f his own ana ly tica l concerns. The myth is a good example 
of th is  dichotomy of meaning. To those who believe in a myth, the
narrative  w i l l  be an expression of tru th . The observer, who does not
believe in the mythic n a rra t iv e , may attach a wholly d i f fe re n t  mean­
ing in terms of some separate theoretical arid analytica l scheme. As 
comnunication both meanings are v a lid ;  the phenomenon is merely being 
viewed from two separate positions.
Considering culture as communication also reminds the observer
that the In ten s ity  of any p a rt ic u la r  zone o f cultura l operation may
vary considerably among the actors involved. One can be misled into
attaching deeper meaning or more intensely f e l t  meaning than the actors
actua lly  experience. As Boon so ap tly  puts i t :
Doubtless anthropologists [o r p o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is ts ]  want "culture"  
as conveyed by symbols to be pregnant with meaning and v i ta l  to 
I ts  actors. . . . This is understandable, since i t  is  more d i f f i ­
c u lt  to explain patterns o f culture steeped 1n an ethos of "I can 
take 1t or leave i t "  rather than "do or d i e . "17
l 6 Ib1d ., p. 248.
17lb id . ,  p. 242.
The rou tin iza tlon  o f  a r i tu a l  or some other cu ltura l operation also 
may appear more s ig n if ic a n t to the observer than the operation i t ­
s e l f .  What is being examined w i l l ,  o f course, determine that question.
The problem of appropriate sources o f information on p o l i t ic a l  
culture has generated as much controversy as the arguments over concep­
tu a l iz a t io n .  This is not surprising since content is intim ate ly  linked  
with the concept, the la t t e r  often being defined in terms of the former 
For example, a general treatment of p o l i t ic a l  culture such as Rosenbaum 
introductory te x t  P o l i t ic a l  Culture is weakened by the emphasis on sur­
vey data. Rosenbaum states that "The basic tool of contemporary
18p o l i t ic a l  culture study is the survey research method." His l is t in g
of the "core components" of p o l i t ic a l  culture reveals a preoccupation
with the use of questionnaires. Other methods such as content analysis
are considered only useful "adjuncts" to survey research, but "unsatis-
19factory" fo r  "primary information gathering." Rosenbaum admits sur­
vey research must confront the d i f f i c u l t  problems of equivalent mean­
ings o f  language, va lid  indicators of measurement, and the r e l i a b i l i t y  
of the responses gathered, especia lly  1n cross-national research, but 
he views these as methodological problems that careful questionnaire  
construction and sampling w i l l  overcome. This study suggests the 
converse, that survey data should be used as an adjunct to cu ltura l  
research that begins with other sources.
Comparative research on p o l i t ic a l  culture Implies a search fo r  
touchstones o f comparison and contrast among diverse cu ltu ra l systems.
*®Walter A. Rosenbaum, P o l i t i cal Culture (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1975), p. 22.
19Ib id . ,  pp. 22-29.
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One can, however, be misled by devising theoretica l patterns of such 
cultura l components as a ttitud es  and b e lie fs  that are based uncon­
sciously on presuppositions inculcated by one's own cu lture . A way of 
avoiding the p i t f a l l  of ethnocentric bias is to begin with what the 
object culture i t s e l f  considers important. Cultures manifest ideas, 
b e lie fs ,  a t t i tu d e s , and orientations considered of importance to the 
group in various ways. A primary source of such cu ltu ra l Information 
is the myths of the object society.
The mythology of a group comprises the dramatic representations 
and explanations of s ituations , events, and aspirations considered 
important to i ts  members. Myths, in a sense, are the preferred history
of the group; tha t is to say, preferred by the group because I t  portrays
20group a c t iv i ty  as conforming to group values. Id ea ls , and mores. The 
p o l i t ic a l  myth is the component of the larger mythology that treats  of 
p o l i t ic a l  matters. Thus the p o l i t ic a l  myth expresses s a lie n t  aspects 
of the "orientations toward p o lit ic s "  that influence the p o l i t ic a l  
behavior of the group.
While general orientations toward p o li t ic s  may be shared through­
out the society, d if fe re n t  groups within the society may manifest those
shared orientations 1n a varie ty  of ways. Because subculture has been
21given a d if fe re n t  connotation elsewhere in the l i t e r a tu r e ,  cu ltura l  
variations 1n th is  study w i l l  be called cultura l subgroups.
20The concept o f myth 1s discussed 1n d e ta il 1n Chapter Two.
21 Rosenbaum, P o l i t ic a l  C u lture , p. 151. "A social group called a 
p o l i t ic a l  subculture Is distinguished by r e la t iv e ly  large membership, 
by Important differences 1n outlook from the national m ajo rity , and by 
a strong group consciousness o f i ts  d if fe ren ce --a  d ifference the larger  
society often regards with considerable unease, i f  not h o s t i l i t y ."
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The advantage to concentrating on cultura l subgroups 1s c h ie f ly  
that the scope of the study Is more manageable. F i r s t ,  the amount of 
information and the number of subjects 1s more l im ite d . Second, the 
homogeneity o f be lie fs  Is assumed to Increase as the size of the 
studied group decreases. On the other hand, care must be taken not 
to extrapolate Indiscrim inately  from the subgroup to the culture at 
large. The subgroup may also be useful In assessing common but 
untested presuppositions about a general culture that should apply 
equally to the subgroup. Another assumption Is that any major 
p o l i t ic a l  subgroup may be used as a source fo r  p o l i t ic a l  culture  
research. Some subgroups, such as p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s , may be more 
amenable to cultura l research because they usually self-consciously  
deal in the expression of p o l i t ic a l  b e lie fs  and ideas. Ingenuity 
on the part of the observer should enable one to examine p o l i t ic a l  
In s t itu tio n s  such as bureaucracies and In teres t groups in a s im ilar  
manner. The members of these groups, too, are Inculcated with the 
p o l i t ic a l  culture of the society, and 1f the concept of p o l i t ic a l  
culture  1s v a l id ,  the behavior of bureaucrats and members of In te res t  
groups w i l l  be shaped by cu ltura l factors although perhaps 1n ways 
d if fe re n t  from more overtly  p o l i t ic a l  In s t i tu t io n s .  The p o l i t ic a l  
party, though, 1s l ik e ly  to be a more efficacious source of cu ltura l  
Information, since the party (a t  least where 1t re l ie s  on open e lec ­
tions to gain or stay in power) must constantly convince supporters 
to remain lo y a l.  A primary function of party myths Is to promote 
such lo y a lty .  Consequently, the p o l i t ic a l  party Is the cu ltu ra l  
subgroup examined In th is  study.
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POLITICAL CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
Reference to culture 1n the study of Latin American p o lit ic s  
has a long and distinguished, i f  varied , t ra d it io n .  Most studies of 
Latin American p o li t ic s  a t some point consider the impact of various 
cultura l factors on the development o f Latin American p o l i t ic a l  in s t i ­
tutions and behavior. Of the many d if fe re n t  ways culture has figured  
in Latin American studies, three general topics appear to predominate.
The f i r s t  is essentia lly  a methodological dilemma: should Latin
America be considered a cultura l u n it ,  bound more by commonalitles
than divided by differences? Or does the unitary approach conceal
fundamental d is tinctions among the twenty nations thereby obscuring
the richness of cu ltura l d iv e rs ity  inherent in a region that comprises
twenty d i f fe re n t ,  in t r ic a te  blends of ethnic and rac ia l ingredients.
The debate, a t  least among scholars, has generally been fr ie n d ly .
Those who choose to emphasize conroon tra d it io n s , t r a i t s ,  values, and
attr ibu tes  usually include a disclaimer such as:
We are aware of the danger of generalizing about twenty countries 
peopled by nearly 250 m ill io n  who are diverse in race, language, 
class, p o l i t ic s ,  and education.22
Studies that stress the d iv e rs ity  o f the national culture generally
23
concede tha t the single cu ltu ra l e n t i ty  approach is  also v a lid .
The debate, though perhaps Insoluble, 1s more important than 
simply a disagreement on approaches or points of view. Considering 
Latin America as a cu ltu ra l un it has on occasion led to fa c i le
^L ou is  K. Harris and V ictor Alba, The P o li t ic a l  Culture and 
Behavior of Latin America (Ohio: Kent State University  PressT 1974),
p. vl'lT"
^See the "Preface to the F irs t  E d ition ,"  1n Needier, Pol i t i c a l  
Systems of Latin America, p. 1x.
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overs im plification  about the nature and the course of Latin American 
p o l i t ic s .  For example, leg is la tures  have often been dismissed sum­
m arily in texts on Latin American p o l i t ic s .  Yet I t  can be argued that  
Latin American leg is la tures  do play Important roles 1n a number of  
countries, but th e ir  performance must be measured in Latin American 
terms, not in terms of the way the United States Congress operates
A J
{often the standard im p l ic i t ly  used). On the other hand, such shared 
experiences as language, colonial experiences, and economic problems 
suggest that the search fo r  cu ltura l commonalities can be useful.
The debate on cultura l unity can sensitize  the observer to the p i t f a l ls  
and the strengths o f each approach.
A second theme of studies on Latin American p o l i t ic a l  culture  
casts culture as the independent variab le  most Important 1n shaping 
p a rt ic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  configurations. Often culture has meant the 
Spanish colonial heritage (or Portuguese in the case of B raz il)  
which is used to explain a wide range of in s t itu t io n s  and p o l i t ic a l  
issues. The colonial heritage is c ited  as a cause fo r  the persistence 
of the la t i fu n d ia  (landed e s ta te ) ,  caudillismo (p o l i t ic a l  authority  
centered in a strong-man), and excessive Individualism . To a lesser 
degree the influence of the Indian cultures is also considered in 
theories of Latin American p o l i t ic s ,  generally to explain the quiescence 
o f the peasantry. In the la s t  decade or so hypotheses about the in te r ­
action o f culture and p o l i t ic a l  arrangements have become more sophisti­
cated and factors other than the colonial heritage notion have been 
given greater weight.
24Weston H. Agor, e d . , Latin American Legislatures: Their Role
and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1971).
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A th ird  l in e  of consideration that links culture to p o lit ic s
has come prim arily  from Latin Americans themselves. Since about the
end of World War I ,  Latin American p o l i t ic a l  thinkers a t various
times and 1n several d i f fe re n t  locales have developed Ideologies designed
to encompass indigeneous values, problems, and patterns o f action. The
specific  goal has been to f i t  the Ideology to the culture and not the
25culture to some foreign ideological p rinc ip les . Aprismo, which 
originated in Peru, is the primary example o f the search for a Latin  
American ideology, but examples o f a s im ila r  concern for indigenous 
solutions to national problems can be found in other countries.
Mexican thinkers such as Jose Vasconcelos have emphasized the influence  
of the Indian culture in the development of the Mexican p o l i t ic a l  s ty le .  
In Costa Rica a basic princ ip le  of the Partido LiberaciiSn Nacional is 
that Costa Ricans should devise Costa Rican solutions to national prob­
lems, rather than re ly  on foreign ideologies. Latin Americans are no 
longer as enamored with the s o c ia l,  economic, and p o l i t ic a l  philoso­
phies of Europe and the United States that were in vogue in the la s t  
century.
Although the Idea of culture has been prominent in analysis of 
and speculation on Latin American p o l i t ic s ,  studies proceeding from 
a careful operationalization  of the concept have been comparatively 
few. Mexico was one of the countries included 1n the Civic Culture 
study by Almond and Verba, but other than an a r t ic le  by Robert Scott,
25Apri smo refers  to the Ideology o f the AHanza Popular Revo- 
luclonaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary A lliance) organ­
ized by V ictor Haya de la  Torre In Peru in the 1920's and based, 1n 
p a rt ,  on the p o l i t ic a l  thought of Jose Carlos Marlategue.
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26the results have figured l i t t l e  In the l i te r a tu re  on Mexico. Even
fewer are studies that e x p l ic i t ly  explore the in teraction  of p o l i t ic a l
culture and the organization and functioning of p o l i t ic a l  subgroups
27and In s t itu t io n s .
There have been some attempts to study , a c l f lc  aspects of Costa
Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu lture; the most deta iled  of these have been disser-
28ta tlons . To date no one has attempted to c o lla te  the several studies
into a comprehensive overview of Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  culture . The
la te s t  published general treatment of Costa Rican p o li t ic s  barely men-
29tions cultura l factors. An early  monograph on Costa Rican p o lit ic s  
as a whole re l ie s  more on in tu i t iv e  in terpre ta tion  than on empirical
v e r if ic a t io n . Here too, the f ie ld  Is replete with opportunities fo r
u 30 research.
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The C1v1c Culture: P o li t ic a l
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations {Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1963);~Eobert E. Scott, "Mexico: The Established
Resolution," 1n P o li t ic a l  C u lture , ed. Pye and Verba, pp. 330-395.
27An excellent analysis that examines such connections is found in 
L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican P o li t ic a l  System, 2nd. ed. (Boston: 
Houghton M i f f l in ,  19?6), pp. 1-117.
28John Allen Booth, "Democracy and C itizen  Action In Costa Rica:
The Modes and Correlates of Public Partic ipation  1n P o lit ic s "  (Ph.D. 
d isserta tion . University of Texas at Austin, 1975); Mario Carvajal 
Herrera, "P o lit ic a l  Attitudes and P o li t ic a l  Change in Costa Rica: A
Comparison of Attitudes of Leaders and Followers with Respect to Regime 
Values and Party Id e n tif ic a tio n "  (Ph.D. d isserta tion , University of 
Kansas, 1972); Dorothy McBride Stetson, " E l i te  P o l i t ic a l  Culture 1n 
Costa R1ca" (Ph.D. d iss e rta t io n , Vanderbilt U n ivers ity , 1968).
?QCharles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican P o lit ic s  (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, 1971).
30James L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder,
Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1962
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METHOD
The procedure followed in th is  study is divided into three 
stages. In the f i r s t  stage the concept o f p o l i t ic a l  niyth and i ts  r e la ­
tion to p o l i t ic a l  culture are discussed. The a ttr ib u te s  o f  the p o l i ­
t ic a l  myth are delineated and the functions of the myth in p o l i t ic a l  
matters are examined. The re lationship  between p o l i t ic a l  myths and the 
development of p o l i t ic a l  parties as a subgroup is also explored.
The second stage is a discussion of selected aspects o f  Costa 
Rica's p o l i t ic a l  cu lture . The few studies of Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  
culture tha t ex is t provide an incomplete picture of the subject.
Either the focus is society-wide, o ffering  broad generalizations with 
l i t t l e  empirical v e r i f ic a t io n ,  or the investigation is lim ited  to 
specific  groups and narrow considerations. A comprehensive survey 
of the e n t ire  range of the Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  culture is beyond 
the scope of this study. Nevertheless, some observations can be made 
about Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  values, t r a i t s ,  and concepts.
The th ird  stage is a recounting of the Liberaclon version of 
the events that led to the founding of the party ( I . e . ,  the Myth o f
the Revolution) and a c r i t ic a l  evaluation of the h is to r ic a l accuracy
32of that account. Attention 1s directed to those aspects o f  the 
story that display mythic q u a l i t ie s .  The story described here Is a 
composite based on the events and in terpretations most heavily stressed
31 I t  1s customary 1n Latin American studies to re fe r  to p o l i t ic a l  
parties  by th e ir  I n i t i a l s ,  e .g . ,  PLN fo r  Partido L1beraci6n Nacional. 
Costa Ricans do not use the I n i t i a ls  but prefer to shorten the t i t l e  
to L1beracl6n. That 1s the short form used In th is  study.
32When c a p ita l iz e d , Revolution refers  to the Revolution of
1948.
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1n the Liberaclfin l i t e r a tu r e .  Quotations are used to I l lu s t r a te  the 
language employed and as a re f le c t io n  of the a ttitudes  toward the 
events and the characters involved. Of p a r t ic u la r  concern is the in fo r ­
mation that the Myth of the Revolution omits or disguises. A lterna­
t iv e  explanations of the main events are offered when appropriate.
The contention is that what a group leaves out of i ts  myths may reveal 
as much about the group's values and ideals as the information that  
i t  Includes. Also underscored are the ways in which the Mvch distorts  
events, s itu a tio n s , and character portrayals to create a p art icu la r  
impression and to enhance a p a r t ic u la r  image of Liberaci6n and i ts  
leaders.
This study is based on eight months of f ie ld  research in Costa
33Rica, which included personal interviews, mail questionnaires, and 
research at the B ib lio teca Nacional (National Library) in Sin Jose.
The Myth o f the Revolution is derived from books and pamphlets by 
Costa Ricans which display an unmistakably partisan bias, and on 
Liberacion propaganda. Statements from interviews, both personal 
and from the questionnaires,are used to support the Information 
gleaned from the printed sources. Party propaganda and party sanc­
tioned treatises  are considered to be primary sources because these 
provide excellent examples of how myths are made. The h is to r ica l  
evaluation 1s based on a number of r e la t iv e ly  recent studies, includ­
ing a r t ic le s ,  books, and d isserta tions , that provide e ith e r  more objec­
t iv e  treatments or a lte rn a t iv e  explanations.
^See Appendix A.
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GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Costa R1ca is a small, mountainous country some 380 kilometers 
long by 270 kilometers at i ts  widest point and 120 kilometers a t the 
narrowest, which l ie s  along a generally northwestern to southeastern 
axis. Nicaragua borders i t  on the north and Panama on the south. A 
series o f mountain ranges s p l i t  the country from the northwestern cor­
ner to the middle of the Panamanian border. Three basic types of t e r ­
ra in  p r e v a i l - - r e la t iv e ly  f l a t  plains in the northwest, and north, and 
in the southeast; rugged mountain with f e r t i l e  valleys through the 
center; and dense jung le , cut with many r ivers  and streams along the 
A tlan tic  side.
Three types o f climate predominate. The central highlands are 
cool, ranging in temperature from 14 degrees centigrade at night to  
22 degrees during the day. The temperatures usually tend to be lower 
during the rainy season which lasts  from about June to mid-November. 
During the rainy season prec ip ita tio n  is usually l im ited  to two or 
three hard showers in the afternoon; in the dry season days are hot 
with v i r tu a l ly  no ra in . The A tlan tic  side of the mountains is hot, 
between 22 and 28 degrees centigrade and very humid with heavy ra in ­
f a l l  most o f  the year. The Pac ific  side is also hot 1n the lowlands,
34but tends to receive less rain and is less humid.
34For more complete geographical information, see Secretarla de 
Integracion T u r is t ic a ,  Manual del guia de tu r is ta s .  Republica de Costa 
Rica (San Jose, Costa Rica: Trejos liermanos,, 1$68); Costa Rica,
M in isterlo  de Obras PubHcas, In s t i tu to  Geografico de Costa Rica, 
Geograffa de Costa Rica (San J o s l, Costa R1ca: n .p . ,  1954); U.S.
Department o f  the Army, Area Handbook fo r  Costa Rica, 1970, pp. 33-84.
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According to the 1973 census, the population o f Costa Rica 
exceeds 1.8 m in io n . Approximately 55 percent l iv e  1n the Meseta 
Central, a long plateau which extends about 70 kilometers from the 
c i ty  o f Cartago due west to a ridge o f mountains that forms i ts  
eastern boundary. The Meseta Is bounded on the north and the south by 
mountain ranges. T ra d it io n a lly  the population has been concentrated 
in the Meseta Central with San Jose in the center and the three next 
largest c i t ie s  no more than twenty kilometers d istant from the capita l 
c i ty .  The t ra d it io n a l demographic pattern appears to be changing with 
Puntarenas, the Pacific  po rt , now the th ird  largest c i ty .  The popula­
tion  of Puerto Lim6n on the A tla n tic  is  gaining 1n re la t io n  to the 
c it ie s  o f the Meseta as w e l l .^ 5
Costa Rica's economy Is based on agricu lture  with bananas now 
the principal export crop, and coffee a close second. Until the early  
1970's coffee had been the leading export commodity fo r over 100 years, 
but the expansion of bananas 1n the southeastern, P ac if ic  coast region 
and the reintroduction of bananas on the A tla n tic  coast have increased 
production to the point that bananas have become the leading export 
product. Since the production and exportation of bananas is  controlled  
by foreign companies, coffee 1s s t i l l  the major Costa Rican-controlled  
industry. In recent years Costa Ricans have tr ie d  to d iv e rs ify  
th e ir  economy by promoting l ig h t  industry and c a t t le  production.
In 1502 Columbus, on his second voyage to the New World, anchored 
in a bay that was subsequently to become the port o f  Llmon. Because
^Costa Rica, 01recci6n General de Estad^stlca y Censos, Censos 
Naclonales de 1973, agropecuarlo . My compilations are based on data 
from pages 3TJ-45.
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he encountered Indians o f the region wearing ornaments o f gold, he 
believed he had a t la s t  found the riches fo r which he had been search­
ing. He named the area Costa R1ca--R1ch Coast. Nearly two and a h a lf  
centuries passed before those who colonized Costa R1ca began to re a liz e  
the potential fo r  riches the rugged but f e r t i l e  land had to o f fe r .
Although the Spanish f i r s t  made contact with Costa Rica on the 
A tla n tic  side, the f i r s t  settlements were located on the Pac ific  
Coast which presented a more hospitable environment and better  harbors.
Moving down from Nicaragua to a point near the present-day 
Pacific  port of Puntarenas, expeditions established two small s e t t le ­
ments in 1561. The early  colonists soon discovered that the highlands 
provided much more comfortable l iv in g  conditions and 1n 1564 Cartago 
a t the east end of the Meseta Central was founded. Costa Rican develop­
ment as a nation has centered in that general region ever since.
As a Spanish colony, Costa Rica came under the ju r is d ic t io n  of 
the Captaincy General o f Guatemala, a subdivision of the Viceroyalty  
of Mexico. L ife  1n colonial Costa Rica was precarious. During the 
next 200 years the Costa Ricans suffered from attacks by pirates and 
Indians. A promising cocoa industry in the A tla n tic  side never 
developed f u l ly  due to the depredations of the Mosquito Indians, 
based in Nicaragua and urged on by the English. L i t t l e  capita l was 
ava ilab le . The gold Columbus had seen had been obtained by the 
Indians of the region through trade. There being no mines, the 
supply of gold ornaments was soon exhausted. Although there were
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social classes 1n colonial Costa R1ca, lack o f capita l and lucra tive  
cash crops meant that everyone shared the labor and the meager standard 
of l iv in g .
Independence came to the Costa Ricans by de fau lt.  A fter Mexico 
had successfully broken with Spaint the Captaincy General of Guatemala 
followed su it  1n September o f 1821. Spain offered no resistance. I t  
was October before news reached Costa Rica that i t  was independent.
Costa Rica remained a part of the United Provinces of Central America 
un til  the formal dissolution of the federation 1n 1848.
Costa Rican history during the 1800's is marked by four high 
points. The f i r s t  was the introduction of coffee around 1810. By 
the 1820‘ s the Ticos realized that coffee could be a tremendous 
agricu ltu ra l resource and began expanding production. When through 
the e ffo rts  of a B r it is h  sea captain, William Le Lacheur, d irec t  
trade with Great B r ita in  was established, coffee became king. Pro­
duction and p ro fits  rose rapidly  and the large coffee producers 
began to dominate the economy and p o l i t ic s .
Costa Rican nationalism received a stimulus in the 1850's, 
when Costa Rica sent I ts  army to f ig h t  William Walker and his f i l i ­
busters in Nicaragua. The war was a re la t iv e ly  minor incident in 
which more casualties resulted from disease than combat, but Costa 
Rica's national hero, Juan Santamaria, performed the heroic deed that 
made him the nation's premier martyr. Costa Ricans take great pride
Sanuel Stone, La dinastfa de Ips conquistadores (San Jose, Costa 
Rica: EDUCA, Centroamerlcano, 19757.“ T to n e  has traced the lineage of
the family of Juan Vlsquez de Coronado, so-called conquistador o f Costa 
Rica. This family and a few others have composed the upper class o f  
Costa Rica since i ts  beginning.
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1n th e ir  part in the f i l ib u s te r  war. This was one of the f i r s t  
genuinely national endeavors.
The th ird  high po int, although many Costa Ricans probably would 
disagree, was the ru le  by the d ic ta to r  Tomas Guardia, 1870-1882. He 
expanded the education system, promoted trade, and started the con­
struction of the nation's f i r s t  railway system. His period of power 
was a time of national economic progress and consolidation.
The fourth high point was the expansion o f suffrage and the 
In s t i tu t io n  o f d ire c t  elections that occurred in 1889, Costa Rica 
did not suddenly become a partic ipato ry  democracy, free of presiden­
t ia l  interference or of e lectora l manipulation. The year 1889 marked 
the beginning of a trend toward free e lections , and thus began a 
period of r e la t iv e ly  peaceful and usually stable government that lasted
un til  the 1940’ s, Interrupted only in 1917 by the seizure of govern-
37ment by Frederico Tinoco who himself was deposed two years la te r .
The period from 1900 to 1940 was r e la t iv e ly  uneventful, except­
ing the Tinoco incident. Probably the most important development was 
the founding of the Communist party by a young lawyer, Manuel Mora 
Valverde in 1929. The Communists began to organize the banana workers 
into unions during the 1930's with only moderate success. The Commu­
nists played a much more important role  in the turbulent years of the 
1940's.
37 For the h istory of Costa Rica up to the 1900's , see Carlos 
Monge A lfa ro , H is toria  de Costa Rica (San Jos6, Costa Rica: Imprenta
Trejos, I960 );  0, Leon FernSndez, H istoria  de Costa Rica durante la  
dominaci6n espaftola, 1502-1821 (Madrid: Tipograffa delfanuel G1n5s
HernSndez, 1889); Joaqufn Bernardo Calvo, The Republic of Costa Rica, 
trans. L. de T. (Chicago; Rand, McNally, 1890).
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The decade o f the 1940's was one of the most d i f f i c u l t  In Costa 
Rica's h is tory . Almost from the time Or. Rafael Calderon Guardla 
took o ff ic e  in 1940, b i t t e r  opposition to his administration divided 
the country. I t  was a period o f v io len t c o n f l ic t  and sweeping socio­
economic reform. Calder6n was succeeded by his close supporter 
Teodoro Picado in 1944. The Calderon era ended 1n 1948 with his over­
throw by force. The p rec ip ita tin g  event was the e lection of O t i l io  
U late , a prominent newspaper publisher. When Calderon refused to 
accept the e lection res u lts , a rev o lt  led by Jose Flgueres Ferrer  
forced Calderon and his supporters into e x i le .  Figueres governed 
a t the head of a junta fo r  eighteen months then turned the govern­
ment over to Ulate in 1949. Those events are the substance of the 
Myth o f the Revolution.
Since U la te 's  term as president from 1949-1953, there have been 
seven e lections. In each Instance the e lections have been 
open, hotly contested, and the results have been accepted by a l l  
parties even though the incumbent party was defeated in a l l  but the 
1974 e lec tio n .
The national government of Costa R1ca is organized into three 
separate branches--executive, le g is la t iv e ,  and ju d ic ia l .  The pres i­
dent Is chosen by d ire c t  e lection fo r a term of four years and may not 
be reelected. Although the executive is strong, the president 1s 
res tr ic te d  by several constitu tional provisions such as very lim ited  
powers to suspend c iv i l  r ig h ts . The le g is la tu re  is  unicameral,
elected by d ire c t  vote on party l is t s  according to a proportional
\
system o f a lloca tion  by province. This term is fo r  four years and
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the deputies must wait a f u l l  term before being e l ig ib le  fo r  re-  
38e lec tio n . The ju d ic ia ry  is independent o f the other two branches.
The Supreme Court appoints and supervises the lower courts. The mem­
bers of the Supreme Court are selected by the Leg is la tive  Assembly, 
but th e ir  e ight-year terms extend over a t  least two four-year le g is ­
la t iv e  terms.
Costa Rica is divided into seven provinces fo r certa in  adminis­
t ra t iv e  purposes such as apportioning the memberships of the Legisla­
t iv e  Assembly. Local government Is vested in the cantons (roughly 
equivalent to county), each o f which is governed to a lim ited  degree 
by a municipal council elected by the residents of each canton. At 
present there are 79 cantons. The autonomy of the municipal council 
is severely lim ited  by a res tric ted  tax base and national government 
control over most services. Municipal elections take place simul­
taneously with those fo r  the Leg is la tive  Assembly and president.
Elections and electoral campaigns are administered and regulated 
by the Supreme Electoral T r ibunal, an independent body whose members 
are appointed by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal 1s also responsible 
fo r  maintaining the f i le s  of voter reg is tra tio n  through supervision 
of the C iv il  R eg is try .3^
3ftA thorough treatment o f the Leg is la tive  Assembly 1s found in 
Christopher E. Baker, "Costa Rican Leg is la tive  Behavior in Perspective" 
(Ph.D. d isserta tion , University of F lo rid a , 1973); the re lationship  
between the executive and the le g is la t iv e  branches is examined in 
Kenneth J. M ije s k l,  "The E xecu tive -leg is la tive  Policy Process in Costa 
Rica" (Ph.D. d isserta tio n , University  o f North Carolina, 1971).
390enton, Patterns of P o l i t ic s , pp. 34-44. Denton provides an 
adequate 1f b r ie f  summary of the Costa Rican government. See also, 
Busey, Notes. Chapters I ,  I I ,  IV , and V.
ORGANIZATION
The organization o f the chapters follows the procedure outlined  
on method above. Chapter Two 1s a discussion of the concept o f p o l i ­
t ic a l  myth and how 1t re la tes  to the study of p o l i t ic a l  cu lture .
Chapter Three contains observations about the p o l i t ic a l  culture of 
Costa Rica that have been made by Costa Ricans and others. In Chapter 
Four the examination of the Myth o f the Revolution begins with a 
description of the dramatic q u a lit ies  of the narrative  using several 
main characters as i l lu s t ra t io n s .  Chapter Five is an analysis of the 
mythic version and a lte rn a t iv e  versions iso la ting  d istortions and 
omissions that conform to id e n t i f ia b le  patterns. Chapter Six is  an 
analysis of how the Myth is reflec ted  in the organization and operation 
of Liberacifin as a p o l i t ic a l  party. Chapter Seven concludes the study 
with observations on the links between the Myth and a ttr ib u te s  of 
Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu lture .
CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL MYTH
P o li t ic a l  s c ie n t is ts ,  l ik e  most people, tend to use myth as 
a pejorative  term or as a synonym fo r  fa l la c y .  Because myth has 
strong emotional overtones 1t is a more powerful word than misconcep­
t io n ,  which Implies that one merely does not have his facts s tra ig h t,  
or i l lu s io n  which means one 1s simply fooling oneself. When ca lling  
someone's Ideas or b e lie fs  a myth, one insinuates that not only are the 
Ideas wrong but that anyone holding such foo lish  b e lie fs  is therefore  
foolish himself. Authors a t times contrast myth with r e a l i ty  in th e ir  
t i t l e s  to indicate that they are correcting widely accepted misconcep­
tions about a part ic u la r  subject. For example see: Theodore Draper,
Castro's Revolution: Myth and R e a l i t ie s ; and Peter R. Nehemkis, Latin
America: Myth and R e a l i ty .*  Neither author defines myth e x p l ic i t ly
(although Draper uses myth in  much the same way as 1t 1s used In 
th is  study), but by using myth th is  way, the authors emphasize the 
Importance of the material they are presenting. "Latin America" Mis­
conceptions and Correct Conceptions" lacks the impact of Latin Amence 
Myth and R e a li ty . Myth as commonly used 1s a potent word, but es a
*New York: Praeger, 1962; New York, and New America L ib rary ,
1966. Lee McDonald makes the same observation using other examples 
In his "Myth, P o lit ic s  and P o li t ic a l  Science," Western P o li t ic a l  
Quarterly 22 (March 1969), p. 141.
28
concept useful in analysis 1t needs a more specific  d e f in it io n .  Since 
myths are emotionally charged, the concept should be purged o f  I t s  
pejorative  connotations.
Consequently p o l i t ic a l  myth to be a useful concept needs to be 
c are fu lly  defined. To tha t end we w il l  (1) define p o l i t ic a l  myth, 
and survey b r ie f ly  some of the attempts to use myth a n a ly t ic a l ly ,
(2) discuss the larger concept of myth, and (3) re la te  the study of 
p o l i t ic a l  myth to p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re . We w i l l  show that by studying 
the p o l i t ic a l  myths of a society we enrich our understanding of that  
society 's p o l i t ic a l  cu lture .
POLITICAL MYTH
Simply defined, myths are the dramatic expressions of the way 
a group perceives and interprets  i ts  existence. Myths exemplify 
group norms and mores and explain the group's a c t iv i t ie s  and a f fa irs  
in terms of i t s  values and b e lie fs .  The p o l i t ic a l  myth concerns the 
p o l i t ic a l  experience of the group; 1t is a group's preferred history. 
Defining p o l i t ic a l  myth In th is way narrows the scope o f investiga­
tion to manageable proportions, i . e . ,  the stories and accounts of
p o l i t ic a l  a f fa irs  Important to a group. We recognize that th is  defin l 
tion may be too lim ited  fo r  some research concerns, but believe that  
the l im its  we have imposed do not v io la te  generally accepted notions 
current In the f ie ld  of mythology.
Although p o l i t ic a l  myth as a useful concept 1s la rge ly  Ignored 
1n contemporary analysis , w rite rs  1n the past have given n*yths a 
prominent position in th e ir  works. Myth or something l ik e  myth 1s
an integral part of the work of the e l i t i s t  theorists  Mosca and Pareto
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Mosca's " p o li t ic a l  formula" and Pareto's "derivations*" contain e le ­
ments o f the myth. Both authors addressed the problem of Unking  
b e l ie f  systems to societal behavior, and concluded that man, in addi­
tion  to the sa tis fac tio n  of material needs, demands tha t he be 
governed on the basis o f  moral as well as material p r inc ip les . More
often than not expression of a society 's  guiding principles are more
2e ffe c t iv e  when couched In emotional language. Neither Mosca nor 
Pareto was p a r t ic u la r ly  interested In the myth per se, but they were 
concerned with how b e l ie f  systems l ik e  myth are used fo r  social con­
tro l .
3
Sore l, in his Reflections on Violence* considers the concept 
of myth useful 1n explaining the motivation of revolutionaries.
Sorel was interested in the motivation of individuals who performed 
acts requiring enormous s a c r if ic e  and great personal courage which 
could not be explained on s t r i c t l y  pragmatic grounds. For example, 
how does one ju s t i f y ,  in terms of simple s e l f - in te re s t ,  that a 
wealthy individual r isk  his l i f e  and dedicate his possessions to a 
cause contrary to his former way of l i fe ?  More to the po in t, how Is 
s e lf - in te re s t  s a t is f ie d  when the individual can have no reasonable 
expectation of enjoying the f r u i t s  o f a successful revolution?
Sorel concluded that the proponents of v io len t change were driven 
by the motive force o f a great myth. The myth 1s cast 1n an
Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class* trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1939J, pp. /0 -? l ;  V llfred o  Pareto, Sociological
W ritings, selected by W.E. F iner, trans. Derick M lr f ln  (Totowa,New 
Jersey: Rowmon and L i t t l e f i e l d ,  1966), pp. 244-245.
3
Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T.E. Hulme and 
J. Roth (New York: C o ll ie r  Books,~T961).
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apocalyptic mold, with present struggles depicted as a prelude to the
4
f in a l  great b a tt le  In which a l l  con flic ts  would be resolved. The
mythic vision serves several purposes. By casting the present b a tt le
1n apocalyptic terms, the players are c le a r ly  id e n t i f ie d .  One can
ins tan tly  and d e f in i t iv e ly  t e l l  the good from the bad, the righteous
from the wicked. Contradictions and Ir re g u la r i t ie s  are immediately
5
resolved, allowing action unhindered by re f le c t io n .  Victory is as­
sured, perhaps not 1n one's l i fe t im e  but assuredly at a given (often  
stated) time in the fu ture . One cannot f a l l  because one’ s actions 
contribute to the f in a l  victory.** Sorel's  view of myth Is not sub­
s ta n t ia l ly  d i f fe re n t  from the d e f in it io n  used in this study, with the 
exception that he is concerned only with myths that express eschatolog- 
ical concerns. E ffective  myths are those " . . .  which enclose with  
them, a l l  the strongest inc linations which recur to the mind with the 
insistence of ins tincts  in a l l  the circumstances of l i f e ;  and which
7
give an aspect of complete r e a l i t y  to the hopes o f  immediate action. . ." 
To Sorel, the myth offered a raison d ’e tre ,  not a model fo r  action.
As such, his concept o f the myth is too narrow fo r  general app lication.  
Nevertheless, Sorel did I l lu s t r a te  the u t i l i t y  of looking to the myths 
of a group fo r  Indications as to the motive force o f I ts  endeavors.
Dela is l re lates the notion of myth as a raison d 'e tre  fo r  v io len t  
a c t iv i ty  to the Idea tha t myths are the primary source o f authority  fo r
4 Ib 1 d ., pp. 41-42.
5 Ib1d ., pp. 49-50, 123.
6 Ib 1 d ., pp. 41-42.
7Ib id . , p. 125.
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society as a whole. The myth, fa r  from being obsolete in modern
society, 1s s t i l l  v i ta l  1n the Increasing complexity o f contemporary
H f e .  "Take a peasant, an a r t is a n , an Ignorant member o f society,"
Delalsl suggests:
P eriod ica lly  the group Is going to encroach upon his time (presta­
t ions , statute labor, m il i ta ry  service, e tc . )  or upon his income 
( ta x a t io n ) .  I t  w i l l  be constantly imposing upon him a number o f  
res tra in ts  such as police regulations, municipal decrees, e tc . He 
w il l  be compelled to obey a number of people whom he does not 
know--such as policemen, judges and tax co llec to rs—by v irtu e  of 
regulations o f which he is generally unaware. Were he to be part ly  
or t o t a l ly  deprived by these strangers of his belongings or of his 
l ib e r ty  ( f in e  or Imprisonment), the law would expect him to submit 
without resistance. How are these sacrif ices  to be vo lu n tarily  
obtained from h1m?8
The key word is 1n the la s t  l in e ,  "v o lu n ta r i ly ."  Force is an option
availab le  to society, but the negative effects  may be greater than the
benefits to be gained by coercion. W illing  obedience by the members
1s fa r  more e ff icac io u s , and the generation o f w il l in g  obedience, then,
1s the primary function of the myth.
Delalsi makes no c lear demarcation between mythical narrative  
and other forms of expression. In essence, myth becomes a "represen­
ta tion  o f  r e a l i t y , "  the "conventional Idea" held by the masses about
g
the "actual facts o f human society ."  Delalsi appears to re fe r  to 
the p o l i t ic a l  culture of a society, at least as myth may re la te  to 
mass man. Myths provide simple explanations o f complex phenomena, and 
l in k  the Individual to the group by providing shared conceptions of 
society and one*s place 1n I t . 1®
o
Francis D e la ls i , P o l I t lc a l  Myths and Economic R ea lit ie s  (New 
York: Kennlkat Press, 1927), p. 12.
9Ib 1 d . , p. 4.
l 0 Ib 1 d ., pp. 3-4.
The major portion o f 0e1a1s1's work 1s devoted to an analysis  
of the great p o l i t ic a l  ryths in operation at the time of his w riting  
in the 1920's. Two points that he makes are of special In te res t  
to the conceptual development o f p o l i t ic a l  myth. Myths are an In te ­
gral part o f a l l  societies (a functional requ is ite  1f you w i l l ) ,  and 
myths are e s s en tia lly  conservative. The second point needs greater 
c la r i f ic a t io n .
Among the various types o f p o l i t ic a l  myths one finds revolu­
tionary myths and other myths pertaining to change. A group may be 
to ta l ly  dedicated to change and i ts  myths w i l l  r e f le c t  that determina 
t1on. As fa r  as the outside world 1s concerned, the myths may be 
quite rad ic a l,  emphasizing the absolute c e rta in ty  that change 1s 
Imminent. Change 1n any of the myths themselves, cannot be admitted, 
fo r  that would ca ll Into question the legitimacy o f the e n tire  mythic 
s tru c tu re .11 When such a group gains ascendancy 1n a society, I ts  
myths are l ik e ly  to become ". . . a  mere formula, a cliche and can no
longer be modified without losing something of I ts  e ff ic a c y  as an
12instrument of s p ir itu a l dominion."
One of the more ambitious attempts to incorporate n̂ yth in to  a
13theoretical scheme 1s found In Maclver's The Web o f  Government.
The I1nch-p1n o f Maclver's theory of government 1s what he c a lls  the 
central myth, a ". . . scheme o f values [ th a t ]  determines the social 
order," i . e . ,  "the myth o f au tho rity ."  This myth sanctifies  the
U Ib 1 d . , pp. 36-41, 66-69.
l 2 Ib1d ., p. 66.
^R.M . Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: MacMillan Co.
1947).
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In s t itu tio n s  o f authority  and the individuals who hold positions
141n tha t structure. Maclver defines myth as "the value-Impregnated
15b e lie fs  and notions th a t men hold, that they Hve by or l iv e  fo r ."
He considers almost a l l  types of b e lie fs  and patterns of b e l ie f  mythic, 
d if fe re n t ia t in g  l i t t l e  among them. This makes his concept d i f f i c u l t  
to operationa lize . Maclver's "myth" 1s closer to the contemporary 
concept of p o l i t ic a l  culture than to current ideas about myth.
A recent and in trigu ing Investigation o f myths and p o lit ic s  is 
P o lit ic a l  Myth and Epic in which Cuthbertson proposes a theory of 
myth as one "mechanism of p o l i t ic a l  dynamics."1® His principal con­
cern is the re la t io n  o f epic l i te r a tu re  to p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y .  He 
l is ts  three main characteristics : "Myth is an a r t ic u la t io n  of symbols
or a communication; i t  contains an essential tru th  value; and i t  1s 
co-organic."17 By co-organ1c, he means that myths are simultaneously 
a product of societal experience and a determining facto r 1n the shape 
the society takes. A myth can neither be understood apart from i ts
18society nor can a society be understood without reference to I ts  myths. 
Cuthbertson‘ s study demonstrates the u t i l i t y  of epic l i te r a tu re  as 
a source of Information on the p o l i t ic a l  cohesions and drives which 
enable a society to function. For instance, Cuthbertson I l lu s t ra te s  
with many examples how certa in  recurring themes 1n a society 's myths
14Ib 1d ., pp. 42-43. "Part One" Is devoted to a discussion of  
myth and society , pp. 3-58.
l 5 Ib 1d ., p. 4.
^ G i lb e r t  M. Cuthbertson, P o l i t ic a l  Myth and Epic (Michigan: 
Michigan State University  Press, 1975), p. xx.
l7 Ib1d ., p. 4.
l 8 Ib 1 d ., pp. 12-48, 221-224.
re f le c t  cu ltu ra l tendencies, such as Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon 
fa ta l is m .19
Although societies are bound together to some degree by th e ir  
myths, not everyone w i l l  believe every myth. In some cases a number 
of co n flic t in g  in terpre ta tions  may be subsumed under a central 
theme. For example, while the North and the South in the United 
States share the same general myths about the orig in  and development 
of the nation, on the question of the C iv il  War, the regional myths 
vary considerably. The d ifference is ty p if ie d  by the southern per­
sistence in c a ll in g  the c o n f l ic t  the "War Between the States" and the 
"War o f Secession" rather than the "C ivil War," which would ca ll into  
question the Southern rationa le  for the war. Groups may espouse a
series o f myths about th e ir  own experience which are a t  complete
20variance from those o f the society a t large . That co n flic t in g
myths occur within the same group of society does not make them any
less v i ta l  an aspect of p o l i t ic a l  dynamics. Sorting out the complexi
t ie s  of the various myths is the task of the student, not the myth 
21adherent.
One f in a l  note on p o l i t ic a l  myth should be added. At the opera 
tlonal level as well as a t the conceptual le v e l ,  p o l i t ic a l  myths may 
be confused with Ideology. Both terms Involve explanation, world
l 9 Ib 1 d ., p. 208.
20For an In teresting  co llec tion  o f a r t ic le s  on various myths In 
United States h is to ry , see Nicholas Cords and Patrick Gerster, comps. 
H^th^and the American Experience, 2 vols. (New York: Glencoe Press,
Z1Henry Tudor, P o l i t ic a l  Myth (New York: Praeger, 1972),
pp. 138-140.
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views, plans fo r  action, and guidelines fo r behavior. Both terms
carry pejorative  overtones, Implying dogmatism in th e ir  adherents.
Defining them has generated considerable disagreement among scholars.
In the abstract, myth and ideology may resemble one another c losely ,
but as p o l i t ic a l  phenomena, they are not the same. When studying
ideologies that ac tua lly  e x is t ,  we usually find  ourselves concerned
with Marxism, socialism, fascism, e tc .—more or less consistent
bodies of thought, often linked to the work of specific  people. An
ideology makes i ts  claim to v a l id i ty  as an Ir re fu ta b le  argument based
on sound logical explications. Ideologies are usually couched 1n dry,
matter of fac t language. Myths, on the other hand, are s to r ies ; the
language is dramatic, sensate, emotional. Myths may be mistaken for
Ideology because they draw on such a wide range of sources and are
based on a varie ty  of b e l ie fs ,  including Ideologies. Myths may be
employed In attempts to gain adherents to a p a r t ic u la r  Ideology,
to transform Ideology Into action as a ca ll to arms, or to ju s t i fy
certa in actions according to some ideological p r in c ip le . Ideology
22seeks to convince by argument; myths simply require b e l ie f .
Regardless of source, myths can be Id e n t i f ie d  by two character­
is t ic s — dramatic narrative  form and unquestioning acceptance. These 
two characteristics  w i l l  be discussed more fu l ly  below.
22For discussions of the d i f f ic u l t ie s  in defining Ideology, see 
Douglas C. Bennett, "Defining Ideology: The Danger o f Methodological
Deformation," in Terms of C o nflic t:  Ideology 1n Latin American P o l i t ic s ,
eds. Morris J. Blachman and Ronald 6. Heilman "(“Philadelphia: In s t i tu te
fo r  the Study o f Human Issues, 1977), pp. 249-263; George Lichthelm, "The 
Concept o f Ideology," History and Theory 4 (1965), pp. 164-195; David W. 
Minor, "Ideology and P o l i t ic a l  Behavior," Midwest Journal o f P o l i t ic a l  
Science 5 (November 1961), pp. 317-331; and W illard A, MulTTns, "On the 
Concept of Ideology 1n P o li t ic a l  Science," American P o li t ic a l  Science 
Review 66 (June 1972), pp. 498-510.
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MYTH
Before link ing  p o l i t ic a l  myth to p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , the broader 
concept of myth needs further exp lica tio n . The d e f in it io n  o f  p o l i t ic a l  
myth used In th is  study derives from a survey o f the l i te r a tu r e  on 
myths and mythology. In th is  section, we w i l l  examine the s a lien t  
characteristics  of myths. In p a r t ic u la r ,  we w i l l  look closely at form, 
the most read ily  Id e n t i f ia b le  aspect of myths; b e l ie f  which 1s the 
essence o f the l iv in g  myth; and the content, o r ig in s , and functions o f  
myths.
Form distinguishes mythic statements from other types of value­
laden societal communications. Mythic s ty le  is dramatic, sensate, 
bigger than l i f e .  "Myth is always a story, a narra tive  o f  events 1n
dramatic form. I t  has a protagonist, and 1t has a p lo t with a begin-
23ning, middle and an end." According to Murray:
. . . myth belongs In the domain of a r t  1n the broadest sense, 
that 1s, belongs with what a r t  1s to ch ild ren , to p r im it ives ,  
to the m ultitude, to professional c r i t i c s ,  or to the a r t i s t ,  
whether or not 1t serves the alms of re l ig io n ,  morals, p o l i t ic s ,  
or commerce. I ts  concrete, "sensible" (graphic, f ig u ra t iv e ,  
v isua lIzab le ) representations distinguish 1t from the general, 
conceptually-abstract, Imageless, and emot1onally-un1nvolv1ng 
dic tion  of science and philosophy, as well as o f  much ordinary 
thought and speech.24
Events are depicted 1n v iv id ,  s t ir r in g  language; characters are por­
trayed 1n herlo lc  dimensions. This applies equally to enemies. Just 
as the protagonists in a myth r is e  above ordinary people 1n v ir tu e ,  
In te ll igen ce  and a b i l i t y ,  so the foes descend below petty  misdemeanor
^3Tudor, P o l i t ic a l  Myth, p. 137.
24
Henry A. Murray, "The Possible Nature o f a 'Mythology* to 
Come," 1n Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Henry A. Murray (New York: George
Brazi 11 e r , 1960TT"p. 321.
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to downright e v i l .  I t  1s as 1f the worse the opponent 1s, the greater  
the v ic to ry  fo r  the group* The dramatic q u a lit ie s  of the myth as nar­
ra t iv e  require a cast o f larger than H f e  f ig u re s , or a t  least ordinary 
characters who transcend th e ir  mundaneness to perform heroic acts.
25Guevara's Guerri11a Warfare 1s an example o f mythic w rit in g .
He purports to have constructed a primer on the conduct of peasant 
g u e rr i l la  warfare based on his experiences in the Cuban Revolution. 
Guevara's In te rp re ta tio n  of the Cuban Revolution has been challenged 
on many points and can be considered an exercise 1n mythmaking i t s e l f ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  when myth Is defined as preferred h is tory . The key to 
his theory of g u e rr i l la  warfare 1s a mythical creature patterned 
a f te r  an Idealized conception of the Cuban revolutionary. The 
individual he describes is a person of heroic s e l f -s a c r i f ic e ,  in t e l ­
ligence, and cooperativeness. Guevara's revolutionary men are almost 
superhuman; they are of mythic stature . Guevara also apparently had 
an Idealized view of peasants, fo r  th is  was the group from which the 
new revolutionary men were to be recru ited . Had the peasants of 
Bolivia accepted Guevara's conception of the peasant, his myth might 
have come a liv e  and provided the driving force fo r revolution in
B o liv ia . Unfortunately the Bolivian peasants rejected both Guevara and
26his v is ion , so his attempt to put his theories In to  practice fa i le d .
25Che Guevara, G u e rr i l la  Warfare, trans. J.P. Morray (New York: 
Vintage House, 1969).
26Richard Gott, Rural G uerrillas  In Latin America (London:
Penguin Books, 1973), "Part F ive ,"  pp. 467-561.
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A fte r  his death, "Che" himself was mythicized by l e f t i s t  students
and revolutionary groups who considered him the embodiment of his
27own revolutionary man.
Although dramatic narrative  Is the basic form by which myths
are expressed--myths are essentia lly  s tories— transmission of the
Ideas, values, even the s to ry - l in e  of myths often employ other
mechanisms such as symbols, a r t ,  music, and r i tu a ls .  The narrative
provides a framework fo r  understanding each specific  expression in 
28another medium. Dramatic language or form is one of the few 
aspects of myths about which one finds considerable agreement 1n the 
1ite ra tu re .
Dramatic form, while the most easily  d iscernib le  a t t r ib u te ,
1s not the sole determinant of a myth. What distinguishes a myth from
other dramatic exposition is tha t myths are held to be true . This Is
another point on which mythologlsts agree. To be a myth, a t  least
to be a l iv in g  myth, the narrative  must be accepted as a true account.
When a myth Is no longer believed, i t  loses I ts  e f f ic a c y . I t  ceases
to be a v i ta l  l iv in g  myth and loses the a b i l i t y  to d ire c t  actions,
i . e . ,  . . the power to Invoke b e l ie f ,  kindle the heart and orien t
29endeavors." To the non-believer, a myth may contain Incredib le
?7
Jean Larteguy, The G u e rr i l la s , trans. Stanley Hochman (New 
York: Signet Books, New American L ib rary , 1970), see Chapter One,
"Che Guevara or the Myth," pp. 13-60.
^®Laur1 Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," Studies on R e lig ion , 
no. 2 , Finnish Society fo r  the Study o f  Comparative Rel1g lon ." ffe ls in ln , 
Finland, 1972.
29Murray, "Mythology to Come," p. 306. Murray c a lls  myths that  
have been forsaken " In ert"  myths.
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Ideas and arguments apparently devoid of log ic . Myths are clung to
1n the face o f seemingly overwhelming evidence to the contrary. I f
the be liever accepts the basic assumptions o f his nyth, no amount of
b r i l l i a n t  argumentation w i l l  sway him from his commitment.
The myth, therefore , held above rational review, appeals
d ire c t ly  to the emotions, although modern myths may incorporate
s c ie n t i f ic  evidence and reasoned debate. No d is t in c t io n  1s made by
the believer between the myth as an in te rp re ta tio n  or perception
and some Independent re a l1 ty -- th e  myth is r e a l i t y ,  accepted as a
30given. Objective evaluation by a be liever is excluded. Intense, 
unquestioning acceptance, then, 1s the essence o f myth.
Since b e l ie f  Is a req u is ite  o f  myth, the substance of a myth 
must a t  some point touch on the lives  o f those who believe 1n i t ;  
that 1s, specific  myths are always linked to specific  groups. From 
the perspective of the group, the believers of a myth, there are several 
re ferents . Myths are neither mere f l ig h ts  o f fancy nor simply Imagina­
t iv e  contrivances. Myths re la te  to the experiences of a group. The 
content of a p a r t ic u la r  myth or set of myths may center on an Individual
or a p a r t ic u la r  event, but the phenomenon being explained always relates  
31to a group. For example the stories about cowboys would lose th e ir
30Dav1d Bldney, "Myth, Symbolism and Truth," In Myth: A Symposium,
ed. Thomas A. Sebuek (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1955),
p. 12, Frank Kermode makes a s im ilar  argument but from a l i t e r a r y  per­
spective; see, e .g . his essay on "Fictions" In The Sense o f  an End1no: 
Studies 1n the Theory of F iction  (New York: Oxford University  Press,
I5B7JV"pp7 39^40.
31Tudor, P o l i t ic a l  Myth, p. 139. See a lso , Ernst Cassirer, The 
Myth o f  the State (New Haven: Yale University  Press, 1946), p. 47.
Most rnythologlsts leave th is  feature o f iryths implied or present 1t as 
a given, e .g . ,  Karen McCarthy Brown, Myth and Mythmakers (Kbenhavn, 
Kbenhavns Un1vers1tets Fond t i l  T11vejebrlngelse a f  Lremldler, 1969).
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meaning 1f taken out o f the context o f United States h is tory . Although
the "Western" 1s popular abroad, the cowboy remains a pecu lia rly
American phenomenon, who continues to f u l f i l l  some deep-seated need
321n the American psyche. The same applies to p o l i t ic a l  "strongmen" 
such as H i t le r  or Peter the Great, Myths arose about these Ind iv iduals ,  
both within and outside th e ir  soc ie ties , because th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  were 
relevant to those who believed the stories In which these strongmen 
play a central ro le . This is not to say that imagination plays no 
part in mythmaking; c le a r ly  i t  does. But myths are not created about 
inconsequential matters or questions that are o f no importance to 
the believers . For example, Guevara did not imagine the Cuban Revolu­
tion nor the people who fought, but he based his theory of g u e rr i l la
warfare on an idealized (mythical) in te rp re ta tio n  of his experiences
33in Cuba. Imagination only embellishes myths; i t  does not create 
the basic theme. The te l l in g  o f  a myth may (and probably does) employ 
t r i v ia l  d e ta i ls ,  but the central theme always revolves around important 
questions, such as o r ig in s , environmental change, and s u rv iva l, issues 
a t the heart o f  the group's existence and functioning. One clue to 
the c e n tra l i ty  of myth to group consciousness is the in te n s ity  with 
which the group embraces the mythic version o f an event.
32David Brlon Davis, "Ten-Gallon Hero," In Myth and the American 
Experience, vol. 2 , eds. Cords and Gerster, pp. 84-97.
33Whether or not an Individual can properly be said to create and 
adhere to an individual myth 1s beyond the scope of th is  study. Since 
we are concerned here with the p o l i t i c a l ,  which Implies numbers, the 
omission seems J u s t i f ie d ,  Harry Lewis comments on th is  question In his 
"Some Meanings o f Myth," 1n Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Murray, pp. 111-112.
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Turning now to the content o f myths, several questions require
consideration i f  not resolution. F i r s t ,  when we study myth a t what
level of abstraction should we d ire c t  our attention? In th is  study
we have defined myth as narrative  w ith in which are embedded a t t i tu d e s ,
values, and b e lie fs  by which specific  phenomena are explained. Others
define myth more broadly. Cassirer, fo r  Instance, considers myth a
unique mode of thought, one of four d is t in c t  ways In which man finds
34order 1n a natu ra lly  chaotic world. Cassirer provides some stim ulat­
ing insights into the nature of mythic perception, but his d e fin it io n  
of myth Is too general to be of use in examining specific  myths,
Lasswell and Kaplan define myth as a pattern o f symbols that shape
35the basic perspectives of the members o f a society. Since the authors
define symbol as ” . . . whatever has meaning or significance in any
sense," th e ir  d e f in it io n  of myth lacks the s p e c if ic ity  that we would
36prefer to give the term.
34The other three modes are science, language, and a r t .  Whether 
or not one accepts Cassirer's p a rt ic u la r  categories, the Idea of sepa­
rate  modes o f  thought helps to explain some o f the varia tion  1n human 
^ehavlor, I . e . ,  why a t d i f fe re n t  times the same Individuals appear to 
act lo g ic a lly  and at other times 11 lo g ic a l ly .  I t  may be that the modes 
o f perception vary 1n domination and subordination. See Ernst Cassirer, 
Language and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Harper S Brothers,
1946), pp. 1-17, 23-41; and Casserlr, Myth of the S ta te , pp. 3-49. For 
an excellen t discussion of Cassirer's  contribution to mythology, see 
Brown, Mythmakers, pp. 52-60, 81-83.
35This Is an extension o f the authors' d e f in it io n  o f p o l i t ic a l  
myth. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A
Framework fo r P o li t ic a l  Inquiry (London: Routledqe & Kegan Paul,
1952}, pp. l l t ^ n T .
36I b i d . , p. 10.
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Lasswell and Kaplan do ra ise  an Important question, however. 
Given that myths express Ideas, values, and a t t i tu d e s , should myth 
then be defined as the idea or the expression of the Idea? For 
example, 1s the Idea of rac ia l superiority  myth or does myth mean 
only the stories which I l lu s t r a t e  the princ ip le  that one race Is 
superior to another? Myth can be used 1n e ith e r  way depending upon
the object of analysis. Henry H a tfie ld  treats myth as a un ified  set
37of "motifs, b e l ie fs ,  [and] archetypes," 1n his analysis of Nazism.
38Other analyses of specific  myths concentrate on mythic narratives.
The content o f myths has several important features. One of 
these 1s e ff ic a c y . Since a myth explains something the group wants 
to understand, 1t must be In language and 1n concepts the group can 
comprehend. Commenting on th is  point, Bldney says, "Mythical sym­
bolism leads to an o b je c t if ic a t io n  of fe e lin g s , myth o b je c t if ie s  and
organizes human hopes and fears and metamorphoslzes them into per-
39s1stent and durable works." Mythmaking Involves the recasting of  
Information, whether experientia l or Idea tion a l, Into terms under­
standable and useful to the average person. In p a r t ,  e ff icacy  de­
pends upon congruence of the myth with the common experiences of 
the group, and In part 1t stems from the u t i l i t y  of the myth 1n 
ju s t i fy in g  the group's existence or various a c t iv i t ie s  the group
^7Henry H a tf ie ld ,  "The Myth o f Nazism," In Myth and Mythmaking, 
ed. Murray, pp. 199-220.
38 For example, see P ierre Maranda, e d . ,  Mythology: Selected 
Readings (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972).
^B ldney , "Myths, Symbolism and Truth ,"  p. 8.
44
40wants to perform. The In tens ity  with which a myth is  held varies  
d ire c t ly  with the degree to which actions o f a group c o n f l ic t  with th e ir  
values.
To be practica l the myth must s im p lify . Those particu lars  that
do not f i t  in to  the mythic theme or tha t contradict the prevailing
In terp re ta tio n  are discarded. Information tha t cannot be ignored is
somehow worked into the account in such a way tha t the mythic theme
is undisturbed. Consider the myths of Negro in f e r io r i t y .  Blacks
were suited by nature fo r  slavery because they were ju s t  one step up
the evolutionary ladder from apes. White supremacists, p a r t ic u la r ly
those professing fundamentalist C h r is t ia n ity ,  c ited  the story of Ham,
son of Noah, as b ib l ic a l  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  discrimination against 
41blacks. Despite there being no mention of skin color In the pas­
sage from Genesis, the mention of slavery apparently was s u ff ic ie n t  
to reconcile slavery and la te r  Jim Crow with Christian princ ip les .
The mere fac t that myth Involves s im p lif ic a t io n  means that  
reconc ilia tion  of co n flic t in g  Impressions w i l l  necessitate d is to r ­
t io n . That d is to rtio n  is endemic to myths does not mean that myths
are therefore l ie s .  The operationalization  of the most s c ie n t i f ic
42theory requires some d is to r t io n . In myths, d is to rt io n  ranges from 
omission o f Incongru ities , through twisting In te rp re ta tio n , to outright
40Tudor, P o l i t ic a l  Myth, pp. 127-132.
41 Genesis 9:18-27. See a lso , Joel Kovel, White Racism: A 
Psychohistory (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. u3-65.
42 I t  can be argued that a l l  thought Involves d is to r t io n . See 
Cassirer, Language and Myth, pp. 6 -7 .
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l i e s .  Myths may also be almost completely natura l. The degree to 
which a part ic u la r  inyth d is to rts  1s an empirical question.
The p a r t ic u la r  aspect o f myths that makes them useful In 
cu ltura l analysis 1s that th e ir  content 1s patterned. Myths are not 
collections o f random Imaginings. The exposition o f a myth may con­
ta in  material apparently extraneous but " . . .  i t  must Include i ts  
'essential fe a tu re s , '  that is ,  1t must set fo rth  concrete, sensible 
exemplifications o f I ts  complete thema (thematic pa tte rn )."  The 
thematic patterns r e f le c t  the " . . .  emotions, wants, and actions,
which are present in v i r tu a l ly  a l l  men and women of a l l  societies and 
43times . . . ." The l im its  of acceptab ility  are set by the values, 
mores, and norms of the group. Using Nazi myths as an example, a 
fundamental pr inc ip le  of Nazism was v iru le n t  anti-Semitism. This 
feature of Nazism drove out or destroyed many of the best s c ie n t i f ic  
minds of Germany, despite the desperate need the Germans had fo r  those 
minds fo r  l l l t a r y  development. In the long run, Nazi anti-Sem itic  
programs were counter-productive, but they conformed to a basic group 
value.
In modern myths one way o f  iden tify ing  the conformity of myths to 
cu ltura l l im its  1s by examining the h is to r ic a l accuracy of the n*yth1c 
n a rra tive . The observer does not have to determine some to ta l ly  
objective r e a l i t y  to Id e n tify  the varia tion  of a mythic commentary 
from the records. The patterns detected provide clues to the values, 
and the p r io r i ty  of values and other elements of the culture being 
studied.
* ^Murray, "Mythology to Come," pp. 324, 329.
Another consideration about myths 1s th e ir  o r ig in .  Who creates 
them? Probably no other Issue divides students o f mythology more than 
how and why myths came about. Explanations range from the psychologi­
cal to the philosophical, and have generated considerable disagreement
44To date, no single theory dominates the f ie ld  of mythology.
Unraveling the development o f a myth 1s complicated because 
usually no single source can be Id e n t i f ie d .  Myths ju s t  seem to grow. 
In one sense, a l l  the believers o f a myth are mythmakers, fo r  th e ir  
fa i th  and the Individual rep e tit io n  of the mythic narrative  give the 
myth v i t a l i t y ,  and they contribute to i ts  existence. Mythmakers 
1n n o n - l i te ra te  societies were usually p r ies ts , leaders, and story­
t e l l e r s ,  but embellishments could be added by the ordinary believer  
who experienced, or imagined, a new perspective or theme. Modern 
mythmakers may include a group's leaders, o f f ic ia l  h is to r ians , public 
re lations people, and propagandists. At times, the leaders of a 
group may t r y  to achieve certa in  ends by purposefully manipulating 
mythic symbols, and by reinforcing mythic predispositions through 
deliberate  d is to r t io n . In other instances, the transformation of 
information Into myth 1s the product of group consciousness working 
new data In to  old molds. I t  has been suggested that myths may be 
the products of "creative imaginations" belonging to those Individuals  
often the "alienated and withdrawn," who somehow fe e l the c r i t ic a l  
situations confronting mankind a t  large or th e ir  own group a t a deeper
44 For a thorough and excellent discussion o f the various schools 
of mythology, see Brown, Mythmakers. See also, Richard V. Chose,
Quest fo r  Myth (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969); Cassirer, Myth o f
t h e T t a t e ; Levin, "Some Meanings o f Myth," pp. 103-114; and Tudor, 
P o lit ic a l  Myth.
level than most, and who a r t ic u la te  these feelings In ways meaningful 
45to the group. At the present state of mythology, no one has derived 
a completely acceptable answer to the question of o r ig in . We can 
accept as given that myths do e x is t ,  can be Id e n t i f ie d ,  and i f  exa­
mined care fu lly  w i l l  t e l l  us much about the societies to which they 
appertain.
A note on the historian as a mythmaker should be added. As 
Tudor has pointed out, " . . .  much that passes fo r  history is properly 
speaking myth or 1s shot through with mythical ways of thought.
Myth Is not h istory ( in  the academic sense), although mythical narra­
tives usually share the same subject matter as h is to r ica l accounts.
The basis fo r  acceptance of an h is to r ica l account is the h is torian 's  
adherence to acceptable research methods. The h istorian  presents 
what he considers the most cogent, logical description o f ,  and conclu­
sions about events that ava ilab le  evidence w i l l  support. No claim to 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y  1s made. The mythmaker may use the same evidence, but 
only that which w i l l  substantiate his version of the events and his 
conclusions. The Inclusion (or exclusion) of evidence depends upon 
the degree to which the information coincides with what is believed 
ought to have happened and to i ts  consistency with the drama, in  to to .
But historians sometimes f a i l  to fo llow  the dictates of h is to r i ­
cal study. No one has a l l  the facts about every event, and presupposi­
tions may color In terpretations of the evidence ava ilab le . Also, new 
Information on old topics Is frequently discovered. Conscientious
45Murray, "Mythology to Come," p. 345.
*®Tudor, P o l i t ic a l  Myth, p. 123.
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h is to r ic a l (or p o l i t ic a l  or socio logical) analysis tha t 1s la te r
proved wrong 1s not mythmaking. Mythmaking Involves the purposeful
d is to rtio n  of evidence fo r specific  ends, . . t o  advocate a certa in
course of action or to ju s t i f y  acceptance o f an ex isting  state of 
47a f fa i r s ."  The h is torian  1s especially  susceptible to the la t te r  
goal. Evidence which co n flic ts  with the prevailing ethos can be d is ­
missed as inconclusive, Ir re le v a n t  or aberrant. In modern society 
the h istorian  provides much of the substance of the prevailing myth­
ology. The h istorian should not be held accountable fo r the uses to 
which his endeavors are put. When he in te n tio n a lly  contributes to 
the perpetration of myth as h is to ry , he may properly be considered 
a mythmaker, not an h is to r ian .
The f in a l  aspect o f myths to be considered here Is the function  
of myths in society. Myths a f fe c t  societies (or groups) 1n a number 
of ways. Malinowski believes that myths are "a v i ta l  Ingredient" 
of society. Myth " . . .  expresses, enhances, and codifies  b e l ie f ,
i t  safeguards and enforces m orality  . . . and contains practical
48rules fo r  the guidance of man." Murray l is ts  f iv e  classes of mythic
function or e ffe c ts .  These are cynosural (em otional), convlctlonal
( In t e l le c t u a l ) ,  evolutional (propagatlonal} ,  conational (educlble and
49d e te rre n t) ,  and In te g ra t io n a l .
Most w riters  on mythic function present the e ffec ts  of myth as 
benign. Most agree that myths f a c i l i t a t e  coordinated action and that
47Ib 1 d ., p. 124.
48Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic. Science and Religion, and Other 
Essays, comp. Robert Redfleld (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1948), p7 79.
A Q
Murray, "Mythology to Come," pp. 334-339.
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they promote In tegration . In Brown's words, " . . .  myth 1s the thread
th a t helps weave the fabric  of society closer and more f irm ly  around 
50the people." I t  must be added tha t the e ffec ts  of myths are not
always po s itive . While contributing to s o l id a r i ty ,  myths may seduce
51the group to acts that have serious consequences. For example, myths
of racia l and cu ltura l sup erio rity , 1n p a rt , led the Germans to attempt
m il i ta ry  adventures beyond th e ir  c a p a b il it ie s  1n World War I I .  I f  we
confine our attention to Intragroup dynamics, myths appear to be
generally b en e fic ia l.
A quotation from Merriam's P o li t ic a l  Power serves as a suntnary
fo r  this discussion o f myth. Although he does not use the term myth
s p e c if ic a l ly ,  his words capture the essence of myth as an essential
part of a soc ie ty ’ s cu lture .
The w ell-n igh magical Influence o f  stories upon children and 
adults as well opens an Important avenue to the celebration of 
power, e ith er  d ire c t ly  o r ,  perhaps more e f fe c t iv e ly ,  1n In d irec t  
fashion. They l is te n  even when they do not f u l ly  understand.
For 1n th is  mood of re la t iv e  approachabll1t y , . . . thrown o f f  
guard by the s c ie n t i f ic  mask o f  the h is to r ia n , the subject may 
be read ily  Indoctrinated with whatever the s ituation  demands. .
. . For 1f the story 1s r e a l ly  good, what matter whether 1t be 
r e a l ly  true . I f  I t  does not embody the l i t e r a l  t ru th ,  1t may 
express the ambitions of the group and I t s  c lear picture of 
i t s e l f  In I ts  best moments.52
Now having discussed the distinguishing characteristics  of
myth, i t  remains to consider the place of p o l i t ic a l  myth In the
wider concept of p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re .
50Brown, Mythmakers, p. 34.
51Sidney 1n p a rt ic u la r  advances th is  thesis 1n his essay, "Myths, 
Symbolism and Truth."
52Charles E. Merrlam, P o l i t ic a l  Power: I ts  Composition and
Incidence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934), p. 1057
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POLITICAL MYTHS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 
Myths present Idealized representations o f a group's s e l f -  
image, I t s  creation , and I t s  h is tory . From the standpoint of p o l i ­
t ic a l  research, then, the p o l i t ic a l  myth would appear to be subsumed 
most appropriately under the rubric of p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , the " . . .
ordered subjective realm of p o lit ic s  which gives meaning to the p o l i ty ,
53d isc ip line  to in s t i tu t io n s ,  and social relevance to individual acts ."
The concept of p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , as an approach to the compara­
t iv e  study o f p o l i t ic a l  soc ie ties , links the behavior of individuals  
to the operation o f in s t itu tio n s  and groups. Broadly defined, p o l i t ic a l  
culture refers to ". . . the system of empirical b e l ie fs ,  expressive
symbols, and values which defines the s ituation  in which p o l i t ic a l
54action takes place." For comparative purposes, p o l i t ic a l  culture  
assumes that a t t i tu d e s , b e l ie fs ,  fe e lin g s , and orientations held by 
members of a society form id e n t i f ia b le ,  reasonably coherent patterns 
which they share. Pye and Verba believe that such patterns, once 
id e n tif ie d  and elaborated, can provide important clues to the v a r ia ­
tions and p a ra lle ls  among the diverse and numerous p o l i t ic a l  societies  
55of the world. As expressed by Verba, p o l i t ic a l  culture refers " . . .
not to what 1s happening 1n the world of p o l i t ic s ,  but what people be-
5611eve about those happenings."
^Lucian Pye, "Introduction: P o l i t ic a l  Culture and P o l i t ic a l  De­
velopment," 1n P o li t ic a l  Culture and P o l i t ic a l  Development, eds. Lucian 
Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1965), p. 7.
^Sidney Verba, "Comparative P o litic a l Culture," 1n P o litic a l 
Culture and P o litic a l Development, eds. Pye and Verba, p. 513.
55Pye, " Introduction," pp. 4-10.
®®Verba, "Comparative," p. 516.
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The ubiquity o f myths and the varia t ion  o f mythic narrative
and symbols give r is e  to a number of In teresting  questions. Do
myths perform the same functions 1n a l l  societies? Can variations 1n 
myth explain variations 1n behavior? What do the p o l i t ic a l  myths 
of a p a r t ic u la r  p o lity  t e l l  us about that soc ie ty ’ s p o l i t ic a l  culture?  
What Insights In to  specific  p o l i t ic a l  behavior do specific  p o l i t ic a l  
myths give? Are some societies more susceptible to the influence of
myths than others? The problem a t th is  stage in the study of p o l i t i ­
cal myth is not the generation o f questions, but the selection of 
which questions to pursue f i r s t .
P o l i t ic a l  myth f i t s  the d e f in it io n  of a "priv ileged operational
zone of c u ltu re ,” I . e . ,  a process of communication 1n a society that
Is read lly  id e n t i f ia b le  by a dis in terested observer. This emphasizes
57the communicative aspect of cu ltura l e n t i t le s  such as myths. Myths, 
a f te r  a l l ,  are a basic mechanism for communicating values, opinions, 
orientations and often simply Information. P o l i t ic a l  myth as defined 
In th is  study, then, contributes to the understanding of p o l i t ic a l  
cu lture . The question 1s, what Information can be gleaned from the 
study of p o l i t ic a l  myths? Verba suggests that p o l i t ic a l  crises play 
a v i ta l  ro le 1n the formation and shaping of a p o l i t ic a l  cu lture .
Crises provide the stimulus fo r  myths to grow.
Two broad approaches to the study of p o l i t ic a l  myth suggest 
themselves. One can continue what seems to be the most convnon l in e  
of Inquiry followed by mythologlsts 1n other f ie ld s :  that 1s developing
57James A. Boon, "Further Operations o f  ‘Culture ' In Anthropology: 
A Synthesis o f and fo r  Debate," Social Science Quarterly 53 (September 
1972), pp. 227-232.
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general theories of myth, I ts  o r ig in s , and functions 1n society.
The other approach 1s to apply conceptual and theoretical work already 
accomplished to specific  cases. The object o f the la t t e r  approach is 
to expand the substantive base o f mythological research and to derive  
new Insights Into p art ic u la r  societies . The second approach is the 
option chosen in th is  study.
P o li t ic a l  myths linked as they are to p o l i t ic a l  experience, 
cover a wide range o f  a c t iv i t y .  Conceivably, any or a l l  o f the p o l i ­
t ic a l  history of a group can be mythicized. As 1n h is to ry , not every 
occurrence is of equal value to the observer. And l ik e  r e a l i t y ,  not 
every event 1s slgnfleant enough to warrant being transformed into  
myth. For some purposes i t  may be useful to aggregate experiential 
minutla, but the study o f myths would seem to command a tten tion  to 
the great events, the c rises , and the dominant issues 1n the p o l i t i ­
cal l i f e  of a group, fo r  these are the phenomena most l ik e ly  to be 
mythicized.®®
The myths of a society may be divided into the variations con­
comitant to I ts  p o l i t ic a l  subdivisions. There 1s no necessary pro­
h ib it io n  to any p o l i t ic a l  subdivision possessing myths, but some types 
of p o l i t ic a l  groupings may be more prone to mythicize th e ir  experience 
then others. In modern p o l i t ic s ,  the p o l i t ic a l  party since 1t s e l f ­
consciously aims at garnering and maintaining support, 1s l ik e ly  to be 
a primary mythmaking body. Also parties  and myths a l ik e  are often the 
product of p o l i t ic a l  crises .
®®Cass1rer, Myth o f  the S ta te , pp. 285-286.
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That p o l i t ic a l  parties develop as a response to p o l i t ic a l  crises
Is discussed by LaPalombara and Weiner 1n th e ir  P o l i t ic a l  Parties and
59P o l i t ic a l  Development. They add that the h istory o f  a l l  societies  
1s marked by events that stra in  existing procedures and arrangements 
fo r  coping with systemic challenges. Such challenges include, 11. . . 
wars, In f la t io n ,  depressions, mass population movements, a demographic 
explosion; or less dramatic changes 1n the educational system, occu­
pational patterns, agricu ltu ra l or industria l development,"®^ Some­
times a society w i l l  weather these crises with i ts  in s t itu t io n s  
v ir tu a l ly  In ta c t .  At other times, new in s titu tio n s  or other behavioral 
patterns are developed to cope with the problem. An in s t i tu t io n  that  
has developed in response to certa in  crises is the p o l i t ic a l  party.
LaPalombara and Weiner have id e n t if ie d  three types of crises  
that are conducive to the creation of parties: legitim acy, in tegra­
t io n ,  and p a rt ic ip a tio n . B r ie f ly ,  a c r is is  of legitimacy occurs when 
the structure of authority  1n a society breaks down and new sources of 
authority  are established. I t  1s suggested that p o l i t ic a l  parties  
are among these new sources. On the other hand, closely t ie d  to a 
c r is is  o f legitimacy is the c r is is  o f p a rt ic ip a tio n . The demand for  
p o l i t ic a l  part ic ipation  by new groups (or formerly excluded groups) 
frequently 1s the cata lyst fo r  change. Parties are one mechanism 
fo r  channeling demands into e f fe c t iv e  action. And while a c r is is
59Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Develop­
ment o f P o l i t ic a l  P artie s ,"  in Pol1t1cal Parties and P o l i t ic a l  Develop­
ment, eds. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron WelnerTPrlnceton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 14-19.
60lb id . , p. 14.
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of In tegration may orig inate  1n t e r r i t o r ia l  or ethnic cleavages, 
p o l i t ic a l  parties  may f a c i l i t a t e  the union o f t e r r i t o r ia l  and ethnic 
div is ions.
Once formed, p o l i t ic a l  parties have sometimes continued to operate 
long a f te r  the resolution o f  the c r is is  that prompted th e ir  formation. 
Such is the case of the Partido Liberacion Nacional 1n Costa Rica. 
Memories of crises in the minds o f those who took part 1n the party  
formation, or who were affected by the crucial events, often persist  
and continue to a f fe c t  the subsequent development and operation of the 
p a r t y . T h e  memories of which LaPalombara and Weiner speak are often  
the substance of party myths.
Just as the p o l i t ic a l  mythology o f a society is a dramatic 
representation of i ts  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , so the myths of a p o l i t ic a l  
party illum inate  essential a t t i tu d e s ,  values, and b e lie fs  o f the 
party as a cu ltura l subgroup. A party 's  myths may explain the c i r ­
cumstances o f the party's  o r ig in ,  momentous events In the party 's  
evolution, i t s  successes and fa i lu re s .  In the case o f a party formed 
for specific  objectives, such as gaining national Independence, the 
party myths w i l l  help to ra t io n a liz e  the continuing existence of an 
organization whose i n i t i a l  reasons fo r  being have been s a t is f ie d .
One o f  the most Important functions of the party mythology 1s to 
act as a mechanism fo r  group In tegration . The myth resolves c o n flic ts  
between the party 's  specific  goals and actions, and those goals and 
actions sanctioned by the societal cu ltu re . The party myths help to 
reconcile actions o f the party member with values and a tt itu d es  that
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may have been Inculcated In him as a member of the larger society, 
but which may appear to c o n f l ic t  with the a ttitudes  and values o f his 
subgroup. For example, re v o lt ,  which presupposes re jec tion  of certa in  
p o l i t ic a l  values, may be ju s t i f ie d  on the grounds of higher values also 
held by the society. The Myth of the Revolution in Costa R1ca 1s a 
case 1n point.
The identify ing  characteristics  o f  a party 's  myths are essen­
t i a l l y  those of any myth--dramatic presentation, acceptance based on 
fa i th  not reason, s im p lis tic  explanations o f complex Issues, and re fe r ­
ence to the experience of a p a rt ic u la r  group. The myths w i l l  explain 
events, actions, and situations o f importance to the party. In the 
following chapters we w i l l  look a t an example of the myths of a p a r t i ­
cular subgroup— the Myth of the Revolution of 1948, the founding myth 
of the Partido L1beraci6n Nacional of Costa Rica.
CHAPTER THREE
ASPECTS OF COSTA RICAN 
POLITICAL CULTURE
The p o l i t ic a l  culture of Costa R1ca is a m ulti- leve led  mosaic 
of b e l ie fs ,  a t t i tu d e s , opinions, and thoughts. As y e t ,  no one has 
completed a comprehensive study of Costa Rican cu ltu re , although 
certa in  aspects such as a ttitudes  among selected groups have been 
examined.* Gradually, as more cu ltu ra l pieces are id e n tif ie d  and 
described, a c learer picture of the Costa Rican mosaic w i l l  emerge.
One o f the components o f culture 1s the myth. As a form of  
expression, myths r e f le c t  the culture to which they belong. Myths 
w il l  vary according to societal divisions in the same way that  
other cultural expressions w i l l  vary. Each group within a society  
w il l  have i ts  own myths about i ts  experiences and i ts  place in the 
society. These myths do not develop Independently o f the general 
cu lture . The cu lture  a t large w i l l  normally a f fe c t  the shaping of 
the group's myths, which 1n turn w i l l  echo dominant societal themes 
and ideas. This is c e rta in ly  true In the case of Liberaci6n.
*Mar1o Carvajal Herrera, "P o lit ic a l  Attitudes and P o li t ic a l  Change 
1n Costa Rica," (Ph.D. d is serta t io n , University of Kansas, 1972); John 
Norman Rilsmandel, "Costa Rica: Self-Image, Land Tenure and Agrarian
Reform, 1940-1965," (Ph.D. d isse rta t io n , University  of Maryland, 1972); 
Dorothy McBride Stetson, " E l i te  P o li t ic a l  Culture 1n Costa R1ca," (Ph.D. 
disserta tio n , Vanderbilt, 1968); V ic tor Goldklnd, MSoc1o-cultural Con­




In th is  chapter, we examine some of the ideas Costa Ricans and 
others have expressed about Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re . The 
f i r s t  part 1s a general discussion of some Costa Rican t r a i t s  as 
they a f fe c t  the p o l i t ic a l  process. The second part examines three 
specific  Costa Rican concepts that have notably influenced Liberacion 
myths. These are la  1 evenda blanca, the concept o f l a  generaclon, 
and the concept o f  la  m fstica . The chapter concludes with suggestions 
about Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  values.
COSTA RICAN CULTURE
D eta iled , empirical research on Costa Rican culture Is lacking, 
but there are Costa Rican scholars who have t r ie d  to understand and
define what i t  means to be Costa Rican. The ch ie f form o f  cu ltu ra l
2
Introspection has been the essay. Two such essays seem p a r t ic u la r ly  
applicable to a discussion of Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , although 
each work treats  broader concerns than the p o l i t ic a l .
Probably the f i r s t  attempt to analyze Costa Rican culture  from 
a sociological perspective was accomplished by Eugenio Rodriguez Vega.
We know of no study that e f fe c t iv e ly  supersedes his Apuntes para una 
soclologfa costarrlcense (Notes fo r  a Costa Rican Sociology) e ith e r  1n 
scope or perspicacity . He described a number of signal sociological 
and psychological t r a i t s  of his people and t r ie d  to trace th e ir  o rig in s .
2
Luis Ferrero Acosta, "Prologo," in Ensaylstas Costarrlcenses comp. 
Luis Ferrero Acosta (San Jose, Costa Rica: L1brer1a Lehmann, 1972),
pp. 77-83.
^Eugenio Rodriguez Vega, Apuntes para una soclologla costarrlcense  
(San Jos£, Costa Rica: E d ito ria l Un1vers1tar1a, 1953).
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The cardinal national t r a i t ,  according to Rodrfguez, 1s an 
extreme individualism . Underlying many o f the more prominent charac­
te r is t ic s  o f the T1co 1s his tendency to avoid social contact, and to 
depend upon himself (and his fam ily) fo r  s o c ia l,  economic, and psy­
chological sustenance. This tendency 1s heightened by a d is trust  
of others. Costa Rican individualism has been manifested 1n four d is ­
t in c t ,  though Interconnected ways: psychologically, in t im id ity ;
a r t i s t i c a l l y ,  in the absence of a true popular a r t ;  p o l i t i c a l ly ,  1n 
personalism and the absence o f  permanent p o l i t ic a l  parties ; and s o c ia l ly ,
4
1n a reaction against unions and cooperatives. The l a t t e r  two charac­
te r is t ic s  are most pertinent here.
Nominally, Costa Rica has been a democracy, with regular and 
generally respected elections since a t  least the l a t t e r  decades of  
the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the government has been 
dominated by a succession of strongmen, caud illos . These men may 
have been duly e lected, but they achieved th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  success 
through the force of personality and w i l l .  Some may have espoused 
various philosophical Ideals or Ideological p rinc ip les; but th e ir  
p o l i t ic a l  power was based on personal appeal. Without th e ir  presence 
whatever organized following attached to them dissolved. These were 
not, with a very few exceptions, d ic ta tors  in the absolute sense. 
Generally speaking, th e ir  ru le  was benevolent, and 1n some cases 
quite  enlightened. For the most p a r t ,  they Intervened minimally 1n 
the average c i t iz e n 's  a f fa i r s .  C1v1l l ib e r t ie s ,  and other p o l i t ic a l
4Ib1d., p. 24.
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rights were respected. Parties based on Ideas (except fo r  the miniscule 
Communist Party) were nonexistent. Government was p a te rn a lis t ic  and 
unobtrusive. Whatever benefits accrued to the populace depended 
upon the a b i l i t i e s  and goodwill o f the leader-presldent
Rodrfguez based his comnents on how the system appeared to 
him in 1952. Even then he intimated that personalism might be chang­
ing to a more Ideo log ica lly  or o rgan izationally  oriented system.
When he wrote Apuntes, the National Liberation party had ju s t  been 
formed, and he alluded to certa in  unspecified attempts to modernize 
Costa Rican p o li t ic s  going on at tha t time. Liberacion comes the 
closest to being a modern In s tu t io n a lize d , ideological party o f any 
1n Costa Rica, Personalism 1s very evident 1n Liberacion, a point that  
w il l  be developed further in the next chapter. A ll of the other p a rt ie s ,  
despite th e ir  disclaimers, are t ied  to persona lit ies . Even the old 
Communist Party, now divided Into two sp lin te r  groups, is dominated 
by personality . The change th a t Rodriguez antic ipated has occurred, 
but only to a lim ited  degree. Costa Ricans s t i l l  tend to prefer to 
give allegiance to an Individual rather than to an Idea or an organ­
iza tio n .
Individualism has been a major obstacle to the growth of a 
labor movement. In the 1940's, a t  the Ins tiga tion  o f communists and 
s o c ia l is ts ,  and a c tiv e ly  supported by the Calder6n Guardi a administra­
t io n , a surge o f labor organization and a c t iv i ty  took place. Between 
1942 and 1951, some 372 unions were established. Also during those 
eight years 168 unions were dissolved. Of the 138 unions ex is ten t 1n
5 Ib1d ., pp. 42-47.
1951, only 72 were f u l ly  operative and discharging th e ir  prescribed 
functions. S im ilar figures were given fo r cooperatives.^ A study of  
Costa Rican labor, conducted a decade la te r  found the unions to be 1n 
even worse s t r a i ts .  The author a ttr ibu ted  much of the d i f f ic u l t y  to 
the "conservative and moderate character of the Costa Rican people."^ 
Suspicious of unionism 1n p r in c ip le ,  the Costa Rican public has been 
unwilling to support the growth o f a strong labor movement; social 
reticence Inherent in Costa Rican workers hinders the formation of  
the unions themselves.
Writing in the la te  1960‘ s, Luis Barahona Jimenez made s im ila r
Q
observations. Barahona id e n t if ie d  three principal q u a lit ie s  of the 
Costa Rican character: conformism, tolerance, and individualism , the
origins o f  which he also traced to the colonial experience. By con­
formism, Barahona meant a quasi-fa ta lism , a tendency to accept matters 
as they ex isted , and a general lack of i n i t i a t i v e .  In p o l i t ic a l  a f fa i r s
th is  manifested i t s e l f  1n a "se lf-m arg ina lization  w ithin the democratic 
g
process." In times of c r is is ,  the Costa Rican w i l l  r a l ly  around capable 
and forcefu l leaders, but usually he tends to be apathetic regarding 
community and national in te res ts .
6 Ib1d ., pp. 49-52.
7
Joseph J, McGovern, "The Costa Rican Labor Movement: A Study
1n P o l i t ic a l  Unionism," Public and International A ffa irs  4 (Spring 1966), 
pp. 295-315.
®Lu1s Barahona Jimenez, "Tres notas sobre el c a r ic te r  costarrlcense, 
1n Ensayistas Costarricenses comp. Ferrero, pp. 295-315.
9 Ib 1 d ., p. 298.
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Tolerance 1n the Costa Rican 1s closely akin to the apathy 
mentioned above. That Is ,  the T1co 1s suspicious of and avoids 
extremism, preferring to take a middle course 1n soc ia l,  economic, 
and p o l i t ic a l  a f fa i r s .  Even the h o s t i l i t y  f e l t  toward extremists  
does not, " . . .  culminate In a destructive fu ro r , 1n cold calculated  
vengeance or in p o l i t ic a l  crim e."10 I t  may be simply apathy or 1t 
may indicate a p o l i t ic a l ly  mature people who have fa i th  in th e ir  
In s t itu t io n s  and believe that a f re e ,  democratic society 1s the best 
system for achieving soc ia l, economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  and cu ltura l goals. 
Id eo lo g ic a lly , th is  1s translated Into a commitment to democratic 
l ibe ra lism , based on the b e l ie f  1n the natural equality  o f man, pro­
tected by law .11 The Costa Rican constitu tion  established the basic 
freedoms and rights attendant to the princ ip le  of equ a lity .
F in a l ly ,  Barahona discusses the excessive Individualism of the 
Costa Ricans. An ostensible commitment to democratic forms and pro­
cedures obscures the tendency to relinquish the decision-making poten­
t i a l  of such procedures to p o l i t ic a l  " . . .  figurones (pretentious
nobodies), In f la te d  with the power conferred upon them by triumphs
12a t the p o lls ,  and who are generally devoid of personal values."
Barahona too a ttr ibu ted  the in a b i l i t y  of the Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l
system to sustain nonpersonalistic p o l i t ic a l  parties to the excessive
13Individualism of the average Costa Rican.
l0 Ib 1 d ., p. 303.
U Ib1d ., pp. 301-304.
l 2 Ib1d ., p. 309.
l 3 Ib1d ., pp. 304-310.
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THREE COSTA RICAN POLITICAL CONCEPTS
La Levenda Blanca
Theodore Creedman coined the phrase l_a leyenda blanca re ferr ing  
to a comon)y held (by T1cos and many North Americans) perception of 
Costa Rica as an oasis of democracy 1n a region of violence and d ic ta ­
torship. Costa Rica, according to the legend (myth?), o ffers  the best 
of a l l  possible clim ates, in which the people l iv e  comfortably, 1f 
simply, enjoying a near perfect democracy with complete freedom of 
expression. Costa Rica's h is to ry , the legend continues, has never 
suffered from the abuses of la tifun d ias  and bloody m il i ta ry  d ic ta to r ­
ships. Since independence, the nation has stead ily  progressed toward 
the economic and social betterment of a l l  I ts  people. Education has 
always been honored and promoted more than m il i ta ry  a f fa i r s .  Although 
Costa Rica, of course, s t i l l  enjoys these special ben e fits , the 
"golden age" of democracy occurred from the 1900's to the 1940's 
under the remarkable guidance of two men, Ricardo Jimenez Oreamuno 
(Don Ricardo) and Cleto Gonzalez vlquez (Don C le to ). Under these two 
men the democratic government that had been developing during the 
nineteenth century f in a l ly  bloomed. Costa Ricans believe themselves
uniquely blessed in Central America, and a cut above most of South
14America as well
Costa Rica's unique position according to the legend resulted  
from three main elements: rac ia l homogeneity, the yeoman c i t iz e n ,
14Theodore S. Creedman, "The P o li t ic a l  Development of Costa-Rica, 
1936-1944," (Ph.D. d is serta tio n , University of Maryland, 1971), pp. 1-4. 
For a c r it iq u e  of the so-called "golden age" by a Costa Rican, see Mario 
Sancho, Costa R ica, Suiza Centroamericana (San Jose, Costa R1ca:
Talleres Tlpfigraflcos "La tr ib u n a ,"  1935).
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and the lack o f  a m il i ta ry  t ra d it io n .  Of these only the la s t  Item 
1s not exaggerated. Supposedly the great m ajority of Costa Ricans are 
d irec t descendants o f Spanish colonists , with periodic Infusions o f  
new blood, mostly from Europe. Costa Ricans point with pride to the 
abundance o f  blond ha ir and blue eyes seen 1n th e ir  population.
Costa Rica never had a large Indian population that could be exploited  
by la t i fu n d ls ta s . The legend holds that homogeneity spared the Costa 
Ricans from rac ia l cleavages and c o n f l ic ts .  Although economic d iv i ­
sions became more d is t in c t  and divergent, p a r t ic u la r ly  a f te r  mid­
nineteenth century, social and economic d is tinc tion s  were free  of
15rac ia l or ethnic enmities.
Costa Rica’ s alleged rac ia l homogeneity may be more mythical 
than re a l .  To date, there is no comprehensive study of the racia l 
or ethnic composition of Costa Rica. Samuel Stone, In his study on 
the genealogy of the upper c lass, offers  an in teresting  piece of 
Information on the early  rac ia l makeup of Costa R1ca, as a whole. 
Evidently during the la t t e r  part o f  the eighteenth century, the 
proportion of Indians and Spaniards decreased ra d ic a lly  In re la tio n  
to the number of mestizos (Spanish and Indian m ixture). By 1801, there 
were 1,942 Spanish, only 8,281 Indians, and 30,413 m estizos.16 Costa 
Rica experienced no massive in f lu x  of Europeans in the nineteenth 
century as did Argentina. From where did a l l  those people o f pure 
European descent that make up Costa Rica's populace come? I t  may be
16Leon Pacheco, "Evolucion del pensamlento democrStlco de Costa 
R1ca," Combate 15 (marzo y a b r l l  1961), pp. 35, 43.
16Samual Stone, La. d inastia  de los conquistadores (San Jos£,
Costa Rica: EDUCA, Centroamerlcana, 1975), p. 55.
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that Costa Rica 1s r e la t iv e ly  homogeneous 1n I ts  rac ia l composition, 
but I t  Is most probably a homogeneity o f mestizos, not Europeans.
Just how fa r  the idea of Costa Rica's rac ia l purity  1s carried unchal­
lenged can be seen 1n the following quote from a te x t  on Latin American 
history: "The people l iv in g  on I ts  high central plateau and around 
and In I ts  two small c i t ie s  o f  San Jose and Cartago, are almost a l l  
of pure European stock, descendants of farmers who came from Spain 
in colonial t im e s ." *7 The only group that can make that claim with 
any assurance is the upper class.
The yeoman farmer, t i l l i n g  his own plo t of land, f ie rc e ly  
Independent, and devoted to democracy, the backbone o f Costa Rican 
s ta b i l i t y  and t ra n q u i l i ty ,  is  also a misconception. At one time, 
class differences were minimal. The aristocracy lived much the same 
as the small landowner. The introduction of coffee as a p ro fitab le  
cash crop changed those arrangements. Individual land ownership 1s 
and has been widespread, but most of the farms have been small and 
barely economically v iab le , much less p ro f i ta b le .  As the market for  
Costa Rican coffee grew 1n the 1800's, the cafetaleros (the large  
producers) began contro lling  more and more land. The land they did 
not own they e f fe c t iv e ly  dominated by contro lling  the processing and 
exportation of coffee. Many o f those small owners who retained th e ir  
land became dependent on the cafetaleros to buy and export th e ir  crops. 
Often they had to work the plantations to supplement th e ir  meager
* 7Helen M i l le r  Bailey and Abraham P. N asatlr , Latin  America:
The Development o f I ts  C iv i l Iz a t lo n  3rd ed. (Englewood C l i f f s ,  New 
Jersey: P rentice^Hall, In c . ,  1973), p. 641.
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18earnings. In his study on "The Peasant and Agrarian Capitalism In
Costa R1ca," Seligson paints an even grlmner p ic ture . He finds
that 1n 1967, of those a c tiv e ly  working 1n a g r ic u ltu re , only 22 percent
owned th e ir  own land. He quotes another study based on a 1960 census
as saying, "Costa Rica has a higher percent o f landless rural dwellers
than any other country [ in  Central America] and nearly twice the mean
19percent of a l l  f iv e  countries." Seligson concludes that the small
20landholder is becoming anachronistic and eventually w i l l  disappear. 
Whether one accepts Seligson's prediction or not, he does challenge, 
with convincing evidence, the assumption that the yeoman c it ize n ry  
is a bulwark of Costa Rican p o l i t ic s .  His data on land tenure, to ­
gether with Stone's f ind ings, impugn the theory that the small indepen­
dent landholder ever played a very in f lu e n t ia l  p o l i t ic a l  ro le .
The assertion that Costa Rica lacks a tra d it io n  of m ilita r ism  
has greater v a l id i ty ,  fo r  Costa R1ca never had a large or w e ll-  
equlpped army. Here too, one must be careful 1n assuming more than the 
facts support. Costa Rica abolished her m il i ta ry  forces in 1949, but
1t can be argued that the C iv i l  Guard and the police units that replaced
21the army are be tte r  trained and better  equipped than the army ever was. 
Panama too has no army, but Panama is dominated by I t s  National Guard.
The p o s s ib il i ty  exists tha t the Costa Rican C iv i l  Guard may become too 
e f f ic ie n t  and e ffe c t iv e  a lso.
*8Stone, La d ln a s tfa , pp. 93, 103-104.
19M itchell A. Seligson, "The Peasant and Agrarian Capitalism 1n 
Costa R1ca," (Ph.D. d is serta tio n . University  of Pittsburgh, 1974), p .37.
20Ib 1 d .,  pp. 243-246.
21Jon D. Cozean, "The Abolition of the Costa Rican Army," (M.A. 
thes is , University o f Missouri, 1966), pp. 95-106.
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A n ti-m il ita r ls m  may be a Costa Rican cu ltura l t r a i t .  Unlike  
th e ir  neighbors, so the legend goes, the T1cos have suffered l i t t l e  
p o l i t ic a l  violence. Normally th e ir  e lections have been peaceful and 
v io len t opposition to the government has been Infrequent. Compared 
to the other Central American countries, Costa R1ca has experienced
less violence. But Costa Rica has not been completely harmonious.
22Governments 1n Costa Rica have been overthrown by force, and p o l i t l -
23cal dissent has, on occasion, been v io le n tly  suppressed. Perhaps
the greatest d ifference between Costa Rica and the res t of Central
America is that violence has not been considered quite acceptable as
a mechanism of change In Costa Rica.
An indication of the In ten s ity  with which lji leyenda blanca 1s
held by some can be seen in the response to a m ild ly  c r i t ic a l  l e t t e r ,
which was published 1n a Latin American p e r io d ica l, w ritten  by two
North Americans who had done research in Costa R1ca. The le t te rs  from
Costa Ricans were v i t r i o l i c ,  ignoring the point of the orig ina l c r it ic is m
24and attacking the authors as touris ts  and " l i t t l e  gringos."
James L. Busey, "The Presidents of Costa R1ca," The Americas 18 
(July 1961), pp. 55-70. Busey l is ts  a l l  o f the major v io le n t d is tu r ­
bances attendant to presidentia l succession. The number is higher than 
most Latin Americanists would expect. See page 60.
^C arlos  Luis F a llas , Mamfta Yunai (San Jose, Costa Rica: Edito­
r ia l  Soley y Valverde, 1941), THis 1s an autobiographical novel of 
F a llas ' experiences as a p o l i t ic a l  organizer In the banana regions con­
tro l le d  by United F ru it  Company (Mamita Yunai) in the 1930‘ s. Fallas  
paints a fascinating p icture of p o l i t ic a l  suppression through In tim ida­
tion by a foreign corporation aided by the government.
^R afae l Aguero B .,  "Cartas," Vision (Mexico), 8 de mayo de 1970, 
p. 6; Mariano Qu1r6s Gonzalez and Benfto flojas Sancho e t a l . ,  "Cartas," 
V is ion , 22 de mayo de 1970, p. 7. The le t t e r  from los grlnguitos (Steve 
Garland and Robert H. Trudeau) 1s 1n the Issue of lG de a b r i l  de 1970, 
p. 8.
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Regardless o f the h is to r ica l accuracy of _la ley end a blanca,
Costa Ricans believe 1n th e ir  rac ia l homogeneity, th e ir  yeoman farmer,
and th e ir  ant1-m1l1tarlsm. The problem l ie s  1n how many believe 1n
the legend. Presumably those who espouse 1 t ,  such as Pacheco (see
footnote 15 above) accept the picture that the legend presents.
Probably those enjoying the benefits o f  modern urban l i f e  share the 
25same v is ion . How deeply imbedded the legend 1s in the campesino 
mind, or in a ttitudes  of the laborers on the banana plantations is 
another m atter. The banana workers at least have shown a willingness  
to organize on th e ir  own behalf. In the 1930's and 1940's, they sup­
plied the rank and f i l e  of the Communist Party, as well as the backbone 
of the unions. The campesino and small landowner are reputed to be 
adamant anti-communists, which may Indicate a strong acceptance of 
the 1eyenda. What the mass o f Costa Ricans believe and feel about
26th e ir  history and p o l i t ic a l  system awaits deta iled  survey research.
25One of the few a t t i tu d in a l  studies on Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  
culture ava ilab le  deals with orientations o f  upper income high school 
students. The author found strong positive  support fo r  the p o l i t ic a l  
system and fo r  Costa Rican pollticans as a group. Responses to 
specific  questions on p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts ,  such as freedom of speech, 
revealed a strong commitment to democratic p r inc ip les . S im ilar  
studies conducted In the public schools would measure a ttitudes  of 
lower and middle class students. See Daniel Goldrlch, Sons of the 
Establishment (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), pp. 103-126.
26One author concludes that the campesino has become convinced 
by l ib e ra l  propaganda th a t ,  ". . .w e  have a model democratic regime, 
cemented onto bases of ju s t ic e ,  with w e ll-d is tr ib u te d  property . . . 
e tc ."  This contrasts dramatically with the l i f e  of the Costa Rican 
peasant tha t the author depicts. See Luis Barahona, "V1sl6n Interna  
del campesino costarrlcense," Reyfsta Conservadora del Pensamlento 
Centroamerlcano 86 (novlembre 1967), p. 5.
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La Generacion
La generacion has a special meaning In Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  
thought. Hugo Navarro Bolandl defines la  generation as a group of 
In te l le c tu a ls  who conjoin th e ir  mental capacities fo r  the purpose 
o f analyzing the country, each from the standpoint of his own special­
ty or profession. From th is  group emanates a common Ideology, a 
program of action and proselytiz ing . Their goal 1s to gain p o l i t ic a l
power, then to Implement th e ir  po lic ies  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  and soclo- 
27economic change.
Rodr-fguez l is ts  f iv e  "ex is ten tia l constants" that define the 
true generacion: (1) the philosophical constant, a common way of
confronting philosophical problems and a s im ila r ity  1n the direction  
the answers to those problems take; (2) the sociological constant, a 
shared in terpre ta tion  of national existence and how they should In te ­
grate themselves Into 1 t;  (3) the h is to r ic a l constant, a common h is to r i ­
cal id e n tity ;  (4 ) the psychological constant, a sense of psychological 
d if fe re n t ia t io n  from other, foreign generational ambits; and (5) the
I1terary-I1ngu1st1c constant, s im i la r i t ie s  in the formal use of language
28as an instrument of expression.
This 1s an Ideal type; In r e a l i t y ,  specific  groups w i l l  only 
approximate the c r i t e r ia .  There is a sense of continuity  1n the 
true generation. Chronologically and e x is te n t ia l ly ,  the generation 
passes through three stages; a formative stage (age 15-30), a creative
27
Hugo Navarro Bolandl, La generacion del 48 (Mexico, D.F.: 
E d ito r ia l "OLIMPO," 1957), p. 31.
2®Rodr1guez, Apuntes, pp. 80-81. The author bases his concept­
ua liza tion  on S. Serrano Poncela, "Las generaclones y sus constantes 
ex is tenc la les ,"  Realidad (Buenos Aires) 6 ( ju lio -a g o s to , 1949), pp. 1-28.
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stage (3 0 -4 5 ),  and a consol 1dative and protective stage (45-60).
Before age 15 and over age 60, a generation as such does not e x is t.
Id e a l ly ,  a generation 1s 1n c o n f l ic t  with two other generations, the
29one I t  1s replacing and the one replacing 1 t.
Costa R1ca claims only two generadones as defined here--el 
[18] 89 and el  ̂ [19] 48. With nearly s ix ty  years intervening, the idea 
of continuity hardly applies. There was no generaci6n of the 1910's 
or 1920's or 193Q's. The question of what makes a true generation is 
Important here because Liberacionistas self-consciously id e n tify  the 
founding fathers of the party as lj* generacion del 48 . Consequently 
the h is to r ica l embodiment of the concept deserves closer a tten tion .
According to t ra d it io n ,  the golden age of Costa Rican democracy 
(about 1906-1940) was the product of a group of remarkable young men, 
"El Olimpo," or La Generacion de 1889. Canas describes the OHmpians 
as:
a pleiad o f  b r i l l i a n t  young men, hardly beyond 30 years of age.
. . . above a l l ,  in te l le c tu a ls  who have a c lear conception, a 
l ib e ra l  conception of things. . . . They have t ra v e lle d , studied, 
seen the world and are well read. And they believe that tranquil 
Costa Rica Is a good te rra in  fo r  the planting of the seed of 
authentic democracy.30
Liberal (a n t i-c le r ic s  and promoters o f the extension of education)
and p o s it iv is t  (advocating s c ie n t i f ic  analysis o f national problems),
the Generation o f 89 entered the p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  of Costa Rica with
enthusiasm. Their f i r s t  and most profound accomplishment was to
In s t i tu te  d irec t popular e lections. They also were responsible fo r
29Serrano, "Las generadones," pp. 12-13.
Alberto F. Caftas, Los ocho anos (San Jose, Costa Rica: 
E d ito r ia l Llberaclon NacionaT, 1955), p. 10.
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the expulsion of the Jesuits , the development of partisan journalism  
(p o l i t ic a l  debate v ia long columns in the d a lly  newspapers), and the 
expansion of education to the lower classes. The two foremost members 
of the Generation, Cleto Gonzalez vfquez (Don Cleto) and Ricardo 
Jimenez (Don Ricardo), epitomized the old Latin American custom of 
contlnulsmo by passing the presidency back and forth  between them from 
1905 to 1936, with the exception of the ten years between 1914 to 1924.*^
Canas admits that the edad de oro (golden age) was also an age
of p lu tocra tic  domination. He w rites:
Formal democracy reaches I t s  splendor. But th is  epoch, longed 
fo r  by many, has a certa in  unmistakable p lu tocra tic  f la v o r ,  a 
patriarchal f la v o r .  The l ib e ra l  generation can govern in peace 
because 1t counts on the help of the plutocracy. . . . th is  1s 
so because there is no c o n f l ic t ,  at the highest le v e ls , between 
the c learest and most exemplary Ideas of the l ib e ra ls  and the 
Inc ip ien t interests of the plutocracy. From the pleiad of b r i l ­
l ia n t  men, 1t 1s the r ich  who choose.32
That Costa Ricans consider th is  period the epitome of democracy reveals
a preoccupation with formal processes and not necessarily a notion of
representative or responsible government. Peaceful, 1f controlled
e lections , c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s ,  and a p a te rn a lis t ic  government that 1f I t
accomplished l i t t l e  also made few demands were evidently  the Costa Rican
d e f in it io n  of democracy.
To Navarro, the Generation of 89 was not a "true generation."  
B r i l l i a n t  though the Ollmpos were, they lacked a coherent Ideology 
and never re a l ly  translated th e ir  Ideas Into a positive  plan o f action.
^*Stone, La d ln as tfa , pp. 268-269. Between 1914-1924, f iv e  other 
men served as pres1dent--three popularly e lected , one who seized power 
and was himself deposed and supplanted by the elected 1st presidential 
designate.
32 —Canas, Los ocho aftos, p. 11.
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Navarro stresses the shortcomings o f the Generation of 89 as a contrast 
to what he c a lls  the Generacion del 48. He provides an In te l le c tu a l  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  L1beracl6n. What set the 48 apart from a l l  other 
so-called generadones was conscientious self-awareness o f  being a 
generacion— and i t s  action to become so. The action to which Navarro 
refers was the creation of the Centro para el Estudlo de Problemas 
Nacionales (Center fo r  the Study of National Problems). The young men 
who composed the Center, mostly students 1n law and a g r ic u ltu re , con­
sidered themselves the d ire c t  heirs o f  the In te l le c tu a l trad it ion s  of 
el 89. They dedicated themselves to s c ie n t i f ic  analysis of the 
defic iencies o f contemporary Costa Rican society, I t s  government and
economy, and to formulation o f policy a lternatives  to those of the
33government (which they considered Inadequate and u n s c ie n t if ic ) .
I n i t i a l l y  the Center Intended to remain aloof from the turmoil 
of p o l i t ic s .  Only a f te r  Intensive study would I t  o f fe r  advice on 
solving the problems confronting the s ta te . Gradually the Center 
was drawn more and more into p o l i t ic s .  The government, i t  re a lize d ,  
was not waiting fo r I t s  advice, but plunging ahead w i l l y - n i l l y  with 
social and economic reforms. In 1945, the Center merged with the 
newly organized Partldo Acci6n Demtfcrata led by Jose Flgueres. The 
Center had been advocating the formation o f an Ideological party to 
lead the nation 1n social progress but had rejected that ro le  fo r  I ts  
members. The elections of 1944, r i f e  with fraud and scandal, convinced 
1t to jo in  with the a c t iv is t  Acclon Democrata as the only way to insure
^N avarro , La generacion, pp. 35, 106-109.
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progress and prevent the fu rther adulteration o f  Costa Rican democracy.
/  /  34
The new party , Social Democrata, u lt im ate ly  became U berac lon .
The sense of being a special group, the In te l le c tu a l e l i t e ,
carried over Into the myths o f  L1beracl6n which sees i t s e l f  as the
fu l f i l lm e n t  of the Center's aspirations. The "Preamble" to the
revised Carta Fundamental of L1beracl6n, promulgated In 1969 states:
We are the consequence of the great movement In i t ia te d  1n 1940 
by the Center fo r the Study of National Problems, that proclaimed, 
in the name of a new generation, the necessity o f In i t ia t in g  a 
peaceful revolution in Costa R1ca, and that based I ts  postulates 
on an objective study o f the national r e a l i t y ,  pledged to give 
to these problems, solutions s t r ic t ly  Costa Rican.35
The essence o f  the concept o f  la  generaci6n is revealed 1n the 
las t phrase of that quotation--solut1ons s t r i c t l y  Costa Rican. Any 
reasonable idea, or proposal or theory should be considered, but 
blind acceptance of foreign solutions (p a r t ic u la r ly  Marxist) 1s In to le r ­
able. Costa Ricans can and must work out th e ir  own solutions taking  
whatever technical or In te l le c tu a l  help seems appropriate but always 
shaping th e ir  po lic ies  to f i t  Costa Rican needs.
Denominating the leadership of the Revolution and the founders 
of L1beracl6n a generacion serves several purposes. F i r s t ,  I t  under­
scores the proposition that the Revolution was Costa Rican in o r ig in ,  
philosophy, and expectations, not the resu lt  of a lien  agitators  and 
Ideologues. Second, 1t links the protagonists o f the Revolution to an 
h is to r ic a l precedent, the Generacion del 89 . Th ird , I t  substantiates
34Oscar Agu11 ar Buigarel 11, Costa Rica y sus_ hechos p o lit ic o s  de 
1948 (San Jose, Costa R1ca: T1pogr£f1cos de Antonio Lehman, 1969},
pp. 56*82.
35Part1do Uberaclon Naclonal, "Preambulo," Carta Fundamental 
numero dos 1n Carta Fundamental (San Jos£, Costa Rica: Prlmero Con-
greso Ideol£g1co, 1969), p. 8.
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the re jection  o f personalistic  p o l i t ic s  by d iffus ing  responsib ility  
fo r  the re v o lt  among a larger group than the coterie  of Figueres* 
supporters.
To an extent, the so-called Generacion del 48 conformed to the 
c r i t e r ia  outlined by Rodriguez, p a r t ic u la r ly  the members o f  the Centro 
in the early  1940's. The young men who made up the Centro shared 
common philosophical and ideological perspectives, i . e . ,  an a f f in i t y  
fo r  social democratic solutions to national problems. Although 
there may have been exceptions, the young men of the Centro were from 
middle and upper class fam ilies  and were well-educated {beyond the 
secondary le v e l ) .  The members of the Centro stressed that they viewed 
the nation's problems from a s t r i c t l y  Costa Rican perspective. P r i ­
marily th is  meant the re jection  of Marxist analysis, but fa sc is t  solu­
tions were also excluded. They c le a r ly  and self-consciously perceived 
themselves as the h is to r ica l Inheritors  of the Generacion del 89. 
F in a lly ,  the l i t e r a r y - l in g u is t ic  c r i te r io n  was f u l f i l l e d  by the primary
a c t iv i ty  of the Centro, the publishing of the journal Surco and la te r
36the managing of the newspaper D ia r io . The Centro also f i t  Navarro's 
description of a qenerad6n. They were In te l le c tu a ls  who worked to ­
gether to analyze s o c ia l,  economic, and p o l i t ic a l  conditions in Costa 
Rica. Each was to contribute , according to his own background and 
t ra in in g ,  to the formation of an ideology and a program of action  
uniquely suited to Costa Rican problems and tra d it io n s .
36 In protest over alleged government censorship, 0t111o U late ,  
the owner of D iario  de Costa R ica, refused to publish his newspaper.
To keep his vow, yet prevent financ ia l ru in ,  Ulate turned publica­
tion  o f Diario over to the Centro. English, L1berac16n, p. 22.
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The members o f the Centro certa in ly  t r ie d  to f u l f i l l  the require­
ments of a generacion, but gradually d ire c t  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s  
overshadowed th e ir  In te l le c tu a l pursuits. By the time the Revolution 
occurred 1n 1948, the date by which they are known, the appellation no 
longer applied. Analysis and recommendation had been supplanted by 
action.
Rodrfguez, w rit ing  in 1953, doubted that a Generacion del 48 
re a l ly  existed. The Centro Para el Estudlo de Problemas Naclonales 
did not resume a f te r  the Revolution, and LiberacHSn Naclonal had not 
yet proven i ts  p o l i t ic a l  e f f ic a c y . Although he believed 1n the actions 
and the motives of the National Liberation Movement, he expressed 
concern that the r e v ita l iz in g  of the nation would be l e f t  half-done. 
"But today, having completed the heroic part o f the task, the young 
people have returned to th e ir  stupor, to th e ir  is o la t io n , to th e ir  
Costa Ricanlsm." Rodrfguez feared that Costa Ricans would slide back 
Into th e ir  usual complacency and allow a return o f  the abuses of 
government they had recently fought to end.
Rodriguez may have been r ig h t .  When the Centro combined with  
Acdfin Democrata in 1944 to form the Partldo Social Democrata, the 
members of the Centro began losing th e ir  position as in te l le c tu a l  
leaders of the opposition. By 1948, Figueres and his supporters, who 
were drawn from both factions , were c le a r ly  the leading a c t iv is ts  1n 
the opposition. Victory 1n the revo lt  made Figueres and his closest 
advisors preeminent 1n Costa Rican p o l i t ic s .  Only three members of
^Rodrfguez, Apuntes, p. 88.
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38the Junta Fundadora were former Centro members. Since the return of 
constitutional government in 1949, few Centro members have partic ipated  
a c tiv e ly  in government. Out o f 121 Centro members l is te d  by Stone, 
only e ight have served as cabinet members fo r  a Liberacionista pres i­
dent, none fo r  an opposition adm inistration. Only seventeen have been
39elected to the Leg is la tive  Assembly. Whether through disenchantment 
with Liberaci^n, p o l i t ic s  in general, or personal reasons, most of 
the young men of the Centro apparently have avoided p o l i t ic s  in the 
post-Revolution years. The contribution of the Centro to the formation 
and operation of Liberacitfn Nacional may have been more symbolic than 
substantive. Nonetheless, Llberacidn has t r ie d  to c a p ita l ize  on the 
Idea of In s t i tu t io n a l iz in g  the generational aspects of the movement 
that led to the Revolution.
La M^stica
Costa Rican p o lit ic ia n s  frequently speak of lj» mfstica In th e ir  
campaign speeches. La mfstica is one o f  those idiomatic words that  
do not transla te  well Into another language. The phrase that comes 
closest to expressing I ts  meaning 1s another foreign phrase, e s p r it  de 
corps. A Costa Rican sociologist defines la mfstica as a fee lin g  of
^®They were Gonzalo Facio Sagreda, Alberto Marten Chavarrfa, and 
Bruce Masfs D iblasst. Daniel Oduber Qulrds, an Important member of  
the Centro, acted as secretary to the Junta, but did not s i t  on the 
Junta proper. He subsequently became one of the most Important figures  
1n Llberacldn. The membership o f the Junta 1s found 1n Castro, Figueres, 
pp. 159-160. The membership of Centro 1s l is te d  in Stone, La d in a s tfa , 
pp. 585-597.
^ S to n e , La d in a s tfa , pp. 520-559. The cabinets are found 1n 
the In te rn a tio n a l Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who1 s , s . v . , by year.
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belonging, a consciousness of kind that Inculcates cohesiveness among
40the members and stimulates a group dynamic.
Rodrigo Carazo, a leading p o l i t ic ia n  In one o f the current 
opposition p a r t ie s ,  defines la mfstica as a rationa le  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  
actions, the motivating force behind a p o l i t ic a l  movement. The true  
mfstica of a p o lic ia l movement springs from the h is to r ic a l impulse 
to be a nation. "La mfstlca is achieved when there are goals and 
there exists the design fo r  achieving them." The nation that d r i f ts  
without a c lear conception of i ts  destination , leaders who are con­
tent ju s t  passing the days, the p o l i t ic a l  party tha t wants only to 
be 1n power, do not have nrfstlca. La mfstlca inspires the responsib ility  
to work. I t  implies duty, but complemented by the sa tis fac tion  of 
accomplishment. Duty is f u l f i l l e d  because one wants to comply, not 
because compliance 1s compelled. "La nrfstlca Is that which brings 
an In d iv id u a l,  a party, a country to f ig h t  with enthusiasm to achieve 
i ts  goals ."^1
Perhaps what re a l ly  makes Llberacionlstas feel d if fe re n t  from
other Costa Rican parties and organizations Is expressed by Baeza,
describing a p o l i t ic a l  r a l ly  fo r  Figueres in 1968:
Liberac iln  had grown, but had never los t I ts  sense of the mfstica 
of human l ib e r ty ,  o f  soda! ju s t ic e ,  of economic ju s t ic e ,  of a l l  
devotion to culture and education for a l l . 4‘
^Conversation with Dr, Eugenio Fonseca Tort6s 1n his o ff ice  
a t the Unlversidad de Costa R1ca, April 1974.
41 Interview with L1c. Rodrigo Carazo Odio In his o f f ic e  in 
San Jos!, Costa Rica, July 1975.
^ A lb e rto  Bae2a Flores, La lucha sin f in  (Mexico, D .F .: B. Costa-
Amlc, 1969), p. 423.
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This sentiment 1s s t i l l  expressed by Llberaclonlstas. In 1974, 
when asked why he joined L1beracl6n, a municipal councilman from a 
rural canton on the A tlan tic  zone responded, "L1beracl6n 1s the only 
party that makes an economic and social study o f the country." 
"L1beracl6n 1s the most responsible party, and the best organized.
We who want democracy w i l l  always be with L1beracl6n Naclonal."^3 
Another municipal councilman believed that L1berad6n has maintained 
i ts  p o l i t ic a l  strength, " . . .  because fo r twenty-five years the Party 
has known how to reduce gradually the social breach so notorious
before 1948, a l l  based on the social democracy that sustains our
44 ✓ideals ."  The most poignant statement of the Liberaclon appeal came
from a man who had worked his way up from pe6n agrfcola {farm hand)
to Jefe de Planta (Chief of an industria l p la n t) .  He said:
When L1berad6n was born, I ts  proclamations, I ts  Idea ls , a l l  
sought the Improvement of the peasant and the worker. I ts  
actions carried forward reforms 1n the l i f e  of the country, 
without fears , without demagogy, [which] made me think that  
here was a p o l i t ic a l  party that merited the respect of the 
people. Being very young, seventeen years of age and not of 
a U b e ra d o n ls ta  home, I gave my a f f i l i a t i o n  and from then I 
served In I ts  ranks.*5
A local L1berad6n leader added th is  statement to a questionnaire
on party a f fa irs :  " I consider L1berad6n Nadonal to be a party of
democratic insp ira tion  with some mfstica among I ts  members regarding
43Response to a questionnaire prepared by the author and d i s t r i ­
buted to L1beracl6n o f f ic ia ls  In July 1975. Respondent's name to 
remain anonymous as stipulated on the questionnaire. H ereafter, a l l  
quotations from other respondents to these questionnaires w i l l  be 




46the perfecting of many o f I ts  parts ."  Another example 1s found In 
a comment on the defeat of Daniel Oduber in the presidentia l elections  
of 1966. The author w rite s , "The defeat of Llberacion 1n 1966, among 
other things, was due to the loss of la  mlstlca of the P a r ty . '*^
Costa Ricans, despite a certa in  reputation fo r  s to l id i t y ,  apparently 
need s p ir i tu a l  and emotional stimulation as well as pragmatic rewards.
COSTA RICAN POLITICAL VALUES
Consolidating the ava ilab le  information on Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  
culture reveals some serious lacunae. Any p ro f i le  of the Tico as a 
p o l i t ic a l  being a t th is  stage w i l l  be te n ta tive  a t  best. Much of the 
material is dated and therefore does not take into account s o c ia l , 
p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic changes that have occurred in the la s t  two 
decades. Also there is p ra c t ic a l ly  nothing on possible variations  
1n p o l i t ic a l  orientations according to such social d iv is ion as socio­
economic status. Much 1s assumed about Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  values, 
orien ta tions , and b e l ie fs ,  but l i t t l e  has been v e r if ie d  em pirica lly .  
Nevertheless, some comments can be made about the Costa Rican p o l i ­
t ic a l  cu lture .
The most s tr ik ing  aspect o f the l i te ra tu re  on Costa Rican 
p o l i t ic a l  culture is the contrast between the Image presented by 
such w riters  as Barahona and Rodriguez and the Image prevalent In 
much of the North American l i t e r a tu r e ,  especia lly  1n textbooks.
46 "Questionnaire Response."
47Baeza, La lucha, p. 418. The author evidently means that  
Llberacldn fa i le d  to get across an e f fe c t iv e  Image o f  the party fo r  
the voters during the campaign.
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The charac ter is t ic  that comes through strongest In the writings of  
the former Is apathy. One gets the Impression tha t the commitment 
to democratic In s t i tu t io n s ,  the peaceful exercise of p o l i t ic a l  power, 
and c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  may stem from a fundamental lack of In te re s t ,  
an In a b i l i t y  fo r  passionate commitment, an absorption with s e l f  and 
family that precludes e ffe c t iv e  organization and dynamic p o l i t ic a l  
a c t iv i t y .  Yet Costa Rica's h istory Is remarkably free  of violence.
With only a few exceptions, e lection  results have been honored since 
the la te  1800's, turnout a t  the polls has generally been very high, 
and such p o l i t ic a l  functions as r a l l i e s ,  parades, and public speeches 
have usually been well-attended. S u p e r f ic ia l ly ,  there seems to be 
a firm  commitment to democratic procedures and In s t i tu t io n s .
Although current Information does not allow a f u l ly  deta iled  
p ro f i le  of Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , both Costa Rica's history  
and availab le  analyses of Costa Rica's society and p o l i t ic a l  system 
do support some general observations regarding those p o l i t ic a l  values 
that appear to be most prominent.
Three principles of democratic government stand out as nuclei 
for Costa Rican p o l i t ic a l  values: tra n sfe rra l of p o l i t ic a l  power by
elections , p o l i t ic a l  t ra n q u il i ty  (the eschewal o f v io lence), and 
d v l l  r igh ts .
Election o f  the president by d ire c t  vote and universal male 
suffrage began 1n 1913, but Costa Ricans had been selecting th e ir  
leaders by In d ire c t  elections (e lectors  selected by the c it ize n s )  
since the founding of the Republic In 1848. I f  not always followed 
scrupulously, the princ ip le  o f e lectora l government was well established  
by the 1940's. Not a l l  o f Costa Rica's presidents were selected by
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open, competitive e lections. Prior to 1890, fraud and force were com­
mon determinants o f  the national leadership. Since 1890, a d e f in ite  
trend toward competitive elections developed, u n til  now, Costa Rica's  
elections are noted fo r  being honest and competitive.
There are only two Instances 1n which a m ajority of the popu­
lace was s u f f ic ie n t ly  motivated to jo in  1n a common e f fo r t .  The 
f i r s t  was the 1850's 1n the campaign against the Yankee f i l ib u s te rs  
1n Nicaragua; the second was the Revolution o f 1948. The former 
was seen as a defense against a foreign invader; the l a t t e r  allegedly  
was caused by a b la tant tampering with an e le c tio n . Elections may 
well be the most revered of sacred cows 1n Costa Rica. We w i l l  look 
closer a t the question of e lectora l meddling and popular uprising 1n 
subsequent chapters. Suffice fo r  now to note that e lec tora l campaigns 
are followed closely throughout the country and e lection day 1s treated  
as a national f ie s ta .
In the section on la leyenda blanca 1t was noted that Costa 
R1ca has suffered more p o l i t ic a l  violence than Costa Ricans normally 
admit. The point to be stressed here Is that the frequency and the 
In tens ity  of v io len t p o l i t ic a l  actions has been s ig n if ic a n t ly  less 
1n Costa R1ca than In any of her neighbors. One 1s hard put to find  
another country whose history is  as free  of violence. Rather than 
consider domestic t ra n q u il i ty  a re f le c t io n  of a commitment to non­
violence, a positive p o l i t ic a l  value, 1t may be more accurate to 
speak o f a Costa Rican preference fo r  peaceful p o l i t ic a l  operations.
The use o f  v io le n t methods (secret soc ie ties , barrack rev o lts ,  
assassinations, e tc . )  have not attained acceptance as leg it im ate
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p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y .  When violence has occurred, I t  has tended to be
anomalous and Inc id enta l. With the exception of the 1940's, Costa R1ca
has avoided sustained periods o f  p o l i t ic a l  unrest accompanied by v io len t
acts. Nor has the m il i ta ry  ever created a priv ileged and dominant
caste. The only s t r ic t ly  m il i ta ry  heroes In Costa Rican h istory were
part of the a n t i - f i l ib u s te r  campaigns, the quintessential hero being
Juan Santamarla, a young foo tso ld le r. Costa Rican boasts o f no Santa
Anna or S1m̂ n Bolivar. Value, preference, or tendency, however i t
Is termed, nonviolence Is a central a t tr ib u te  of Costa Rican p o l i t ic s .
Contemporary Costa Rica is noted fo r  i t s  respect fo r  c iv i l
l ib e r t ie s .  A concern fo r individual rights dates at least to 1871,
when a series of fundamental rights was incorporated Into the Consti-
48tution of the Republic adopted that year. Included 1n the provisions
fo r  individual rights are habeas corpus, prohibitions o f ex post facto
49laws and b i l l s  of a t ta in d e r, and protection of freedom of assembly. 
These rights were re ite ra te d  and expanded 1n the Constitution of 1949. 
How care fu lly  the constitutional guarantees have been honored 1n prac­
t ic e  is d i f f i c u l t  to judge. Since the end of the revolutionary period 
1n 1949, v io la t ion  of c iv i l  r ights have been few. The questions of 
c iv i l  r ights  1n the Calderon Guardla years, the Revolution of 1948, 
and the period of ru le  by junta w i l l  be discussed 1n subsequent 
chapters. C iv i l  r ights 1n the pre-CaldenSn period are even harder to 
assess. Other than reputation, there is l i t t l e  evidence availab le
*®Costa Rica, Constitution P o llt lc a  de 1871 (San Jos /, Costa 
Rica: Imprenta N adonal, 1944).
49Ib1d. , Tftulo I I I ,  Seccl6n Segunda, "de las garantias 
Ind iv iduales."
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one way or the o th er, although certa in  groups, such as organized 
labor, endured some repression 1n the 1930's . I f  we re ly  on reputa­
tio n , Costa Rica was a paragon o f c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s . Undoubtedly the 
Golden Age of Don Cleto and Don Ricardo was flawed, but again re la t iv e  
to I ts  neighbors, Costa R1ca has maintained a remarkable record. In 
the absence of contrary evidence, i t  seems reasonable to assume that 
Costa Ricans consider c iv i l  r ig h ts  to be a valuable aspect of th e ir  
p o lit ic a l l i f e .
I f  e lec tio n s , p o lit ic a l t ra n q u il ity ,  and c iv i l  rig h ts  are p o li­
t ic a l values In the Costa Rican c u ltu re , presumably Costa Ricans 
would be w illin g  to s a c rif ic e  much to re ta in  them. What and how 
much they would s a c rific e  1s a measure of how dear those values are.
The Myth o f the Revolution centers on the alleged loss of these 
values. Indeed, according to L1berac1on1sta w rite rs , the Revolution 
was caused by the v io la tion s  of those princip les and 1t was fought 
to  restore them. In the follow ing chapters, the ways In which L lbera- 
ci6n Naclonal Incorporated the v io la tio n  of p o lit ic a l values in to  I ts  
ra tio n a le  fo r  rev o lt and seizure of power are explored and the v a lid ity  
o f that ra tio n a le  is  assessed.
CHAPTER FOUR
MYTHIC QUALITIES IN THE LIBERACION 
VERSION OF THE REVOLUTION
Great events shape the h istory  o f every nation. A ffa irs  may 
be of such momentous importance th a t they come to represent h is to r i­
cal d iv id ing lines 1n a nation 's  experience. Two events signaled 
consummate changes In the development of Costa R1ca as a nation.
The introduction of coffee as a cash crop in the 1820's ended the 
cruel irony 1n Costa R ica's name (Rich Coast). The social and econom­
ic e ffe c ts  of coffee production are s t i l l  being assessed but el_ cafe 
changed Costa Rican society even more than its  Independence from 
Spain. The revolution o f 1948 was the second great turning point in 
Costa Rica's national progress, fo r th is  marked the emergence of 
Costa Rica as a modern s ta te .
That a revolution should be a landmark 1n Costa Rica's h istory  
would appear anomalous, given the description of Costa Rican p o lit ic a l  
culture  and values contained 1n the la s t chapter. How did i t  happen 
th a t the v io le n t overthrow of a duly established government occurred 
in a society noted fo r  i ts  pass iv ity  and a tra d it io n  of nonviolence 
1n p o lit ic a l a ffa irs ?  The explanation depends upon one's perspective.
Such an event 1s almost ce rta in  to be the source o f p o lit ic a l  
inyths, and there should be a t leas t two c o n flic tin g  accounts: that
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of the revo lu tio n aries , and that of the regime overthrown. Other 
national groups or outsiders may provide additional In te rp re ta tio n s , 
but assuredly the two princ ipa ls  w ill  espouse discrepant versions.
In te rp re ta tio ns  o f the Revolution fo llow  three main lin e s :
the Revolution was l i t t l e  more than a golpe de estado in which one
group of opportunists replaced another;* the Revolution culminated
a decade-long competition between two groups— the Conmunlsts and
the Social Democrats--vy1ng to be the vanguard of modernization in  
2
Costa Rica; and the Revolution was the inspired work of a group of 
dedicated Social Democrats, committed to prevent the subversion of 
Costa Rican democracy by a corrupt, commun1 s t- infested government, 
and who were destined to lead the social and economic progress of 
the nation w ith in  tra d it io n a l Costa Rican id ea ls . The la t te r  in te r ­
pretation  1s espoused by the Partido Uberacion Naclonal.
The L1beraci6n account of the Revolution (and the formation 
of Llberacion) must f u l f i l l  certa in  c r i te r ia  1f 1t 1s to be considered 
a p o lit ic a l myth. I t  must t e l l  a story 1n dramatic language that 
expla ins, in a s im p lified  form, p o lit ic a l phenomena believed Important 
by a p a rtic u la r  group. I t  must e lim inate ambiguity 1n complex s i t ­
uations, thereby fa c i l i t a t in g  decisive actions. As a myth 1t should 
also provide a ra tio n a le  fo r  actions taken by the group, especia lly  
when such actions v io la te  cu ltu ra l values held by the group's members. 
The leading characters 1n the account w il l  be extraord inary , e ith e r
*M1guel Acuffa V .,  H  48 (San Jose, Costa R1ca: L lb re rfa .
Imprenta y L lto g ra ffa  Lehman, 1974). See Chapter XXXI, "Los Limltes  
de la  Revoludtfn," pp. 375-386.
^John Patrick  B e ll , C ris is  In Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution
(A ustin , Texas: The U n ivers ity  o?~Texas Press, l9 7 T ) .
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1n v irtu e  or 1n v ic e . The story should Impart a sense of Id e n tity  to 
the believers by stressing the unique q u a litie s  o f the group v1s-a-v1s 
other groups. The perspective of the group regarding what Information  
1s included or excluded from the n arra tive  w ill  p re v a il. F in a lly ,  
a lte rn a tiv e  explanations or versions o f the same phenomena w il l  be 
re jected; the un ity  o f the account 1s thereby preserved.
I f  the Llberaddn account o f the Revolution Is  mythic, 1t w il l  
not only f u l f i l l  the above c r i te r ia  but w il l  r e f le c t  the Costa Rican 
cu ltu re . Since revolutions normally require considerable e f fo r t  and 
coordinated actio n , the myth w il l  have to explain how a people reputed 
to be Inactive  and In d iv id u a lis t ic  came to accomplish a successful 
re v o lt. Even more Important w ill  be the ra tio n a le  fo r  the v io len t 
overthrow o f a leg itim ate  government In  a cu lture  that ostensibly  
values nonviolence and e lec to ra l In te g r ity . Incorporation of the 
Idea of l̂a generacl6n and la  m lstlca might also be expected. The 
Liberacldn Myth o f the Revolution complies w ith a l l  of these req u ire ­
ments.
The L lberaddn version of the p o lit ic a l events of 1940-1951 can 
be stated very simply. Tyrannical p o lit ic a l elements threatened the 
tra n q u il, democratic tra d itio n s  of Costa Rica. The Costa Rican 
people rose up 1n response to the mortal th re a t to th e ir  way o f l i f e ,  
defeating the enen\y 1n open combat. To prevent the recurrence of such 
a th re a t, a p o lit ic a l party was founded based on jo in in g  modern theories  
o f social ju s tic e  and economic progress to Costa Rican Ideals of f re e ­
dom and democratic government. In conceptual terms, the foregoing 
Is  the theme of the Myth o f the Revolution.
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Although there 1s no single o f f ic ia l  version of the Revolution, 
several accounts do e x is t, some published by L1beracl6n I t s e l f .  The 
myth o f the party 1s drawn from three primary sources: Interviews
with party members, the words of party spokesmen, and party propa­
ganda. This study re lie s  on the la t te r  two sources, although In fo r ­
mation from Interviews 1s also included. L i t t le  on the Revolution 
has been w ritten  by Costa Ricans. Although many authors take a 
decidedly partisan stand, most favor the L1berad6n version. On the 
other hand, partisan commentaries are an excellent source of party 
myths. While there 1s no evidence that the authors were commissioned 
s p e c ific a lly  to create L1beracl6n myths, the dramatic language they 
employ and the u tte r ly  one-sided versions they pro ffer make them
3
mythmakers of the f i r s t  order.
In th is  chapter we concentrate on specific  features of the 
Uberaclon account that make 1t mythic. To avoid redundancy, we have 
used the main characters 1n the Myth to I l lu s tra te  how the L1beracl6n 
version f i t s  the c r ite r ia  fo r myths elaborated 1n Chapter Two. The 
events of the Revolution I t s e l f  w ill be discussed In subsequent 
chapters on the Myth and p o lit ic a l values. P articu lar attention Is  
directed here toward the d is to rtio n  employed by the mythmakers that 
elevates the main characters to heroic status. Considerable m aterial
3
Excellent examples o f mythic description f i t t in g  the c r ite r ia  
lis te d  above are found 1n the following works on the Revolution. 
Consequently, much o f the I l lu s tra t iv e  m aterial 1s/ drawn from these 
authors. Alberto F. Carlas, Los ocho affos (San dose, Costa R1ca: 
E d ito ria l L1berac16n Naclonal, 1$&7; Alberto Baeza F lores, La lucha 
sin f in  (Mtfxico, D .F .: B, Costa-Am1c, 1969): Arturo Castro EsquTvJT, 
‘ el_ hombre £  su obra (San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta
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Is  quoted to  exemplify the dramatic q u a lity  of the language used by 
the mythmakers. This discussion Is  divided Into  two parts . The 
f i r s t  delineates the mythic treatment o f six major fig u re s —Jos^ 
Figueres, Ledn Cortds, and O tlH o  U late on the heroic s ide , and 
Rafael Calderdn Guardia, Teodoro Plcado, and Manuel Mora on the 
In iquitous side. The second part examines those charac teris tics  
1n l ig h t  o f other evidence from sources not In the Uberaclon camp.
MAIN CHARACTERS IN THE MYTH 
Because myth 1s drama, 1t 1s appropriate to view the central 
figures 1n a myth as dramatic characters. The myth I t s e l f  w i l l  cast 
I ts  protagonists as heroes and v i l la in s .  The consummate hero in the 
Myth of the Revolution is  Jos£ Figueres, the leader o f the m ilita ry  
forces of the Revolution, and the princ ipa l organizer of L lb erad dn . 
Two other heroes worthy o f note and who w il l  be discussed also are 
Le6n Cortes and 0t1l1o  U la te . Just as Figueres has been exalted as 
the savior o f Costa Rican democracy, so has Rafael Calderdn Guardla 
been portrayed as an arch v i l l a in ,  an adversary of a magnitude s u it ­
able fo r  a hero to engage. Calderdn's c h ie f henchmen, Teodoro Plcado 
Mlchalskl and Manuel Mora Valverde are cast 1n an appropriately  
malignant l ig h t .  Here the U beraclon p o rtra its  o f these central 




The f i r s t  fu ll- le n g th  biography o f Figueres begins w ith these
words:
I t  was one of these things th a t Destiny arranges . . . £h1s time 
fo r  the g lory and the good fortune o f our country: Jose Figueres 
Ferrer was born in San Ram6n. . . . 4
The Castro Esquivel biography provides the best example of heroic
treatment of Figueres. The book reads l ik e  an adventure story ,
f u l l  o f daring deeds and acts o f great s a c r if ic e . E x ile  1n Mexico
Is described thus:
His l i f e  1n Mexico was Intensely a c tiv e . A ll his thoughts, 
a l l  his energy was dedicated to the great work, to lib e ra te  
Costa R1ca from Its  e v il ru le rs .5
His return to Costa R1ca 1n 1944 was th a t of a conquering hero, "a
symbol, the only hope o f the f ig h t  and o f the solution against the
e v ils  th a t a f f l ic te d  Costa R ic a .1’ The a irp o rt was packed with
thousands awaiting the hero. The streets  were lined  w ith those hoping
fo r  a glimpse of Don Pepe.® With a speech upon his a r r iv a l ,  Don Pepe
launched his p o lit ic a l career.
The le tte rs  and speeches Figueres made demonstrated his p o lit ic a l
a b i l i t y  and In te lle c tu a l power.
Then 1 t was that Jose Figueres d irected him self anew to the 
people, to  the opposition ist group to which he belonged, to 
open th e ir  eyes, to describe fo r them the enemy tra p , and he 
propounded by radio his transcendental speech . . .  a b r i l l i a n t  
piece of sagacious and v a lia n t analysis of the p o lit ic a l
4
Castro, Figueres, p. 13.
5Ib 1 d ., p. 43.
® Ib1d., pp. 62-63. Pepe is  a dim inutive of Jose. I ts  use 1s 
usually a sign of a ffe c tio n . —
s itu a tio n  o f the present In re la tio n  to the painful past, and 
an Insp iring  and v i r i l e  exhortation fo r  the fu tu re  In whose 
heavens he already saw threatening black clouds.7
Once the In ev itab le  war broke ou t, new facets to Figueres1
a b i l i t ie s  were discovered. He was not only:
. . . the In te lle c tu a l leader of the movement but also I ts  
m ilita ry  commander. Uniquely, he gave a worthy example to 
a l l  his co llaborato rs , maintaining a very high level of 
morale among his men that never fo r a moment fa lte re d , not 
even 1n Instances o f great danger.8
Castro's e n tire  work 1s w ritten  1n th a t ve in . But he 1s not alone
In his adulation o f Figueres.
Luis A lberto Monge, a high-ranking o f f ic ia l  in Uberaclon
w rites 1n the prologue to La lucha sin f in  (a more deta iled  and
sophisticated, but no less biased, biography of F igueres), "The
q
Revolution triumphed w ith Figueres." The t i t l e  of the book, The 
Fight Without End, symbolizes both Figueres' l i f e  and his a ttitu d e  
toward l i f e ,  which Is  presented as a series of struggles destined 
to be overcome. Again Figueres Is  depicted one-dimensionally. Of 
the man him self only v irtues  are revealed; character analysis 1s 
not necessary. Typical o f d ire c t references to Figueres 1s the 
fo llow ing:
He was Chief o f the action and had the Immense prestige o f his 
valor united to the physical resolve of the combatant, but a l l  
o f th is  rested on his character as an In te l le c tu a l,  as an 
Ideological and pragmatic man. . . . L i t t le  by l i t t l e  th is  
engineer and social philosopher, expert In economy, had been 
converted In to  a contrabandist o f arms fo r  lib e ra tio n . The
7lb 1 d ., p. 73.
8 Ib 1 d ., p. 112. 
g
Luis A lberto Monge A lvero , "Prologo," In Baeza, La lucha. p.
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reader o f Whitman, Spencer, Kant, Shakespeare and the Greek and 
Roman classics was transformed In to  a tra in e r  o f g u e r r i l la s .10
As the leader o f a successful revolutionary movement, Figueres
had to re d ire c t the force o f arms In to  a force fo r  power and progress.
Figueres understood th a t his mission . . . was to prepare the 
country, so th a t 1 t would not retrogress to 1940, [and] th a t  
1t be guaranteed that a s itu a tio n  such as had pushed the country 
In to  the c iv i l  war ju s t  ended, would not be po ss ib le .11
Presumably to give some Ins ig h t In to  Figueres* character,
Baeza compares him to a v a rie ty  of famous men, In p a r t ic u la r , the
outstanding p o lit ic a l leaders 1n Latin  America who were Figueres*
contemporaries, e .g . ,  V ic to r Haya de le  To rre , Romulo Betancourt,
Luis Muftos M arin, and V ictor Paz Estenssoro. The allusions are not
always c lea r since names pop up 1n the n arra tive  with minimal Unking
to the general te x t . For example:
The parents o f Jos6 F1gueres--as those o f John F. Kennedy--are 
Catholic and [th ey ] resolved th a t Jos6 should be educated 1n 
the Seminary C o lleg e .12
Recalling Figueres* p red ilec tio n  fo r c a llin g  himself a simple farm er,
Baeza w rite s , **I am reminded of another 'fa rm e r,' [a ] man great 1n
his s im p lic ity , and 1n his Imnense ta le n t ,  W illiam  Faulkner," who when
13required to 11st his profession would put fanner, not w r ite r .
Enigmatic a llusions aside, the Figueres of La lucha sin f in  l i t e r a l l y  
has no fa u lts . The Revolution could not have succeeded without him.
^B aeza, La lucha, p. 225.
12Ib 1 d ., p. 286. 
l2 lb 1 d ., p. 48.
1 3 I b 1 d . ,  p .  3 7 0 .
91
Other L1berac1on1stas followed the same lin e  as the above
passages I l lu s t r a t e ,  but 1n less graphic language possibly because
they emphasize other aspects of the Myth. Araya refers  to Figueres
14as " Its  [the Center's] most distinguished th in ker."  Canas, whose
pamphlet Los ocho aftos provides a ra tio n a le  fo r the Revolution,
pictures Figueres as the s k i l l fu l  g u e rr illa  leader who antic ipated
the Calderon reaction to e lec to ra l defeat and quickly eluded a l l
15attempts to r e s t r ic t  his actions w hile he prepared fo r war.
In the Liberacion portrayal o f Figueres the mythic overtones 
are m anifest. B r i l l ia n t  th in k er, prescient re b e l, consunmate guer­
r i l l a  leader and dedicated democrat, Figueres epitomizes the epic 
hero.
Cortes and O tiH o  Ulate play prominent roles 1n the Revolution­
ary Myth; Cortes as a symbol of the old lib e ra l democracy and Ulate  
as a symbol of the forces of reactionary democracy. Both provide 
fo i ls  fo r the exa lta tio n  of Figueres and Liberacion as the symbols 
of modern progressive democracy.
Cortes embodied the best tra d itio n s  that Costa Rican democracy 
produced according to la  leyenda blanca. Of the highest personal 
In te g r ity , he in s titu te d  honesty and e ffic ie n c y  1n government.
Cortes provided an Important contrast between his sound princ ip les  
of e ffe c tiv e  government and the not only corrupt but incompetent
14 /Carlos Araya Pochet, H is to rla  de los partldos p o litic o s :
L lberaddn Naclonal (San Jose, Costa Rica: T1 pogrif 1cos de Antonio
Lehman, 1969), p. 35.
15Canas, los ocho anos, p. 115.
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adm inistration of Calderon. Canas 1s the best source fo r th is  aspect
of the Myth. He describes Cortes as a "strong character [w ith ] an
enormous capacity fo r work." Applying th is  great capacity to  the
governing of Costa Rica, Cort&s Imbued his adm inistration w ith:
. . . the central proposition o f progress and e ffic a cy : the
labor o f public works th a t had no comparable antecedents; the 
valour w ith which he attacked banking reform that gave a s c ie n ti­
f ic  basis fo r the national bank; the v ita l Iz a t io n  of public  
health and, above a l l  and before a l l ,  the accentuated, accel­
erated , enthusiastic rhythm with which he attacked his work, 
the sensation he managed to give people that the government is 
preoccupied with doing something fo r 1t.l*>
The rigors o f a vicious p o lit ic a l campaign f in a l ly  ended the l i f e  of
th is  great p a tr io t. The r id ic u le  heaped upon him by the Calder6n
government in the campaign of 1943-44 had an obverse e ffe c t to that
Intended. By stea ling  the e lectio n  from th is  great man, the Calder6n-
1stas showed themselves to the Costa Rican people fo r the unscrupulous
demagogues they w ere.*7 The contrast between the virtuous Cortes and
the venal Calder6n, his one-time prot^gd, supports the Uberacion
assertion that only revolution would r id  the nation from Calderonista
c o n tro l.
O t i l lo  Ulate plays a s im ila r ro le  but as a counterpoint to 
Flgueres. U beracion lite ra tu re  neglects U late although he was a 
central fig ure  1n a l l  the events leading to and follow ing the 
Revolution. In one sense the c iv i l  war was fought 1n his name, a 
point that Figuerlstas stressed In la te r  campaign l i te r a tu r e . A fte r  
a l l ,  the e lection  of Ulate was the event that p rec ip ita ted  the f ig h tin g .
16Ib 1 d ., p. 75.
17Ib1d ., pp. 73-76.
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However, U late posed a dllemna fo r  the L1berac1on1stas. He had b u i l t  
up his newspaper E l D larlo  In to  the most popular one 1n the country 
by the 1940's. El D1ar1o became the leading c r i t ic  o f the govern­
ment, providing a forum fo r c r itic is m  by the Center. He was also  
the h e ir  to Cortes as leader of the united opposition. As such he 
could not be denigrated as the o u trig h t enemy of Uberacion th a t he 
came to be. The Revolution was ju s t if ie d  on the grounds that Ulate 
had won the presidency in an honest e lectio n  and had been denied o ffic e  
by the usurpaclous Calderon. That made Ulate the people's choice In
1948. Consequently, U late had to be dea lt w ith c a re fu lly .
Of the L lberacionlsta w rite rs  only Baeza devotes more than an 
absolute minimum of space to U la te . U late is  f i r s t  mentioned as
18the owner of El D iario  dedicated to fig h tin g  fascism and nazlsm.
L a te r, U late 1s discussed as a leading opponent of Calder6n. A 
discussion of Ulate as an ind ividual comes a fte r  the Revolution 
has been dea lt w ith . The tone changes and Ulate Is  revealed as a 
vain and manipulable man. Bae2 a considers him " . . .  psychologically  
the fig u re  who would be converted by the economic oligarchy In to  an
19obstacle to the Revolution, In to  an opponent of revolutionary changes."
Baeza stresses the excessive vanity  1n U la te 's  character, coupled w ith
a g u i l t  complex from being a minor fig u re  In the upris ing . Quite
simply, U late was jealous o f Flgueres.
Flgueres was the valourous fig u re  of the armed revolutionary move­
ment. He had been, 1n th a t d i f f ic u l t  hour, a l l  th a t U late should
18Baeza, La lucha, p. 192.
l 9 I b 1 d . , p .  3 0 7 .
have been but could not, nor wanted to be, because Ulate was 
not a man of revolutionary composition nor of temperament.
He was an exce llen t combative jo u rn a lis t ,  a democrat, an enemy 
of the abuses o f Calderon Guardla and Plcado, but no more.20
Canas makes a s im ila r  statement 1n one of the few references to Ulate
in Los ocho anos:
And now the hour [o f the Revolution] has a rriv e d . No one waits  
fo r  Ulate to ac t. He was elected because he was v irtuous, 
because he was m il i ta n t ,  because he had an enormous, an undeni­
able ta le n t ,  because he had a p o l i t ic a l ly  clean l i f e ,  without 
d is c re d it . . . and because his ideological position . . . was 
democratic, was correct. But not because he would be a great 
leader or a man of immense capacity fo r work.21
The oligarchy turned to Ulate to lead the counter-revo lution .
In tim e, Ulate and the conservative rich  accepted CaldertSn Guardla 
himself to oppose Flgueres. U late was not exactly  censured; he ju s t  
was not the man nor the leader Costa R1ca found 1n Flgueres.
V illa in s
The mythic hero requires an enemy of comparable s ta tu re . The 
Calderon Guardia of L1beracl6n mythology f i l l e d  th a t requirement in  
every way. Calderdn was corrupt, despotic, he made deals with the 
Communists. To CarTas, Calderrfn was "a mediocre doctor," " in te l le c t ­
u a lly  in fe r io r  to a l l  his predecessors," "the smiling doctor," "the
22unscrupulous Dr. Caldertfn." Baeza compares Calderdn with Flgueres 
to i l lu s t r a te  the vast d ifferences in the two leaders. Calder6n was 
"a man of the priv ileged  c lass ,"  Flgueres was the "son of an immigrant;" 
Calderdn's fa th er was "a doctor of q u a lity ,"  Flgueres was the "son 
of a rural doctor." Calderon enjoyed a l l  "the f a c i l i t ie s  of his class
20Ib 1 d ., pp. 307-308.
9 1
Canas, Los ocho affos, p. 41.
22Ib 1 d ., pp. 17, 21.
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and social rank'* and "was educated 1n the a ris to c ra tic  U n iversity  of
23Louvain;" Flgueres had to "work by day 1n order to study by n ig h t."  
Baeza Implies th a t because his l i f e  had been easy Calder6n had no 
sense o f ju s t ic e , that he could brook no opposition. Flgueres, 
whose l i f e  had been a continuous struggle ( la  lucha sin f in ) ,  had 
been tempered by the f ir e s  of advers ity . For Baeza, the u ltim ate  
proof of Calderon's lack of character was his w illingness to a l ly  with  
Communists to preserve his own career.
A ll in a l l ,  Calder6n Is represented as a thoroughly despicable 
character. Even a peace-loving nation l ik e  Costa Rica could not 
to le ra te  a man of his 11k.
Calderrfn's two c h ie f henchmen, Teodoro Picado and Manual Mora, 
also receive a tten tion  1n Liberadtfn mythology; Picado because he 
served as Calderon's stooge 1n the presidency, and Mora because he 
led the Communist Party a ll ie d  with CalderOn.
Picado, as described by the Liberac1on1stas, was v ir tu a lly  
Incapable o f action or thought Independent o f Calderdn. He was picked 
by CalderOn to occupy the presidency during the one term In terim  
required by the constitu tion  before CalderOn could resume o ff ic e .
* 24Chosen fo r his lo y a lty , his policy ". . . 1s the policy of Calderon."
Completely lacking the w il l  to govern, he 1s a man of memorlzatlons 
but without a single creative  capacity, completely devoid o f social 
or h is to r ic a l v is io n , who finding himself 1n the pres iden tia l seat, 
has to ask himself why he 1s there , since he has no program, no 
plan, no proposal . . . he 1s simply an Individual to carry out 
the function that Caldertfn wanted: th a t o f a puppet.25
23Baeza, La lucha. p. 89.
2*Canas, Los ocho anos. p. 50.
25Ib1d., p. 67.
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Castro describes Picado s im ila r ly  as "[A] young member of the national 
Forum (national le g is la t iv e  assembly) and a close adherent to the 
regime of Calderdn, [he] was the candidate o f the Government;" who
was chosen by Calderdn and the Communists because of his "weak charac-
26te r  and his In a b il i ty  to understand the s itu a tio n ."
Baeza e a s ily  dismisses Picado as the candidate chosen by Calderdn 
"to succeed him and guard his back: 1 icendado Teodoro Picado, a
o
p o lit ic ia n  w ith the complete confidence of Dr. Calderon. . . . "
Picado, from then on, 1s only mentioned 1n connection w ith Calderon's
nomination, never as an ind ividual 1n his own r ig h t .
Mora, a central character 1n the Calder6n adm in istration , 1s
easy to v i l l l f y .  Mora was the leader o f the Communist Party of Costa
Rica. Need anything more be said? Canas considers Mora a picturesque
demagogue, who brought to Costa Rican p o lit ic s  a new element, violence.
Baeza, whose work on Flgueres 1s as much an anti-Communist d ia tr ib e
as a biography, pays considerable a tten tio n  to Mora. Of Mora the
man, Baeza o ffe rs  nothing; o f Mora's a c t iv it ie s  as the Communist
leader much 1s recounted. The sole purpose o f Mora's a f f i l ia t io n  with
Calderdn was to carry out the master plan of In te rn a tio na l Comnunlsm.
For Mora to speak o f himself as a T1co showed him to be completely
28h y p o critic a l. His soul belonged to Moscow, not Costa R1ca.
Thus the Calderonlstas epitomized ru th less , power-hungry 
p o lit ic s . Calder6n wanted only to aggrandize his own po s itio n , to
26Castro, Flgueres. p. 57.
27Baeza, La lucha. p. 166.
28Ib1d., pp. 140-141, 158-159.
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create his petty d ic ta to rsh ip  by any means. Picado was his w illin g  
too l. Mora and the Cofrriunists, of course, were using Calderon to 
estab lish  th e ir  own tyranny, the tyranny of Moscow. Obviously, the 
freedom-loving Costa Ricans had no a lte rn a tiv e  but to throw that 
bunch out o f o f f ic e ,  and to do that they had to use fo rce .
OTHER VIEWS OF THE MAIN CHARACTERS
Heroes?
The Myth co rrec tly  places Don Pepe at the center of the a n t i-  
Calderonlsta re v o lt. The Revolution of 1948 was la rg e ly  planned and 
instigated by Figueres; the subsequent establishment o f the Partido  
L1beracl6n Nacional can be credited la rg e ly  to his desire to insure 
the continuation o f the Junta's p o lic ie s . In the exhaltatlon of 
Flgueres1 v irtues  and the emphasis on his ro le  in the opposition 
movement, the Myth glosses over a number of questionable points. 
Figueres is a much more complex man than the Myth portrays. His ro le  
1n the p o lit ic a l h istory  o f Costa R1ca was also more problematic 
than the Uberacion mythmakers would have us be lieve . To date no 
one has w ritten  a thorough, ob jective  biography o f Figueres. Conse­
quently, many of the most in trig u in g  questions about his career and 
his character cannot be answered. Several p rinc ipa l assertions about 
the mythical Flgueres can be challenged, even i f  d e f in it iv e  statements 
must await more complete evidence. Three such assertions are discussed 
below.
The f i r s t  question concerns the entry o f Flgueres In to  Costa 
Rican p o lit ic s  ( I . e . ,  his famous speech and subsequent e x ile  In 1942). 
According to the Myth, Flgueres, outraged by the "San Pablo”
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29r io ts ,  denounced the government fo r not protecting Innocent c itizen s  
from the deprivations o f Its  communist a l l ie s ,  to which the government 
responded by e x ilin g  Flgueres on the ludicrous charge th a t he was a neo- 
fa s c is t subversive. On the surface the Myth would seem to be correct. 
Flgueres did make a vehemently anti-government speech which was In te r ­
rupted by his a rre s t. The government then forced him to leave the coun­
t ry .  The government's accusation may not seem so ludicrous when one 
considers that Flgueres was the only person ex iled  despite the fa c t that 
other opponents to Calderon, such as U la te , Le6n Cortes, and members of 
the Center fo r  the Study o f National Problems, had been pouring out 
critic ism s as v i t r io l ic  as Flgueres1 speech, 1f not more so. Why was 
i t  necessary to e x ile  only Flgueres?
The government explained that Flgueres was ex iled  at the request 
of the United States Embassy. Statements about the In s ta lla tio n  of 
a North American m ilita ry  base a t Puerto Urnon made by Flgueres 1n
30his radio speech were c ited  as the stimulus fo r the Embassy's request.
Supposedly Flgueres was to be sent to a concentration camp 1n the
United States fo r naz1-sympathizers. Appeals by his friends a lleged ly
31commuted the sentence to  e x ile . Unfortunately th is  explanation 1s 
not supported by substantial evidence.
29The San Pablo, a ship loading 1n Puerto L1m6n (Costa Rica's  
A tla n tic  p o r t ) ,  was torpedoed and sank on 2 July 1942. A memorial and 
demonstration In San Jos£ two days la te r  degenerated In to  r io ts ,  
alleged ly  Instigated  by communists. On 8 Ju ly , Flgueres made a v i t ­
r io l ic  speech condemning the government fo r  fa ll in g  to prevent the 
violence.
30In his biography o f Flgueres, Castro Esquivel reproduces the 
famous radio speech, but no statements about m ilita ry  bases are Included. 
Castro, Flgueres. pp. 27-35.
31Samuel Stone, La d lnastfa  de los Congulstadores: la  c r is is  del
poder en la  Costa Rica contemporanea (San Jos6, Costa R1ca: EDUCA,
CentroamerTca, 1 9 7 5 ) ,p, 310.
Although not conclusive, certa in  evidence provided by other 
sources lends credence to the p o s s ib ility  o f a Flgueres-German 
connection as the reason fo r his e x ile . During the 1930's Germany 
became a major c lie n t  fo r Costa Rican exports. German businessman 
married In to  the ca fe ta lero  fam ilies  and began exercising considerable 
influence in  the country's p o lit ic a l and economic a f fa ir s .  German 
cu ltu re  and ideas became fashionable. German technology and s k il ls  
were exto lled  to the point th a t "German" meant exce llen t. A fte r a 
v is i t  to Costa R1ca, John Gunther reported, "that some of the b u ild ­
ings housing German companies have Nazi insignia painted on th e ir
32roofs ," and Germans wearing swastikas paraded openly.
The declaration of war by the United States against the Axis 
powers created a serious problem fo r  Calderon. The United States 
pressured him to a rres t German, I ta l ia n ,  and Japanese c itizen s  
residing 1n Costa R1ca, but these included many economically power­
fu l and s o c ia lly  well-connected people. Calder6n complied with the
demands of the United States, but the p o lit ic a l  cost was great as
33his actions fu rth e r alienated the c a fe ta le ro s .
Calderonistas believed that Flgueres was try in g  to aid German 
friends 1n avoiding Incarceration and confiscation o f th e ir  Costa 
Rican properties . Although no source c ited  convincing evidence, a 
piece of In te re s tin g  circum stantial evidence Indicates a certa in  
sympathy by Flgueres fo r the German p lig h t. One o f his f i r s t  acts
John Gunther, Inside Latin  America (New York, N .Y .: Harper
and Brothers, 1941), pp. 136-137.
^Acuna, El 48, pp. 46-49.
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as head o f the Junta was to restore confiscated property to Frederlco  
Reimers, a German whose name was linked to Flgueres p rio r to  the 
e x ile  1n 1942.34
The only c e rta in ty  about the e x ilin g  o f Flgueres Is  that Calderon 
made a serious mistake. One can speculate about what would have 
happened had the government ju s t ignored Flgueres or been content to 
r id ic u le  him as a country bumpkin o f no importance. E x ile  made 
Flgueres a cause ce lebre . Ex ile  in Mexico brought Flgueres in to  con­
ta c t with other p o lit ic a l refugees who convinced him of the e ffic ac y  
and the necessity of armed re v o lt. As Costa Rica's only e x ile  (there  
are no reports of any p o lit ic a l prisoners), he gained in s tan t notoriety  
which the opposition press ne ither delayed nor stin ted  in propagan­
d izing w idely. The only explanation given by a Calderonista leader 
as to why th is  mistake was made came from Manuel Mora, who repeated 
the claim  that the United States requested the action . U ntil fu rth e r  
evidence 1s uncovered, any underlying motive must remain unknown. The 
suspicion lingers th a t Flgueres had already involved himself 1n national 
p o lit ic s . The "San Pablo" incident brought him fame.
Central to the mythic theme is  Flgueres as the leader of the 
opposition. Figueres 1s pictured as a Costa Rican messlah behind 
whom the Costa Rican people r a l l ie d  to throw o f f  the oppressive yoke 
of Calder6n domination. This aspect o f the Myth obscures the deep 
cleavages ex is ting  among the groups opposing Calder6n. U n til the 
fig h tin g  broke out 1n 1948, the la rg est segment o f the opposition  
considered U late to be the opposition leader. He had decis ive ly
34Bel1, C r is is , pp. 88-89.
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defeated Flgueres a t the convention which selected the opposition
35candidate fo r the presidentia l e lec tio n  of 1948. When serious 
opposition to Calder6n f i r s t  developed 1n the early  1940*5, Leon 
Cort&s had been the generally accepted leader. A fte r his death 
1n 1946, Ulate took his place.
The segment that Figueres comnanded was the re la t iv e ly  small 
group of "hot heads" who advocated armed reb e llio n . The a c t iv is t  
group, mostly young men, did not represent the main stream of opposi­
tion  to Calderon, though Ulate and the other opposition leaders 
refused to c r i t ic iz e  the a c tiv is ts  even when they employed the same 
ta c tic s  of violence the opposition so roundly condemned the govern­
ment fo r  using. Flgueres was the logical choice to head those 
desirous of v io le n t a c t iv ity .  He had proved his courage by public ly
speaking out against Calderonlsta outrages. His discourse on Costa
36Rican problems established his In te lle c tu a l c red entia ls . He had 
good connections with revo lu tionaries from other Central American 
countries which meant valuable contacts 1n the gun running business 
and the a v a i la b i l i ty  o f assistance from experienced f ig h te rs . Most 
Important, Flgueres' boundless energy and single-minded drive pro­
vided a motive force fo r the most Im patient elements in the opposition. 
He began planning and preparing fo r armed re v o lt while 1n Mexico 1n
Caftas, Los ocho anos. p. 85.
36While 1n e x ile  and a f te r  his return to Costa R1ca, Flgueres made 
numerous speeches and published essays and c ritiq u e s  of the government 
and Costa Rican problems. A number o f excerpts o f Flgueres1 speeches 
can be found 1n Castro, Flgueres. The besj known of Flgueres* ea rly  
publications 1s Palabras gastadas (San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta
Esparfola, 1943).
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1943-44, then directed the organization of rev o lt 1n Costa R1ca a fte r  
his re tu rn . He became the head of the opposition 1n 1948 by leading 
the successful armed upris ing.
The conservative and the Ulate (moderate) branches of the 
opposition never f e l t  completely comfortable with Flgueres and the 
a c tiv is ts . Several attempts were made by the opposition to compro­
mise with the Calderonlstas during Picado's adm inistration . Cortes
1n 1946, ju s t p rio r to his death, had made overtures to the Picado 
37government. U late tr ie d  to reach an accord with Picado 1n the 
same year, but fa ile d . The Figueres faction  accused him of entering
into  " ille g it im a te  conversations with the Government th a t the people
38would never have accepted." Even a fte r  the e lection  in 1948, U late
and his supporters kept try ing to avoid a v io le n t confrontation w ith  
39the government. The advent of armed re v o lt under Figueres pushed 
Ulate In to  a te r t ia r y  ro le  from which he did not emerge u n til the 
presidency was turned over to him by Flgueres 1n 1949. His position  
as leader of the moderates in the opposition never abated. During 
the period of government by the Junta, he became the c h ie f spokesman 
fo r  the conservative forces as w e ll,  a position he held u n til his 
death 1n 1973.
37B e ll , C r is is , p. 117.
38Canas, Los ocho anos, pp. 78-79.
39Oscar Aguilar B u lg a re lli , Costa Rica y sus hechos p o litico s  
de 1948 (San Jos4, Costa Rica: T lp og riflcos  de Antonio Lehman, 1969),
pp. 169-170.
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Flgueres did enjoy widespread acclaim among the Costa Rican
40populace as the successful leader o f the Revolution. Except fo r  
the fig h tin g  I t s e l f ,  the U beracion claim that he led the opposition 
to Calderon Is  an exaggeration.
Another questionable assertion made in the Myth cast Flgueres 
as a b r i l l ia n t  m ilita ry  leader. Figueres supposedly conceived of 
the overall strategy fo r defeating the government forces and courage­
ously led his men In to  b a tt le . The most deta iled  account of the com­
bat phase o f the Revolution gave much of the c re d it fo r  the m ilita ry  
v ic to rie s  to others; Figueres was not lis te d  as the f ie ld  commander 
In any sp ec ific  b a tt le . Flgueres, according to th is  account, appeared 
to act as the nominal leader, the coordinator and morale b u ild e r, not 
as a m ilita ry  genlous.4 * Acuna concludes that Miguel Angel Ramirez 
was the real m ilita ry  leader o f the Revolution and quotes a member 
of the L iberation  army as saying "when Ramirez a rriv e d , one could
42say that the Revolution had a true Chief and an authentic so ld ie r."  
Acuna may not have been e n tire ly  f a i r  1n his treatment of Figueres as 
a combatant; he does o ffe r  evidence that not everyone who fought with 
Flgueres considered Don Pepe's contribution as a so ld ier absolutely  
v i t a l .
C learly  Flgueres played the central ro le  in the events surround­
ing the Revolution, but the character portrayed 1n the Myth exaggerates
40Flgueres' popular appeal Is  attested  to by the overwhelming 
m ajority  of votes he received 1n the 1953 e lec tio n s , and the s t i l l  
considerable m ajority  he won 1n the 1970 e lec tio ns .




his contribution on a t  least three points. The d e f in it iv e  biography,
1f 1 t 1s ever accomplished, w il l  undoubtedly reveal other Inconsis­
tencies between Flgueres the mythic hero and Flgueres the man.
The representations of Leon Cortes and O t l l lo  U late 1n the Myth 
are as d is torted  as the characterization  of Flgueres. The Myth 
fosters the image o f Cortls as a model o f governmental propriety  
such th a t the Im proprieties of Calderon appear so extreme th a t revolu­
tion  was ju s t i f ie d .  The Myth describes Ulate as an honest but uninspired 
p o lit ic ia n *  inadequate fo r  the challenges of governing 1n the modern 
world. Depicting Ulate as In e ffec tu a l enhances the image of Flgueres 
as a fo rc e fu l, capable leader.
The adm inistration of Leon Cortes from 1936-1940 was touted as 
the epitome of honesty and e ffic ie n c y  1n contrast to Calder6n's venal 
adm inistration . I t  is  true that Cortes l e f t  a surplus 1n the treasury  
when he turned the presidency over to Calderon. He was able to do 
so because his government had exemplified what the cafetaleros con­
sidered good government, i . e . ,  minimal government. Cortes, In e f fe c t ,  
did l i t t l e  to advance the country, economically or s o c ia lly . Nor was 
Cortes re lu c tan t to use force 1 f challenged. In 1938 he dismissed 
the e n tire  National E lectoral Council (a government body that admin­
is tered  e lections) fo r  refusing to annul the e lec tio n  of a communist 
deputy. Elections 1n general were manipulated by the Incumbent 
government. Government employees were expected to work fo r the 
candidates 1n the congressional elections and the police acted as 
government spies against the opposition. C ortls never tr ie d  to  
In s t itu te  economic or social reform that would have antagonized his
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wealthy supporters. Therein lay his a c c e p ta b ility . Perhaps because 
he did not cause the cafeta leros any discom fort, they considered him 
a great president.
Cortes may have played a fa r  more crucia l ro le  than the Myth 
assigned to him. Opposition to Calder6n may have begun as a feud 
between Calderon and Cortes. Evidently Cortes viewed Calderon as 
a stand-in fo r him u n til the ob ligatory Interim  term ended 1n 1944, 
when Cortes intended to run again fo r  president. CalderSn had d e fin ite  
ideas of his own about who should govern Costa R1ca and he had an 
ambitious program of reform to in s t itu te . In add itio n , Calderon 
immediately began dismissing Cortes' supporters from th e ir  govern­
ment positions. Once Calderon began sponsoring such reforms as 
soda! security and labor r ig h ts , the alarmed conservatives, whose 
prerogatives were d ire c tly  threatened, turned to Cortes and found a 
w illin g  a l ly .  Cortes made a perfect leader fo r the opposition in 
i ts  attack on Calderon's w astefu l, expensive, d isrup tive  p o lic ie s .
His e ffic ie n c y  and fis c a l propriety  were constrasted to Calderon's
44 ✓Incompetence and extravagence. U n til his death 1n 1946, Cortes
led the opposition to Calderon. At th a t time the mantle of leader­
ship was transferred to U late.
The ambiguity of the mythic treatment of U late was discussed 
above. To ju s t i fy  the Junta, and la te r  LlberaclOn, Ulate had to
^^Theodore S. Creedman, "The P o lit ic a l Development of Costa R1ca: 
1936-1944: P o lit ic s  o f an Emerging Welfare State In a Patriarchal
Society," (Ph.D. D isserta tio n , U n ivers ity  of Maryland, 1971), pp. 32-69. 
Acufta makes the same po int; see his El̂  48, pp. 37-38.
44Creedman, " P o lit ic a l Development," pp. 169-172.
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be depicted as Incompetent and opposed to social reform. This meant 
he had to be relegated to a minor position 1n the Revolution. As 
the p o lit ic a l h e ir to C o rtls , U late was fa r  more Important 1n the 
events leading to the Revolution than the Myth admits. Further, he 
did not agree completely with armed re v o lt as the solution to the 
election  annulment 1n 1948. Even a f te r  the fig h tin g  had begun,
45Ulate apparently hoped th a t a peaceful settlement could be reached.
The U beracion claim that Ulate turned on the Movement a fte r  
v ic to ry  had been achieved 1s also an exaggeration. Ulate had never 
f u l ly  supported Flgueres in the f i r s t  place. Second, he ju s t i f ia b ly  
expected to receive the presidency once Calder6n was defeated. A fte r  
a l l ,  U late had been duly e lected . Had not the Revolution been fought 
to preserve e lec to ra l In te g rity?  U la te , and p a rtic u la r ly  his con­
servative supporters, f e l t  betrayed. They had given Figueres moral 
support and some fin an c ia l assistance to r id  themselves o f one social 
reform er, only to fin d  another in his place. When asked why he 
signed the Pact accepting the creation of the Junta Fundadora, Ulate  
rep lled:
I understood that these people who wanted [me to sign] held power; 
then I thought to myself: I am the President by the w ill  o f the
people, but these [people] have the guns. What would happen i f  
I did not sign? Another c iv i l  war? Sumnlng up these thoughts, I 
came to the follow ing conclusions: Whatever concession I made would
be less e v il than [lo s in g ] the live s  of Costa Ricans. I signed.46
Ulate and his supporters had only the word o f Flgueres that Ulate  
would receive the presidency at the end o f the agreed tim e. When 
Flgueres began making changes by f l a t ,  the new opposition was formed, 
th is  time a n tl-F ig u e ris ta .
45Acuna, H  48 . p. 185.
46Ib1d ., p. 352.
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V illa in s ?
Rafael Calder6n Guardla, the arch v i l la in  of the Myth o f the 
Revolution, made many serious mistakes during his term in o ff ic e  and 
in the campaign fo r ree lec tio n  1n 1947-1948. Yet he was not the 
to ta lly  unscrupulous, u tte r ly  corrupt despot portrayed by the Myth.
Some o f the sp ec ific  charges of corruption and violence made against 
his adm inistration are considered 1n the next two chapters. In 
th is  section some general observations regarding Calderon w ill  
m itigate  the te r r ib le  Image presented by the Myth.
Calderon took o ff ic e  w ith a strong desire to make desperately
needed social and economic changes. While a student In Belgium,
Calder6n was deeply a ffected  by the social theories of Cardinal
47M erd er and the Papal Encyclical Rerum Novarum. He became firm ly  
committed to the a lle v ia tio n  of poverty and economic stagnation  
through the extension and expansion of government services. Calderon 
In s titu te d  a system of social s e cu rity , began the construction o f 
low cost housing, established a code of labor r ig h ts , and tr ie d  in  
various other ways to Improve the lives  of the lower c lass. Calderon's 
ta len ts  lay  p rim arily  1n s ta rtin g  projects; his adm inistrative a b i l i t ie s  
were considerably less developed,
47Cardinal M e rd e r, an In f lu e n tia l in te lle c tu a l force a t the 
University  of Louvain 1n Belgium where Calder6n la te r  studied, tr ie d  
to provide a C hristian  a lte rn a tiv e  to socialism  on matters o f social 
reform. See Henry Louis Dubly, The L ife  o f Cardinal M erd er (London: 
Sands & Co., 1928), pp. 39-114. lie rum Novarum reaffirm ed the princip les  
o f cap ita lism , but 1t also ca lled  fo r the protection of workers r ig h ts , 
Including adequate wages, decent working conditions, and reasonable 
hours of labor. See, Catholic Church, "On the Condition o f Workers,"
1n Two Basic Social Encyclicals (Washington, D .C .: Catholic University
Press, 19T3), pp. 2-81.
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Concerned w ith In it ia t in g  the reforms he believed necessary* 
Calderon neglected to supervise his subordinates adequately. As 
he him self la te r  admitted some o f his ass is tan ts , p a rt ic u la r ly  those 
handling government contracts, enriched themselves a t public expense. 
Rather than develop a coordinated plan of management, Calder6n con­
centrated on dealing with sp ec ific  problems. As a consequence he 
b u ilt  a new governmental bureaucracy based on the antiquated founda­
tion  of the old in s titu tio n s . Further he plunged ahead with reform 
before preparing the groups most negatively a ffec ted . He made no 
attempt to convince the middle and upper Income groups to accept 
the Increased cost or to show them the benefits  th a t they would accrue 
from rais ing  the standard of liv in g  fo r a l l .
The charge that Calder6n wanted to set up a d ic ta to rsh ip  on
the lines o f T r u j i l lo  in the Dominican Republic or Somoza In Nicaragua,
cannot be supported by the evidence proffered by the L1berac1on1stas.
Calderon was determined to successfully implement his program o f change.
When he began to lose support, he also seemed to lose perspective
as he permitted abuses by his followers that opened him to charges of
48corruption and fraud.
The Myth d ea lt ju s t  as harshly with Manuel Mora and Teodoro 
Picado, The fa c t th a t Mora was the head o f the Communist Party of 
Costa R1ca doomed him to accusations o f the w ildest s o rt. Mora was 
denounced as the je fe  o f the thugs, the b u lly  boys, the marlachls
48 Ib id . ,  pp. 35-84; A g u ila r, Sus hechos, pp. 23-90; Creedman In 
p articu lar defends Ca1der6n strongly In his " P o lit ic a l Development."
used by Calderon to In tim idate  his opponents. And 1t 1s true that 
Mora's followers were w illin g  to go into  the streets  to defend th e ir  
in te re s ts . When Calderon took them as a ll ie s  they did much of the 
d ir ty  work fo r him. As the head of the Communist Partj^ Mora must 
share part o f the blame fo r the excesses of the Calder6n government.
Tactics of in tim idation  were not in tr in s ic  to the Communist
Party of Costa Rica. While try in g  to organize the labor movement
1n the 1930's Mora learned about violence and in tim idation  a t the
hands o f the United F ru it Company and Cortes' p o l ic e .^  Mora
him self and his fam ily  were nearly k ille d  1n 1946 when his home
was dynamited, and in the next year another attempt was made to
50assassinate him. L i t t le  wonder he did not prevent his followers  
from committing v io le n t acts of th e ir  own.
Mora's actions 1n the Calderbn deliberations a f te r  the 1948
elections and la te r  in negotiations to end the f ig h tin g  b e lle  the
L iberad6n  Image o f an unprincipled te r r o r is t .  Mora argued vigorously
against annulling the elections on the grounds th a t the Calderonistas
had much to lose and l i t t l e  to gain by such actio n . In an In terv iew
Mora explained his position regarding the best possible course fo r
the Calderonistas:
We [the comnunists] said that e ffe c t iv e ly  there had been fraud, 
but the declaration [1n favor of U la te] by the Tribunal of 
Elections created a very dangerous and complicated s itu a tio n
49Creedman, " P o lit ic a l Development," pp. 74-76. See also Carlos 




fo r us, because we knew the le g a lis t ic  m entality  of the people 
o f Costa Rlca.51
He believed that the m ajority  o f the people would consider the decision 
of the Tribunal in v io la b le . To refuse to accept that decision would 
be to r is k  c iv i l  war. Consequently, he counseled le t t in g  llla te  have 
the presidency. Once the decision to annul the elections had been 
made and his party had decided to go along w ith Calderon, Mora stead­
fa s t ly  supported his party and the government.
In the f in a ls  days of the Revolution when the government was 
about to collapse, Mora s t i l l  had an e ffe c tiv e  fig h tin g  force that 
could have carried on the f ig h t  without government support. Many of 
Mora's supporters urged him to make a la s t  d itch stand 1n San Jose.
This would have been enormously costly 1n liv e s , not to mention 
property. Mora chose to negotiate with Figueres to Insure the 
continuance of the reform program started  by Calder6n. Although he had 
resorted to violence when he thought 1t necessary, Mora's principal 
concern was Improving the lo t  of the workers and the peasant. His
almost u n ila te ra l action at the end of the c iv i l  war showed a w il l ln g -
52ness to s a c rif ic e  his own position fo r social reform.
I f  any leading character in th is  tu rbu len t period can be con­
sidered a trag ic  f ig u re , 1t 1s Teodoro Picado. The Myth portrayed 
him as a simple stooge fo r Calderon, unable or unw illing to take a 
step without his je fe 's  permission. Picado was not a mere puppet of
51A g u ilar, Sus hechos, pp. 356-367.
52 *For Mora's part 1n the negotiations, see Acuna, El 48,
pp. 299-302; fo r  Mora's version o f the events surrounding tfie Revolu­
t io n , see A g u ila r, pp. 311-324, 341-366.
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o f Calderon. I t  1s true he carried  on the po lic ies  In it ia te d  by 
Calder6n, but his actions as President Ind icate  that he too was 
conrvttted to socio-economic reform.
Picado accomplished much during his adm inistration . The
primary task he undertook was to straighten out the confused and
in e ff ic ie n t  manner 1n which the reforms already promulgated were
administered. The country was in a serious fin an c ia l po s itio n , with
a huge d e f ic it  caused by reduced exports and increased imports due
1n part to the Second World War and to the g rea tly  expanded budget
created by Calderon. Picado In it ia te d  a series o f f is c a l reforms
known as the Leyes de Ordenamiento Fiscal (Laws of Fiscal Order)
that Included the creation o f a com ptroller's  o ff ic e  to oversee
a l l  f is c a l a f fa ir s ,  establishment o f an o ff ic e  fo r drawing up the
budget based on c a re fu lly  planned gu idelines, and c e n tra liza tio n  o f
the rece ip t of revenues 1n a department of the treasury. To Increase
53revenues, an Income tax was f in a l ly  passed under his d ire c tio n .
E lectoral fraud posed another grave th reat which he handled 
e ffe c t iv e ly . Picado's e lectio n  had been s u llie d  by fraud and other 
governmental misconduct. Soon a fte r  taking o ff ic e  he proposed the 
establishment o f an e lec to ra l tribunal to adm inister fu ture e lec tio n s . 
In 1946 the new E lectoral Code was passed which established an 
Electoral Tribunal to supervise a l l  phases o f the elections and an 
Election Registry responsible fo r questions o f voting e l ig ib i l i t y .
The elections th a t took place under Picado*s adm inistration (the  
1946 Congressional e lections and the 1948 general e lec tio ns) were
®3Agu1lar, Sus hechos, pp. 14-111; B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 73-80.
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probably as honest as any In Costa R ica's h istory  to that tim e.
Unfortunately fo r Picado and Calderon, the Electoral Tribunal had
a fa ta l flaw . I t  s t i l l  was not e n tire ly  free  o f partisan Influence.
The members were appointed by the three branches o f government— the
President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. By law the decision
o f the Tribunal regarding the presidency was subject to confirmation
by the Congress. This arrangement contained ju s t  enough ambiguity
that both sides in 1948 could in te rp re t the law to s u it th e ir  own
ends. Flaws not withstanding, Picado deserves much o f the c re d it fo r
54bringing e lec to ra l honesty and fa irness to Costa Rican p o lit ic s .
Picado should also be credited fo r  his e ffo rts  to m inify the
incidence o f violence during his adm inistration and especia lly  during
the Revolution. Picado considered the Alma Ticazo--an armed attempt
to seize the government--a mere "boys prank." He responded by per-
55sonally releas(ng from prison a l l  those captured by the po lice .
The press attacks on nearly everything he attempted were extremely 
v i t r io l ic .  Not once was any newspaper closed down nor any radio  
stations forced o ff  the a i r .  Throughout his adm inistration the 
Figueristas carried  on a te r r o r is t  campaign of bombings and d is ­
ruption. No secret police protected the government by midnight 
ra id s , the prisons were not f i l l e d  w ith p o lit ic a l prisoners, no 
one was executed. V io len t confrontations occurred between the
54A g u ila r, Sus hechos, pp. 112-116; B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 115-121.
^The golpe de estado attempted on the night of 24 June 1946 1s 
called  the Alma Tleazo a f te r  the radio s ta tion  Alma T1ca which was to 
have been the central ra lly in g  point fo r  the rebels. See B e ll,  
C r is is , pp. 96-97.
government supporters and members of the opposition, but the govern­
ment did not d ire c t a coordinated plan o f harassment. A free  press
and compassionate consideration fo r "misguided youth" are strange
56ta c tic s  fo r a d ic ta to r to use.
Picado seemed unable to believe that Costa Ricans were re a lly  
capable o f revo lu tion . U ntil the Revolution was firm ly  under way 
1n A pril of 1948, Picado maintained his fa ith  1n the tranqu il nature 
o f the Ticos and the peaceful tra d itio n s  o f Costa Rican p o lit ic s .
Picado was the f i r s t  o f the government o f f ic ia ls  to admit 
that the rebels were winning, th a t the poorly tra ined and poorly 
led forces of the government could not cope with the growing 
F1guer1sta army. He began negotiations w ith the L iberation  Army 
to end the f ig h tin g . Picado made c lear his In tention  to resign 
1n a le t te r  to Mora and Calder6n saying, "We do not have the r ig h t  
to continue s a c rific in g  our people, I have decided to s a c rific e  
m y s e l f . F a t h e r  Benjamin Nunez Vargas, the negotiator fo r Flgueres, 
attested to the concern Picado had fo r ending the bloodshed, saying 
1n an Interview :
I believe that In the la s t days Teodoro Picado tr ie d  to a c t, not 
as the p o lit ic ia n  who had stayed 1n the service o f a c liq u e , but 
as a p a tr io t . I  hope to w rite  th is  pub lic ly  one day, to pay 
homage to Teodoro P i c a d o . 58
Nunez1 comment 1s not mentioned 1n L1berac1on1sta w ritin g s .
56Acuna, LL 48, pp. 103-112; B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 96-100.
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L ette r dated 18 A p ril 1948 given 1n evidence before the Supreme 
Court o f Costa R1ca during Picado's t r ia l  fo r  treason. Transcribed In  
I ts  e n tire ty  1n Defense de los senores 1Icenciado Teodoro Picado y don 
Vicente Urucyo by Enrlque Gu1er(San Jos&, Costa- Ri ca: n . p . ,  1950),
pp. 2?-28.
e g
A g uilar, Sus hechos, p. 396.
Picado, as did Calderon, made many mistakes. Aguilar concluded 
th a t Picado's greatest mistake was to allow him self to be used by 
his friends and his enemies. To deal e f fe c t iv e ly  with the worst o f 
the opposition, Picado would have had to  become what the opposition 
accused him and Calder6n o f being, a d ic ta to r . This he refused to be. 
The opposition, espec ia lly  the revo lution-bent F lg ueris tas , never 
gave him the chance to be as e ffe c tiv e  a president as his a b i l i t ie s  
and his desires could have produced.
CONCLUSIONS
The principal figures 1n the Revolution, as portrayed in the 
Uberacion account, are mythic. The description of each character 
supports the basic mythic theme— the lib e ra tio n  of Costa Rica from 
corruption, tyranny, and archaic governmental In s t itu tio n s , The 
lin e  between good and e v il is c le a rly  drawn. The leaders of the 
oppressive regim e--Calder6n, Picado, and Mora--have no redeeming 
q u a lit ie s ; the leaders o f the oppos1t1on--F1gueres and Cortes—have 
no fa u lts . U la te , the other opposition leader, is flawed, but his 
presumed weaknesses--lack of decisiveness, reluctance to change, 
economic conservat1sm--enhance the stature  o f Flgueres and ju s t i fy  
the eighteen month ru le  by Junta. The language 1s hyperbolic and 
dramatic. The stereotypical treatment of these s ix  protagonists 
epitomizes the mythopoela 1n the L1beracl6n account.
The portrayal o f Flgueres h ighlights two p a rtic u la r  aspects of 
the Costa Rican p o lit ic a l cu ltu re . The Movement fo r  National L ibera­
tion was supposed to be a spontaneous reaction to the excesses o f the 
Calderonistas. Uberacion Nacional 1s ostensibly a modern In s t i tu ­
tio n a lized  p o lit ic a l  party . Yet Flgueres dominated both the Movement
and the Party 1n the Myth as w ell as 1n r e a l i ty .  The s u s c e p tib ility  
o f Costa Ricans fo r personal1st1c p o lit ic s  1s re flec ted  1n the Myth 
despite U beracion disclaim ers that U beracion has moved beyond the 
p o lit ic s  of personality .
The p a rtic u la r  a ttr ib u te s  and actions o f Figueres that the 
Myth emphasizes are those th a t conform to Costa Rican p o lit ic a l  
values. Flgueres entered p o lit ic s ,  according to the Myth, not fo r  
personal gain but because he was outraged at the misconduct o f the 
Calderonistas. His goals were to restore respect fo r  e lec tio n ^ , 
honest government, and to end p o lit ic a l v io lence. Except fo r  the 
Revolution I t s e l f ,  his contraventions o f those Ideals are ignored.
The mythical Figueres 1s the archetypical Costa Rican c it iz e n . The 
Myth portrays him as a self-made man who has stayed a loo f from p o li­
t ic s  u n til a national c r is is  moves him to enter the p o lit ic a l arena. 
Although slow to s ta r t ,  the Costa Rican c it iz e n  w arrio r, as embodied 
in Flgueres, knows how to and does take the necessary measures to 
restore national values. At the same tim e, the Myth must show 
Figueres as a man of vision because he was instrumental in founding 
a self-consciously Ideological p o lit ic a l party , a departure from the 
personal1st1c party usual 1n Costa Rica up to that time. The fo llo w ­
ing chapter examines the ways In which the myth Incorporates Costa 
Rican values examining the formation o f U beracion Nacional.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL VALUES IN THE MYTH 
OF THE REVOLUTION
Myths, by nature, d is to r t  as they explain events and s ituations  
to the group that believes them. D is to rtio n  ranges from om itting  
evidence contrary to the mythic theme, to In te rp re tin g  generally  
known events 1n a favorable way, to o u trig h t ly in g . The degree o f 
d is to rtio n  1n a myth depends upon how fa r  the mythic theme diverges 
from r e a l i ty .  That is  to say, d is to rtio n  varies according to the 
need to convince the group th a t the myth Is  v a lid . When the group 
1s called  upon to act In ways that contradict cherished idea ls , 
a considerable amount of d is to rtio n  1s required to reconcile action  
with b e lie f .  Such reco ncilia tio ns  are a primary function of myths.
The d is to rtio n s  1n p o lit ic a l myths fo llow  d iscern ib le  patterns. 
Myths are not c o lle c t iv it ie s  of random fan tas ies . The central pat­
tern to which a myth conforms can also be called  the mythic theme. 
Whatever 1s included in the mythic narra tive  w il l  enhance the theme; 
th a t which would de trac t from or c a ll In to  question the theme is  
excluded. A mythic theme 1s a d is t i l la t io n  of mythic n arra tive  to 
a simple statement o f essential elements, e .g . ,  t ru s t ,  b e traya l, 
revenge; r is e ,  triumph, f a l l ;  s in , punishment, redemption. One of 
the questions mythologlsts have struggled with Is  whether or not there
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ex is ts  a basic set of mythic themes common to a l l  so c ie ties . Of 
greater salience here 1s how a cu lture  fleshes out a simple mythic 
theme 1n ways th a t re f le c t  cu ltu ra l norms, b ias , and values. The 
mythic theme provides a lin e  of reasoning; cu ltu ra l Idiosyncrasies  
determine what emblishments the cu lture  considers lo g ic a l. Both the 
theme and the supporting n arra tive  conform to cu ltu ra l expectations. 
Values are one a ttr ib u te  th a t a ffe c t the conformation of myths-- 
p o lit ic a l values 1n the case of p o lit ic a l myths.
The theme of the Myth o f the Revolution 1s read ily  d iscern ib le  
in the Carta Fundamental (Founding Charter) o f Llberacion Naclonal, 
I . e . ,  th re a t-re a c tlo n -re s o lu tio n . There 1s a d ia le c t ic  a t work in 
the L iberation  theme. An Incumbent regime threatens to destroy 
the tra d it io n a l Costa Rican values, thereby creating a counterforce 
th a t restores the lo s t values through armed re v o lt , culminating 
In the establishment of a new p o lit ic a l party which w il l  guarantee 
the preservation of Costa Rican democracy.
Liberadrfn mythology I t s e l f  links  the mythic theme and the
aspect o f p o lit ic a l cu ltu re  a t question here, I . e . ,  p o lit ic a l values.
The "Preamble" to the Carta Fundamental proclaims that:
This Epic [Revolution o f 1948] constituted the great s a c rif ic e  o f 
the Costa Rican people 1n th e ir  f ig h t  to  reconquer national values 
[which had been] gradually lo s t . . . .1
*Part1do LlberadtSn Naclonal, "Carta Fundamental de 1951," 1n 
Carta Fundamental (San Jos4, Costa R1ca: Primer Congreso Ideologlco,
1969), p . 39. This 1s a pamphlet published by L1berad6n which also  
contains the "Carta Fundamental Numero Dos de 1969," and the "Segunda 
Proclama de Santa Marla de Dota" (a statement of objectives o f the 
Army of National L iberation  made 1n 1948). H ereafter the two charters  
w ill  be re ferred  to as the Carta Fundamental and the Carta Fundamental 
Numero Dos; page numbers w il l  be those o f the pamphlet!
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The Carta Fundamental contains no l i s t  of national values supposedly 
lo s t ,  but L lberac lon lstas , 1n th e ir  account of the Revolution, make 
very c lea r what they consider to be the basic p o lit ic a l values of 
Costa Rica th a t the CalderOn regime was destroying. The values 
th a t predominate 1n the Myth p a ra lle l those discussed In the pre­
vious chapter, i . e . ,  respect fo r  e lec tio n s , protection of c iv i l  r ig h ts , 
nonviolence, and honest government. The Myth o f the Revolution 
espoused by Llberacion Naclonal ra tio n a lizes  two great contradic­
tions fo r the Llberacion p a rtld a rlo s . The Myth ju s t i f ie s  the v io le n t  
overthrow of the government 1n a country that takes pride in  re je c t ­
ing violence as in  acceptable p o lit ic a l method. Second, the Myth 
explains why the group th a t threw out one government fo r being d ic ta ­
to r ia l took over as a governing body th a t ruled by f i a t .  The Myth 
also establishes the legitim acy o f Llberacion Naclonal as the he ir  
to Costa Rican aspirations expressed 1n the Revolution.
The f i r s t  two functions, which are simply rationales fo r past 
actions, required considerable d is to rtio n . To ju s t i fy  armed re v o lt,  
the Incumbent government had to be presented 1n the worst possible 
l ig h t ;  the L iberation  Movement, on the contrary, had to exemplify 
a l l  the best q u a litie s  o f Costa Rican democracy. The Llberacion  
version o f the causes and conduct o f the Revolution d is to rts  most 
by omission. Pertinent evidence th a t m itigates action taken by 
the government was excluded; only the Information supporting Llbera- 
clOn In te rp re ta tio n s  was Included. The published accounts th a t ad­
vance Llberacion explanations share a p ro c liv ity  fo r  categorical 
assertions without supporting data.
The n arra tive  covers p o lit ic a l events o f about ten years, from 
the f i r s t  e lec to ra l challenge to the Calderonistas 1n 1942 to the 
foundation o f Llberacion Nacional in 1951. Perusal o f Llberacion  
l i te r a tu re  reveals that the selection (and exclusion) o f Information  
conforms to the p o lit ic a l values mentioned above. In add itio n , 
great emphasis is  placed by Liberac1on1stas on the Costa Ricaness 
( fo r  lack o f a b e tte r term) o f the Liberation Movement. This Is  
especia lly  applicable to the L1berad6n attack on the communist 
supporters of Calder6n and to th e ir  own ideological pretensions.
In th is  chapter, Liberaci6n l ite ra tu re  1s examined in terms 
of the p o lit ic a l values that exert the greatest influence on the 
conformation of the mythic n a rra tiv e . These are: e lec to ra l In teg ­
r i t y ,  honest government, c iv i l  r ig h ts , and nonviolence. In each 
section , f i r s t  the Llberacion version o f the events that stress the 
v io la tio n  (o r redemption) o f the values 1s re la ted . Then a lte rn a tiv e  
explanations drawn from non-Liberacion sources are offered in contrast.
L1berac1onista mythmakers did not fab ric a te  the occurrences o f 
1940-1948; nor did they imagine the excesses and reprehensible be­
havior of many Calderonistas. They did omit any mention of a c t iv it ie s  
of th e ir  own th a t might d e trac t from the image of the L iberation  Move­
ment as the savior o f Costa Rican democracy. The in te rp re ta tio n s  the 
mythmakers gave to the actions of the Calderon government are severely 
skewed to ju s t i fy  the undemocratic way 1n which Llberacitfn o r ig in a lly  
came to power.
HONEST GOVERNMENT
Latin  American governments have been notorious fo r  corruption  
o f a l l  types. B ribery, g r a f t ,  and peculation often have been the 
norm; honesty among government o f f ic ia ls  has been the exception.
Costa R1ca, on the other hand, has enjoyed an extraordinary reputa­
tion  fo r governmental v ir tu e . Whether or not th is  reputation 1s 
deserved 1s of less concern here than th a t the groups opposed to 
the Calder6n Guardla regime made charges of corruption th e ir  f i r s t  
lin e  o f a ttac k .
Calderon Guardia took o ff ic e  In 1940 a f te r  winning a v ir tu a lly
2
unopposed national e le c tio n . By the time the midterm congressional 
e lection  took place, opposition to Calder6n Guardla was growing. 
According to the L1beracion1stas, the increasing awareness of corrup­
tion  and nepotism turned supporters against Calderon. Canas c ite s  
"nepotism raised to uncalculable extremes," the most nefarious  
example being the appointment of "a brother o f the President, an 
obscure bank cashier u n til that year, [as ] Secretary of Government
3
and Third Designate to the Presidency." Even worse, these "Incompe­
ten t and Inept" re la tiv e s  used th e ir  positions to secure lu c ra tiv e  
contracts and promote th e ir  own business in te re s ts . Abetted by a 
puppet Congress, the Calderon government managed to Incur the f i r s t  
national d e f ic it  since 1929. Calderon mob1ll2ed a l l  the power of 
the s ta te  to secure sa tis fac to ry  resu lts  in the 1942 congressional
2
John Patrick  Bel 1, C ris is  1n Costa R1ca: The 1948 Revolution
(A ustin , Texas: Un1 vers 1ty c>f Texas Press, 1971), p. 16.
^Albert E. Carlas, Los ocho a nos (San Jose, Costa R1ca: E d ito ria l
Llberacldn Naclonal, 195577 p. 18.
e lec tio n s , but the people, recognizing the fraudulent nature of the
government, began to re je c t calderonlsmo. CalderOn, Incapable of
s e lf -c r it ic is m  or o f a lte r in g  his methods, had to fin d  a new source
of support. Who would be w illin g  to support a corrupt and fraudulent
4
government? "Of course! The Connunlsts!"
Baeza concentrates on the Communist p a rtic ip a tio n  in the 
Caldenfn government. He quotes the public c ritic ism s  made by the 
Costa Rican Conmunist Party to i l lu s t r a te  the perfidy  o f the Calderon­
is ta s . A fte r two years o f v i l l i f y in g  the Calderfin government, changes 
In policy d ictated by Moscow required the Contnunists to attempt 
rapprochement with governments opposing H it le r .  This change coin­
cided with Calderdn's need fo r support. What more f i t t in g  p o lit ic a l  
combination could there be than the jo in in g  o f a venal. In c ip ien t  
d ic ta to rsh ip  with the insidious Communists? The Communists In jected
a new element into  Costa Rican pol 1t1cs --th e  w illingness and the
5
a b i l i t y  to use violence.
L iberacionistas considered the a llia n c e  between Calderon and 
the Communist Party an act th a t proved beyond doubt Calderon's im­
m orality . To them, communism represented a lie n  b e lie fs  u tte r ly  
opposed to Costa Rican tra d itio n s  and values. There 1s no doubt that 
Manuel Mora and other Communists were In f lu e n tia l 1n CalderOn*s 
adm inistration; the Communist Party under the name Vanguardla Popular 
(Popular Vanguard) worked a c tiv e ly  with the Calderonistas. Whether
4 Ib 1 d ., pp. 18-23.
^Alberto Baeza F lores, La lucha sin f in  (M lx lco , D .F .: B. Costa
Am1c, 1969), pp. 98-103.
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one believes that Mora and the Vanguardla were working to Improve 
the lo t  of the working class, or that they were only using Calder6n 
to seize power fo r  themselves depends more on one's philosophical 
and Ideological d isposition than on evidence. Communism was a 
p o lit ic a l Issue fo r the Costa Ricans 1n the 1940's and has remained 
so, even though Mora and his colleagues continue to take part 1n 
p o lit ic a l a f f a i r s .6
Other questions o f corruption o ffe r  good examples of mythic 
d is to rtio n . The opposition seized three p a rtic u la r  aspects o f the 
f is c a l d i f f ic u lt ie s  experienced by the Calder6n government as proof 
of his unworthiness to lead the country--def1c1ts, fin an c ia l impro­
p r ie ty , and mismanagement.
Calderfin's social and economic po lic ies  incurred d e fic its  fa r  
in excess of any previous adm inistration . Much of the excess was an 
In ev itab le  res u lt of expanded government services. To many Costa 
Ricans th is  alone was s u ff ic ie n t proof of corruption , fo r  how else  
could overexpenditures be explained? Many of the expenditures them­
selves, such as sending representatives to meetings and conferences, 
even rais ing  salaries  fo r permanent employees were considered signs 
o f corruption. Thus, the actual Instances of public o f f ic ia ls  using 
th e ir  o ffice s  to make p ro fita b le  business deals merely proved the 
suspicions that corruption was rampant. Exacerbating a l l  the 
normal problems attendant to  expanding a tra d itio n a l government 
with archaic In s titu tio n s  and procedures, were the exigencies o f a
6For an exce llen t discussion o f the Issue o f convnunlsm 1n Costa 
R1ca during the 1940's see B e ll,  C r is is , Chapter 3 , "The Issue o f 
Convnunlsm," pp. 41-61.
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wartime world market. Calder6n was g u ilty  of f is c a l mismanagement and, 
as he admitted during the e lectio n  campaign of 1948, some of his sub­
ordinates did b e n e fit f in a n c ia lly  from o ff ic e . The Myth makes no 
d is tin c tio n  between mismanagement and corruption, nor does 1t mention 
that subsequent governments, including Liberaclon, have committed 
many of the same e rro rs .7
The opposition charged Calderon with nepotism, but In th is  regard 
he was l i t t l e  worse than his predecessors. For example, Creedman 
l is ts  the follow ing re la tiv e s  o f Cortes who held o ffic e  in his 
adm inistration: Otto Cortes Fernandez, President of Congress (son);
Javier Cortes Fernandez, Commander of A la juela  barracks (son);
Claudio Cortes Castro, Adm inistrator of the P ac ific  Railroad (b ro th e r);
Luis Fernandez, M in is ter of the In te r io r  (b ro th e r-in -la w ); Arturo
/  8 Fernandez, Consul of Washington (b ro th e r-in -la w ).
CIVIL RIGHTS
According to the Myth, Calderon began his "adu lteracion" of 
Costa Rican democracy by suspending certa in  ind ividual r ig h ts , in ­
cluding peaceful assembly, freedom o f speech, protection from un­
reasonable search and se izure , and habeas corpus. The government 
claimed the curtailm ent o f these rights  was a necessary part of the 
preparations fo r defense. Costa R1ca had ju s t  declared war on the 
Axis powers and was vulnerable to Invasion. Furthermore, the large
7The best discussion o f corruption In the Calderon government
I have seen 1s In B e ll,  C r is is , Chapter 4 , "Fiscal Corruption and 
Mismanagement," pp. 62-80.
®Tfeodore S. Creedman, "The P o lit ic a l Development o f Costa 
R1ca, 1936-1944" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , U n ivers ity  of Maryland, 1971),
p. 166.
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German comnunlty, so economically powerful, posed a menace from w ith ­
in , The government had to have the power to deal e ffe c t iv e ly  with  
any th re a t. L1berac1on1stas Interpreted these wartime measures 
d if fe re n t ly .^
To s a tis fy  his new a l l ie s ,  ’’the Children of Moscow," Calderon 
in it ia te d  a series o f "Social Guarantees." "The New Policy" would 
take the place o f the "Ind iv idual Rights" which had been suspended 
due to the war with the Axis. The New Policy would estab lish  "the 
r ig h t to s tr ik e , the r ig h t to a minimum wage, and other necessary 
measures;" but i t  would liq u id a te  the others, "the ancient ones, 
known as 'the Rights of Man.1" ^  This was a l l  according to the 
communist master plan fo r gaining absolute control over Costa Rica.
U beracion istas  o ffe r  l i t t l e  evidence that the suspension o f  
constitu tional guarantees was other than a wartime procedure designed 
to f a c i l i t a te  the control of German, I t a l ia n ,  and Japanese liv in g  in 
Costa Rica. Only a few examples of the v io la tio n  of c iv i l  rig h ts  by 
the Calderonistas can be found in the Llberacion l i te r a tu r e .  One 1s 
the sacking o f an opposition radio s tation  1n July of 1943. Baeza 
claims that the attack was the opening move o f the Plcado campaign 
fo r president In the e lection  o f 1944. He w rites th a t , ". . . body­
guards o f P1cado--w1th the impunity of the government--assaulted 
'Radio T lta n ia '"  1n order to silence the voice of the opposition to
Q
Juan Francisco Rojas Suarez, Costa Rica en la  ̂ segunda guerra 
mundial (San Jos£, Costa R1ca: Imprenta NaclonaT, 1943)7 pp. 10-11.
For the debate in the le g is la t iv e  assembly on the suspension o f con­
s t itu t io n a l guarantees, see pp. 12-29.
10Canas,  Los ocho a n o s , p.  2 5 .
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the government o f Caldenfn Guardla.** The g u ilty  parties  were 
arrested and punished fo r  the deed, but the opposition continued
to use th is  occurrence as an example of Calder6n's d ic ta to r ia l
12pol1c1es.
The most Important v io la tio n  o f Ind ividual rights  reported 
in the Myth is  the e x ile  o f Flgueres. The Mythic account goes as 
follows.
On July 8, 1942, follow ing the San Pablo r io ts  a notice ap­
peared 1n the morning papers which announced that Don Jos£ Flgueres 
would t e l l  the true story about the organization dedicated to 
undermining the Republic by sabotage. At the appointed hour, Figueres 
began his exposition on the outrages comnltted by the government 
and the Communists. His arguments were ir re fu ta b le , his speech mag­
n if ic e n t. Before he could complete his discourse the transmission 
was in terrup ted . The silence continued, then Flgueres1 voice was 
heard again; the Government had ordered the transmission stopped.
Flgueres managed a few la s t words, "What the government should do 
131s to get out!" Charging Flgueres with subversion, the Government 
sent him in to  e x ile . The government made a serious mistake, fo r  
th is  speech marked the introduction o f Figueres to p o lit ic s . In 
e x ile  he began his tra in in g  and planning fo r the overthrow of 
Caldertfn.*4
**Baeza, La lucha, p. 166.
*^Creedman, " P o lit ic a l Development," p. 259,
| o
Arturo Castro Esqu1v6l, Jos£ Figueres: el hombre y su obra
San Jos6, Costa R1ca: Imprenta Tormo, 1955), p .“ 35.
^ E s s e n tia lly  th is  same version Is re la ted  by Canas, Baeza, and 
Castro.
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On the subject of the v io la tio n  of c iv i l  r ig h ts , i t  Is  much more 
In te res tin g  to  look a t what L1berac1on1sta mythmakers om it. The 
eighteen months o f ru le  by the Junta Fundadora are an In teg ra l part 
of the Myth o f the Revolution, and Llberaclonlstas make much of the 
s o c ia l, economic, and p o lit ic a l changes that the Junta attempted.
No mention is made of the Junta's own record on c iv i l  r ig h ts . An 
examination o f the record suggests why the Llberaclonlstas are re ­
luctant to review some aspects of the Junta's ru le .
The Pact of the Mexican Embassy served as a peace tre a ty  fo r  
the Revolution. Certain guarantees were made to Picado regarding 
the protection of his supporters in return fo r his resignation and 
the surrender of the government forces. In add itio n , the so-called  
Pact of Ochomogo between Flgueres and Manual Mora s p e c if ic a lly  
guaranteed the protection of labor and implied the protection of 
Mora's supporters. Figueres la te r  denied making any agreement with  
Mora. No document was signed at the meeting on the heights o f Ochomogo, 
but an addendum to the Pact o f the Mexican Embassy made su b stan tia lly  
the same promises. Before discussing the treatment o f the Calderonistas 
by the Junta the follow ing provisions of the agreement are quoted to 
show why the Calderonistas claim they were deceived.
The f i f t h  provision o f the Pact o f the Mexican Embassy reads:
Guarantees are granted fo r the liv e s  and property of a l l  c itize n s  
who d ire c tly  or In d ire c tly  were compromised 1n the c o n flic t .  
Guaranteed In a special way are the l i f e ,  property and rights  
granted to a l l  the m ilita ry  functional res and employees who have 
served the government of L1c. Teodoro Picado. The fam ilies  o f 
a l l  the victim s o f the c iv i l  war and the Incapacitated v ic tim s, 
without d is tin c tio n  by p o lit ic a l p a rty , are guaranteed adequate
Indem nifications. I t  Is  established th a t no rep risa ls  of any 
sort w il l  be exercised and th a t a general amnesty w ill  be 
decreed.15
The s ix th  provision guaranteed the rights  of workers gained under
Calderon and Picado, but more Important 1t c ited  s p e c if ic a lly  an
agreement with the Vanguardia Popular:
Everything re la tin g  to the guarantees fo r the promotion of 
social and economic wellbeing o f the working classes has been 
contemplated 1n a special document that the "Army of National 
Liberation" w il l  present to the Head of the Popular Vanguard 
P a rty .16
The document sent to Manuel Mora, Secretary General of the Van­
guardia Popular, contained several spec ific  guarantees, Including the 
affirm atio n  o f the Labor Code, continuation o f cheap housing programs, 
and the minimum wage. Of In te re s t here are the p o lit ic a l guarantees 
lis te d  below:
3. We observe the p rin c ip le  o f freedom of organization fo r the 
working c lass , the existence and a c t iv it ie s  o f the Trade Union 
Centers ex is tin g  In the country w il l  be respected and w ill  be 
guaranteed. The Rerum-Novarum and CTRC (Confederation of Workers 
o f Costa R1ca). The government w ill  guarantee economic and moral 
help without preference to e ith e r o f them.
7. The democratic republican system w il l  be observed, assuring 
and respecting the freedom of thought, o f conscience, o f word, 
o f meeting, and of organization of a l l  p o lit ic a l parties  that 
e x is t or can be established 1n the country.
10. The fam ilies  of a l l  the victim s o f the c iv i l  war and the 
Incapacitated victim s w il l  receive adequate Indem nifications  
without d is tin c tio n  of p o lit ic a l party . The Government w ill  take 
the necessary steps so that a l l  workers who partic ipated  In the 
war, without d is tin c tio n s  of p o lit ic a l party can return to th e ir  
jobs without the respective work contracts being considered 
broken.
15Oscar Agu11ar B uigarel11, Costa Rica y sus hechos p o litic o s
de 1948 (San Jose, Costa Rica: TipogrSflcos die Antonio LenmanT 1969), 
pp.” Z5T-252.
l 7 I b 1 d . ,  pp .  2 4 6 - 2 4 7 .
Father Nunez, who signed the document, was complying with "instructions
Ifl
from senor F lgueres.” Consequently, the F lguerlsta  claim th a t no 
document was signed a t Ochomogo 1s Ir re le v a n t, since the basic con­
cerns that Mora had expressed at Ochomogo were la te r  s a tis fie d  by 
the le t te r  to him, quoted In part above. Unfortunately fo r  the 
Calderonistas and Mora's fo llow ers , the Junta did not consider I t s e l f  
obliged to comply with the agreement.
Llberacion mythology makes no mention of the Junta's harassment 
o f i ts  defeated opponents. Whether they deserved I t ,  the supporters 
of the deposed government were treated badly in d ire c t v io la tio n  of 
the promises made regarding th e ir  sa fe ty . The worst treatment came 
from Ind iv iduals  seeking personal vengeance, but the Junta carried  
on a de lib era te  program of persecution which contrasts v iv id ly  with  
the Image o f enlightened government L iberadon prefers to p ro ject.
One o f the f i r s t  measures the Junta took against Its  opponents
was to f i r e  a l l  those government workers employed by Picado. Decree-
law Number 7 stated that:
The employees o f whatever Power or Dependency of the State and 
the public In s titu tio n s  and corporations who received s a la rie s , 
payments, or fees during a l l  or part o f the period o f government 
between 8 May 1944 and 8 May 1948, can be dismissed without the 
State incurring any re s p o n s ib ility .!9
The decree Included transportation and a l l  other public service employ­
ees. No p r io r  no tice , severance pay, or any other type of severance 
b en efit had to be paid by the s ta te . T ra d it io n a lly , the higher 
ranking positions were considered patronage posts and the o f f ic ia ls
18Ib 1 d ., p. 246.
IQ ^
Mario Tu lio  Zeledon, H ls to rla  co n stltu d o n a l de Costa Rica 
(San Jose, Costa R1ca: SPI, 19S0), p. 35.
changed w ith the adm inistration . The lower positions were usually  
l e f t  alone. Wholesale dismissals were new to Costa R1ca. The Junta 
claimed th a t the corruption of Calderon had ta in ted  everyone 1n the 
government; to have clean government, the contaminated had to go.
Their malfeasance re lieved  the new government o f any resp o n s ib ility  
to them.20
I t  is  doubtful that supporters o f the defeated government ever
expected to receive any o f the reparations promised In the Pact o f
the Mexican Embassy. The Junta soon disabused any Calderonistas
foo lish  enough to believe they might be so fo rtu nate . A r t ic le  two
of Decree-law Number 33 "Fixing Reparations o f War 1n Favor of the
Victims o f Only the Triumphant P a rtie s ,"  excluded "a ll those persons
and e n tit le s  who In one form or another opposed the revolutionary  
21movement." Not only were nearly a l l  positions 1n the bureaucracy 
a ffec ted , but the e n tire  ju d ic ia ry  was replaced by opposition ists ,
even though most of the former judges had been a p o litic a l as members
2 ?of the courts.
Decree-law Number 77 se ttled  the whole question o f the rig h ts  o f 
the vanquished by declaring "resolved" the Pact o f the Mexican Embassy 
A rtic le  eight stated that "the Founding Junta o f the Second Republic 
desires to withdraw the promises made by Father Nunez 1n the name of 
the Army o f National L ib e ra tio n ."2**
20Ib 1 d .. pp. 33-34.
2 l Ib 1 d ., p. 39.
22John W. Gardner, "The Costa Rican Junta o f 1948-49" (Ph.D. d1s 
s e rta tlo n , S t. John's U n iv e rs ity , New York, 1971), pp. 420-421.
Zeledon, C onstltuclonal. p. 35.
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Replacing government employees with one's own supporters and 
excluding opponents from war reparations were measures that might 
reasonably be expected o f a v ictorious p o lit ic a l movement. Un­
expected, and the source o f much b itte rn ess , was the creation of 
two special courts to try  Calderonistas fo r  war crimes and d e re lic ­
tio n  o f duty. Father Nunez excused the Tribunals as necessary to
prevent those abused by the Calderonistas from taking vengeance on
24th e ir  former oppressors. A g u ila r, on the other hand, believes that
the special courts " . . .  did no more than increase turmoil that went
on In the country in those days. To deepen the wounds of the Costa
25Rican people and to make more d i f f ic u l t  th e ir  re c o n c ilia tio n ."
Decree-law Number 16, dated May 19, 1948, created the Tribunal
de Sanclones Inmedlatas to t ry  charges o f crim inal misconduct against
"the functionaries and employees o f the Calder6n Guardla-Plcado
26Mlchalsky adm in istrations." Decree-law Number 41, dated June 2, 
established the Tribunal de Probldad ("P ro b ity") to  recover fo r the 
state  funds, properties , and other resources taken frau du len tly  by
0 7
Ind iv iduals  during the Calderon-Picado years. The two tribunals  
had three ch arac te ris tics  in common, (1 ) each case was adjudicated  
by a panel o f f iv e  judges, (2 ) defendants were tr ie d  iji absentia , and 
(3 ) there was no appeal. The special courts contravened both the
^G ardner, "Junta," p. 382.
25A g u ila r, Sus hechos, p. 285.
Zeledon, C onstltuclonal. p. 37.
27Ib id .,  pp. 40-49.
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28Constitution and Costa Rican custom. The Junta se ttle d  the constl-
29tu tlo n a l question by declaring the Constitution of 1871 void. As 
fo r custom, the Junta considered i t s e l f  a mechanism fo r change and 
therefore ju s t if ie d  in taking d rastic  measures.
The Tribunal de Sanclones Inmediatas deserves some c re d it fo r  
the manner In which 1t conducted its  business. The judges on the 
Tribunal considered themselves to be a court of law and took great 
care in follow ing the appropriate procedures to Insure that the 
accused received f a ir  hearings. Only cases Involving charges of 
crim inal conduct such as looting and assault were brought before I t .  
The Tribunal was authorized to punish ind ividuals fo r fa ls e  accusa­
tion  i f  in its  judgment the case was unfounded. Although no accusor 
was punished, the Tribunal did refuse a number of cases fo r lack of 
evidence and reprimanded the accusors.
The Tribunal de Sanclones Inmediatas tr ie d  over 350 cases 
covering charges of marauding, arson, and exto rtion  to p o lit ic a l  
m alefaction. The accused were evidently  given scrupulously f a i r  
t r ia ls .  Of the 352 cases recorded, 230 resulted 1n acq u itta l and 
152 1n convictions. Most were t r ie d  fo r c le a rly  crim inal behavior. 
P o lit ic a l crimes accounted fo r  a small portion of the to ta l .  For 
example, f iv e  ind iv iduals  were convicted of p o lit ic a l harassment; 
only seven were convicted of In terference with e lec tio ns; of twenty- 
eight charged with abuse of a u th o rity , only twelve were convicted.
^®Costa R1ca, Const1tucl6n Pol1t1ca de Costa R1ca de 1971 (San 
Jos£, Costa R1ca: Imprenta Naclonal, 1944J7 p. 11; T i t le  I I I ,  Second
Section, A r t ic le  38 s p e c if ic a lly  forbade the creation o f "commissions, 
tr ib u n a ls , or judges fo r sp ec ific  processes."
29 Ib id .,  p. 23. Decree-law Number 2.
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Except fo r Carlos Luis Fallas and Aureo Morales none of the lead­
ing Calderonistas was t r ie d . The crim inal cases probably would have
30had the same resu lts  1n the regular courts.
Despite I ts  careful a tten tio n  to fairness and ju s tic e  the 
Tribunal de Sanclones Inmediatas was a p o lit ic a l instrument. Most of 
the victim s who brought charges before the Tribunal were opposi­
t io n is ts ;  the accused were usually Calderonistas or Communists. 
Eventually a pardon or amnesty was granted to those convicted by 
the Tribunal de Sanciones Inmediatas.
The Tribunal de Probidad was a blantant instrument o f p o lit ic a l  
coercion. The state rather than ind iv iduals  made the charges which 
were c iv i l ,  not crim ina l. No j a i l  sentences were meted ou t, but in 
some cases fines  were lev ied . The Tribunal de Probidad adjudicated 
only charges of fraud or gain a t the expense o f the state made against 
former o f f ic ia ls  of the Calderon and Picado governments. Those 
charged were presumed g u ilty  and a l l  th e ir  fin an c ia l resources were 
autom atically "Intervened" (seized by the s ta te ) . The accused himself 
had to In i t ia te  the adjudication o f his case and prove the acqu is i­
tion  of his property and wealth had been legal and honest. The 
Tribunal published a 11st of Ind iv iduals  (lega l persons such as corpor­
ations were included) whose property and cap ita l had been Intervened 
as o f June 4, 1948. Those on the l i s t  were granted four months to
30Gardner, "Junta," pp. 398-404. Morales was a special case.
He had been a local o f f ic ia l  1n the P a c ific  banana region and had a 
reputation fo r  vicious behavior. He was tr ie d  and convicted In absentia 
fo r  arranging the execution o f eight o p po sitio n is ts . MoralesH's the 
only one convicted by the Tribunal who was not la te r  pardoned or 
granted amnesty.
prove th e ir  Innocence otherwise the Tribunal would declare th a t "the
31Intervened goods were acquired by frau d ," A side e ffe c t o f the In te r
ventlons was the establishment o f de facto censorship. Interventions
of La Tribuna, the Calderonlsta paper, Ultima Hora, the communist paper
and La Voz de Ta V ic to r , a Calderonlsta radio s ta tio n , e ffe c t iv e ly
32s t if le d  the antl-Junta press.
Undoubtedly some Calderonistas had enriched themselves a t the 
expense of the state  during th e ir  time in  o f f ic e . The Junta had the 
r ig h t to t ry  to recover what 1t could o f the defrauded s tate  funds 
and property, but the Tribunal de Probidad was an ill-a d v is e d  method 
of accomplishing th a t goal. The in tervention  o f goods and property 
caused great hardship fo r the accused. The s ta te  allowed them a 
stipend fo r liv in g  expenses out o f which they also had to pay a fee  
fo r the adm inistration of th e ir  own property. They also had to pay 
a l l  th e ir  legal fees out of the stipend. In a d d itio n , because the 
11st was made pu b lic , the persons named were subject to harassment 
and ostracism u n til they had cleared themselves. A ll o f th is  amounted 
to punishment before being proven g u ilty . The primary targets  of 
the Tribunal de Probidad were the leading Calderonistas and a l l  the
33hiyhest ranking members of the deposed regime suffered in te rven tio n . 
Further evidence of the partisan nature of the Tribunal was that 
any Calderonlsta who had joined the opposition was exempted from the
 ̂1
Zeledon, C o nstituciona l. pp. 40-49.
32Ib 1 d ., p. 8 ; see also Gardner, "Junta," p. 392.
33Gardner, "Junta," pp. 405-419.
34B e ll,  C r is is , p. 158, n. 8.
The patent In ju s tic e  of the Tribunal de Probidad was recognized 
by la te r  adm inistrations. Most of the judgments were set aside by 
1959. By the middle 1960's, nearly a l l  defendants had been pardoned 
or exonerated. Many eventually regained th e ir  lo s t property and 
finances.^®
O v era ll, the two special courts were probably the Junta's  
biggest mistakes. Since the regular courts had been completely 
packed with opposition ists , the crim inal cases could have been handled 
through normal channels. Despite I ts  name, the Tribunal de Sanclones 
Inmediatas moved slowly, probably more c a re fu lly  than the regular 
courts would have operated. I f  speedy t r ia l  was I ts  purpose, the 
crim inal Tribunal fa ile d .
Perhaps a special court was the only way to deal e ffe c tiv e ly  
with the Calderonlsta fraud and p ro fite e r in g . The Tribunal de 
Probidad u ltim a te ly  succeeded only In exacerbating p o lit ic a l s e n s it iv i­
tie s  and 1n making the Junta appear a rb itra ry  and v in d ic tiv e ,
A f in a l comment with respect to  the probity of the Junta I t s e l f
should be made. Regardless of how the Junta la te r  ra tio n a lize d  I ts
supresslon of the Vanguardla Popular, F i g u e r e s and Nunez had pledged
themselves to honor the p o lit ic a l rig h ts  o f the Vanguardla. A r tic le
seven of the le t te r  to Mora had stated e x p lic it ly  th a t " . . .  the
freedom of thought, o f conscience, o f word, o f assembly and of
organization of a l l  p o lit ic a l parties  that e x is t or could be estab-
3611shed In the country" would be guaranteed. Soon a f te r  taking
^G ardner, "Junta," p. 419.
A g u ila r, Sus hechos, p. 247. I ta l ic s  mine.
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over, the Junta outlawed the old unions 1n the banana areas, which
allowed United F ru it to f i r e  the troublesome union organizers and 
37leaders. The Junta claimed th a t the Labor Code and Rerum Novarum 
were safeguards enough fo r labor. On the 17th of Ju ly , 1948 the 
Junta " . . .  prohibited the establishment In Costa R1ca o f any
38p o lit ic a l party whose Ideology threatened democratic government."
The Junta considered Marxism a th re a t to democracy, so the ed ic t 
meant the proscription o f the Vanguardla Popular. Neither the 
Communists nor the labor movement has recovered from the blow the 
Junta gave them 1n the sumner of 1948.
Since the Junta turned over the government to O tlH o  Ulate 1n 
1949, Costa Ricans have enjoyed the f u l l  range o f individual rig h ts  
guaranteed them by the Constitution of 1949. Partisan rhetoric  
not w ithstanding, neither Llberacion nor th e ir  opponents when In  
o ffic e  have threatened to abrogate those r ig h ts . Llberaclonlstas  
have stressed the ro le  of the Junta 1n achieving the goals o f the 
Revolution. The absence of any mention of the more d ic ta to r ia l 
po lic ies  of the Junta suggests th a t the treatment o f Calderonistas 
exceeded societal norms. Calderon's v io la tio n  of c iv i l  rights  was 
cause fo r  condemnation; s im ila r  acts by L lberaclonlstas had to be 
excluded from the Myth, an omission that implies a strong commitment 
to c iv i l  r ig h ts  as a p o lit ic a l value.
^G ardner, "Junta," p. 197.
38A g u ilar, Sus hechos. p. 282.
VIOLENCE
Severe p o lit ic a l s t r i f e  plagued the governments o f CalderOn and 
Picado. The Myth maintains th a t, except fo r  Iso lated  Incidents , 
violence and fraud were the Instruments used by a corrupt and Immoral 
government to deprive the Costa Ricans of th e ir  tra d itio n a l rig h ts  
as fre e  and democratic c itiz e n s . Calderon must bear much of the blame 
fo r  the fre n e tic  p o lit ic s  o f the 1940's because he allowed, perhaps 
ordered, his followers to In tim id ate  the opposition 1n the 1944 
e lec tio n s . His enemies, especia lly  the F1guer1stas are equally  
g u ilty  because they made certa in  that u ltim a te ly  no a lte rn a tiv e  to 
c iv i l  war would be possible.
In the Myth, the f i r s t  act o f serious government-sanctioned 
violence was the "San Pablo” Incident in 1942. Mora and his comnunlst 
brjgadas de choque (shock brigades) had given th e ir  support to Calderon. 
But how could they demonstrate th e ir  a b i l i t y  to help?
The explosion on board a United F ru it  vessel anchored 1n
Puerto LlmOn (the A tla n tic  port fo r Costa Rica) provided the Conriun-
1sts with an Ideal opportunity to show CalderOn th e ir  c a p a b ilit ie s .
A public memorial service and parade degenerated Into  a vicious mob,
attacking and destroying businesses owned by alleged supporters
of the Axis powers. The mob was In c ite d  to violence and led by the
Communist leaders. Calderon's po lice did not "move a fin g e r to stop
them." The Communists fo llow ing th e ir  orders from Moscow shouted
th e ir  own patrio tism  and demanded the incarceration  o f a l l  Costa Ricans
39with German connections, e ith e r  by b ir th  or in any other way.
39Baeza, La lucha. pp. 104-116.
137
Covering acts of violence with the fla g  of patrio tism  did not fool
the real Costa Rican p a tr io ts .
The e lection  of 1944, according to the Myth, exposed Calderon's
true colors. The fraud and violence th a t attended the campaign and
e lection  of Picado convinced the many 1n the opposition that only
force could remove the Calderon-Communist plague.
The violence came from both the Communists and the po lice .
40Corteslsta parades were f ire d  upon, several people k il le d  and many
wounded. R a llies  were attacked and disrupted by Communist brigands,
41"armed with th e ir  usual cudgels." An opposition radio s ta tio n ,
already sacked once by Calderonlsta thugs, remained s t if le d  during
42the campaign, a fra id  to broadcast the tru th . The police joined  
in the harassment of Corteslstas by breaking up r a l l ie s  and meetings. 
The radio stations of the Communists and the government party poured 
out "fan tastic" propaganda about the "Corteslsta barbarity" and the 
"hordes of Cortes,"43
As i f  the campaign had not been bloody enough, the e lection  
day was worse. In his chapter "El 13 de Febrero," Carlas l is ts  the 
most b la tan t acts of the Calderonistas. Two a tro c itie s  In p a rtic u la r  
came to epitomize the fraudulence of the e lec tio n . "In Sabanllla de 
A lajuela  Cortes had won the e le c tio n ."  As the resu lts  were being
4\e 6 n  Cortes was the opposition candidate.
4 *Canas, Los ocho anos, pp. 53-54.
42Ib 1 d ., pp. 40-41, 55.
43 Ib id .,  pp. 54-55; Baeza, la  lucha, pp. 168-170.
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transported to the provincial c a p ita l, government o f f ic ia ls  stopped 
the veh ic le , demanded the b a llo t  boxes, then opened f i r e  without 
warning, k i l l in g  one man and wounding others. The b a llo t  boxes were 
saved through the courageous e ffo rts  of an unnamed man. Llano 
Grande de Cartago witnessed an even worse crime. When the c itizen s  
of the v illa g e  tr ie d  to prevent outsiders from voting I l le g a l ly ,  
they were attacked by agents of the police and the m ilita ry . Several 
were k il le d  and many were wounded. Caftas concludes his n arra tive  
w ith:
The "e lections ," a t leas t 1n Llano Grande, had ended. And when 
the day d ies , Teodoro Picado 1s the President E le c t, although
he was not elected In Sabanllla  nor in Llano Grande.44
Calderon had won fo r the time being, but he planted the seeds of his
own destruction . The opposition began to put aside th e ir  d ifferences.
A ll th a t was needed was a true leader.
Picado as President continued the po lic ies  and a c t iv it ie s  of
his j e f e , Calder6n. In Llberacion mythology, th is  period was
important as 1 t was the time fo r  consolidation of the opposition.
According to Canas, "While the government of Picado proceeded to
In s ta ll I t s e l f  and to continue s tra ig h t on w ith corruption, the
45opposition forces tr ie d  to come to an understanding."
During the Picado years several te ll in g  events transpired .
An abortive armed uprising In 1946 convinced the action-prone segment 
of the opposition that more preparation and the r ig h t circumstances
^Canas, Los ocho anos, pp. 60-61; these Incidents were also  
described 1n Baeza, La lucha. p. 170.
45Canas, Los ocho affos, p. 69.
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were needed, The congressional e lection  of 1946 revealed fu rth er  
erosion of support fo r  the Ca1der6n-Pacado-commun1st c liq u e . F in a lly ,  
the Huelga de Brazos Caldos ( s i t  down s tr ik e ) in  1947 displayed the 
depth o f support fo r the opposition among the people.
The only mention of violence committed by ant1-Calder6n forces 
p rio r to the Revolution I t s e l f  was conducted by a group not d ire c tly  
connected with Flgueres.
A few months a fte r  the e lec tio n s , members of the opposition 
attempted an armed uprising. On the night o f June 24, 1946, a group 
of young men armed themselves and tr ie d  to seize San Jos6. The radio  
s ta tio n , "Alma T lca ,"  was to be the ra lly in g  point (hence the name 
Alma Tlcazo to describe th is  event). In Canas* opinion, the attempt 
had to f a l l ,  "because i t  was an In fa n t i le  p ro je c t,"  poorly planned 
and executed. The attem pt, In e ffec tu a l as 1t had been, proved that
there were " . . .  young men who lo s t the fear of arms and b u lle ts ;
46who took pleasure 1n heroism. . . Figueres would fin d  them
useful when the time was r ig h t . El "Alma Ticazo" also proved the 
need fo r deta iled  planning and the r ig h t conditions fo r a successful 
re v o lt.
The incident which convinced the a c tiv is ts  th a t the people 
supported the opposition began In Cartago. The opposition had put 
aside th e ir  differences to combine forces under the banner of the 
Partldo Unl6n Naclonal, w ith Ulate as Its  candidate. In typ ica l
4® Ib1d., p. 79. Neither Baeza nor Castro mentioned th is  
Inc ident.
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fashion the Calderonlsta-Convnunlsts continued th e ir  tac tics  o f
violence and d isrup tion . On Sunday evening, the 20th o f July 1947,"
. . . the c ity  of Cartago, ancient cap ita l o f Costa R1ca, was subjected 
47to te r ro r ."  As was customary, people had l e f t  the movie theaters and
other places to congregate In the Central Avenue fo r  the tra d itio n a l
paseo (walk around the square). The police attacked with te a r gas
48and machine gun f i r e .  Castro's account Is  s lig h tly  d if fe re n t ,
giving a clue to why the police attacked:
An Immense O ppositionist r a l ly  was dispersed by the police with  
shots, blackjacks, trampling and tear gas. There were dead and 
wounded among the Opposition.49
The "true" account was set down by Fernandez Duran in his pamphlet,
50La huelga de brazos caidos. The police attacked an oppositionist 
demonstration. Some o f the young men who fle d  took she lter in a movie 
theater which was then tear gassed. Some of those who fled  the 
theater were machine gunned. Tear gas even pervaded the operating 
rooms of the local hospital causing great distress among the s ick.
The people refused to to le ra te  such reprehensible actions. A s trik e  
was c a lle d . Banks, professionals, even transportation companies, 
joined the s tr ik e . Everything came to a h a lt . The government 
responded by arming 3000 Conmunlsts and thugs brought up from the
47Baeza, La lucha, p. 198.
48Caftas, Los ocho affos, p. 94.
49Castro, Flgueres, p. 88.
50Roberto Fernandez Durjn, La huelga de brazos caidos (San Jos£, 
Costa Rica: E d ito ria l L1 berac 1 tfn“FTac 1 onaT, 1953). Note the publisher.
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coast. These attacked and destroyed businesses th a t supported the 
s tr ik e . The government rea lized  Its  Impotence before the wrath o f 
the people. The opposition leaders forced the government to agree 
that the National E lectoral Tribunal would supervise completely 
the upcoming e lec tio ns .
The Myth stresses the v io le n t depredations perpetrated on a 
normally peaceful c it iz e n ry  by a vicious Communist-Infested d ic ta ­
torsh ip . The Revolution supposedly expressed the b i t t e r  resentment 
of a people too long abused by unscrupulous p o litic ia n s  and th e ir  
Communist b u lly  boy henchmen. Calderon did employ fo rce , especia lly  
during the 1944 e lec tio n  campaign; but the Myth exaggerates the extent 
of government violence and completely ignores the v io le n t a c t iv it ie s  
o f the opposition during the s ix  years leading to the Revolution.
Flgueres ca lled  these years a period o f "gestation" in which he and
51his follow ers prepared fo r  the war they believed In e v ita b le . An 
element o f s e l f - f u l f i l l in g  prophecy is manifest in  Flgueres* s ta te ­
ment because the F1guer1stas not only believed revo lution  in e v ita b le , 
they worked hard to Insure i ts  a r r iv a l.
The Myth relys on sweeping statements 1n Heu o f fa c t ,  c it in g  few 
specific  examples o f the o f f ic ia l  v io lence. Several Incidents taken 
up as b a tt le  cries  by the opposition forces became watchwords of 
governmental a tro c ity  1n the Myth. Evidence from other sources suggests 
th a t the Myth leaves out s ig n ific a n t d e ta ils .
51Castro, Flgueres, p. 196.
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The deaths o f c itizen s  a t the hands of the police 1n la  Sabanllla  
and Llano Grande on e lec tio n  day, February 13, 1944, became symbolic 
of Calderonlsta violence. The Calderonlsta version of the violence 
1n Llano Grande exculpated the police who claimed they had been 
attacked by CortesIstas try ing  to s tu ff  the b a llo t  box. At La
Sabanllla de A la jue la  the police were a lleged ly  try ing to prevent
t  52the b a llo t box from being taken to Cortes headquarters. Both
Incidents were probably s ituations 1n which the police lo s t control
and overreacted. None o f the sources o ffers  evidence that the
tragedies were part of a coordinated government plan. The opposition
made martyrs of the fa lle n  Corteslstas and v i l i f ie d  the government
at every opportunity fo r  those deaths.
The e lec tio n  campaign of 1944 marked a s ig n ific a n t change in  
Costa Rican p o lit ic s . Regardless of which side in it ia te d  the attacks 
on th e ir  opponents, the level of violence exceeded any experienced 
since the nineteenth century. The opposition press, led by U la te 's  
D ia r lo , took every opportunity to remind the Costa Ricans, 1n v iv id  
language, of the outrages a lleged ly  co»rm1 tted by the government.
Plcado struggled throughout his term to re c t ify  the worst of the 
abuses perpetrated by his predecessor, but the opposition refused 
to abate i ts  attacks on his adm inistration.
A new element, terrorism , had indeed been added to Costa Rican 
p o lit ic s , but not by Plcado. A c a re fu lly  planned program of harassment
CO
Creedman, " P o lit ic a l Development," p. 159. Acurta concluded 
th a t the police were a t f a u l t ,  but had acted out of an excess o f zeal 
heightened by nervousness a t  the threatening townspeople. Niguel 
Acuna V. El 48 (San Jos6 , Costa R1ca: L1brer1a, Imp rent a y U to g ra f ia
Lehman, 197477 PP- 90-94.
143
and petty  sabotage was conducted by the F lg uerls tas , beginning 1n 
earnest a f te r  the death o f Cortes 1n 1946. One group a c tu a lly  a t ­
tempted a golpe de estado; Plcado released the c u lp rits  almost 
1mned1ately a f te r  they had been captured. At leas t two attempts 
were made on Calderon's l i f e ,  public f a c i l i t ie s  such as water lines  
and e le c tr ic a l f a c i l i t ie s  were sabotaged, the Calderonlsta newspaper 
La Tribuna was bombed, and many other d isrup tive  acts were comnltted. 
Fights between groups o f Calderonlstas and oppositionists f la re d .
Police were baited and sometimes attacked by gangs o f young members
53of the opposition. The Myth omits any reference to the F iguerista  
campaign of violence.
The famous Huelga de Brazos Caldos 1s an excellen t example of 
mythic d is to rtio n . The Myth pictures La Huelga as a spontaneous 
uprising o f the people outraged by the bruta l suppression of the 
c itize n s  of Cartago. The Myth Ignores the fa c t that Cartago had been 
a center o f opposition a c t iv ity  and the scene o f frequent attacks on 
Calderonlstas. Gangs o f young oppositionists had been roaming the 
streets  beating workers and other supporters of the government.
When the government reinforced the beleaguered a u th o rities  1n Cartago, 
the opposition made the m atter a point of local p ride . Eventually  
the police resorted to tear gas and threatened to f i r e  on the unruly 
crowds. R ioting ensued w ith several deaths and mounting numbers o f 
wounded. The opposition then declared a s tr ik e , hoping th a t a general
53B e ll ,  C r is is , Chapter 5 , "Conspiracy, Rebellion, and th e . 
Second Republic," pp. 81-105; Acufta, Ej[ 48• Chapter V, "Subversion 
o b le rta ,"  pp. 103-113.
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s tr ik e  would re s u lt. The d ic ta to rsh ip  o f Max1m111ano Hernandez
Martinez In El Salvador had been overthrown by a general s tr ik e  in
1944; Flgueres believed the same would occur 1n Costa R1ca 1f support
54were s u ff ic ie n tly  widespread. Banks and businesses closed, creating  
some hardship, especia lly  among the poor. Eventually the govern­
ment was forced to compromise w ith the opposition, conceding to 
demands fo r  guarantees th a t the upcoming elections would be run 
exclusively  by the new E lectoral Tribunal.
The opposition proclaimed la  Huelga a great v ic to ry . In a sense 
1t  was, because the government had been maneuvered Into  agreeing th a t 
the decision o f the Tribunal would be f in a l , even though by law the 
Congress had the t a d t  r ig h t o f review. This accession severely
lim ited  Plcado's f le x ib i l i t y  In confronting the confused events o f the
55election  when 1t took place seven months la te r .  As a means o f 
bringing down the government d ire c t ly , the Huelga fa ile d . The most 
Important aspect of the Huelga, w ith respect to  the Myth, is  th a t the 
s trik e  was not spontaneous but planned. Flgueres hoped th a t a general 
s tr ik e  would be s u ff ic ie n t 1n I t s e l f  to defeat Calderon. When his  
hopes did not m a te ria liz e , he and his followers had to w ait fo r  a more 
opportune tim e. As mentioned above, the annulment o f the e lec tio n  
of 1948 presented an Ideal opportun1ty--one that Flgueres took without 
delay.
5 4 B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 101-104.
55Acuna, £1 48, pp. 110-113; A g u ila r, Sus hechos, pp. 135-155;
B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 99-104.
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The m ilita ry  phase of the Revolution would seem to be one part 
of the Myth 1n which violence would be exalted . A fte r a l l ,  an Incum­
bent government, supported by the nation 's  armed forces, was defeated 
1n b a tt le  and forced to f le e  the country by a group o f amateur 
so ld ie rs , apparently h a s tily  organized and 111-armed. Yet the portion  
of the Myth devoted to m ilita ry  exp lo its  1s re la t iv e ly  small. L lbera- 
clon lsta  mythmakers have chosen to stress p o l i t ic a l ,  s o c ia l, and 
economic achievements over m artia l triumphs.
The Myth presents the m ilita ry  operations as a la s t res o rt, 
forced on the Costa Rican people by Calderon's i l le g a l and immoral 
refusal to submit to the popular w il l  expressed 1n the 1948 e le c tio n . 
The Myth stresses three points: that the Army o f National Liberation
was a c it iz e n  army, not professional so ld ie rs ; th a t the Army of 
National L ib era tio n , un like the government which re lie d  on communists 
and foreigners (Nicaraguans), was a Costa Rican force; and that the 
b r i l l ia n t  leadership o f Flgueres was the deciding facto r 1n the v ic to ry  
of the Revolutionaries. The Mythic version o f the war is  as fo llow s.
As might be expected, the f i r s t  shots 1n the combat phase were
f ire d  by the government. The very day th a t Calderon's puppet Congress
I l le g a l ly  annulled the e le c tio n , police surrounded the home of Dr.
Carlos Luis Valverde. When he came to  the door to Inquire  what was
wanted, the police gunned him down. Dr. Valverde died, the f i r s t
56martyr o f the War o f National L ib era tio n .
t c  m
Canas, Los ocho anos, p. 119; Baeza, La lucha, p. 217; Castro, 
Flgueres, p. 103. A ll three lay  the f u l l  blame on the government.
Valverde was a w e ll-to -d o  doctor who had supported the v io le n t over­
throw o f Calderon fo r several years. He was a lleged ly  one of the 
leaders o f the Alma Tlcazo.
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Flgueres directed the m ilita ry  operations, but not as a f ie ld  
marshall s itt in g  safely  behind the lin e s . Flgueres led his men per­
sonally, sharing th e ir  dangers and hardships, "his au th o rity , born
of sober and austere d is c ip lin e , was enforced by his energetic yet
57 ✓simple presence." Emulating Cespedes of Cuba, Sandlno of Nicaragua,
and the Chilean Rodriguez, Figueres conceived, planned and executed
a b r i l l ia n t  g u e rr illa  campaign. He knew his poorly armed, untrained
c iv ilia n s  could not defeat a conventional army 1n open combat. The
58h it  and run tactics  of the g u e rr illa  fig h te r would be his method.
His years of hard labor as a fanner had given him "an extraordinary
physical resistance," which enabled him to march "at the head of his
soldiers without showing fatigue and with his s p ir i t  always disposed
to continue the forced marches." Day or n ight, 1n the heat or the
cold, "with such a Chief, who avoided no personal s a c rifice  and each
day appeared stronger," who always maintained a steadfast fa ith  1n
v ic to ry , the army ". . .achieved in only a few days an Incredible
campaign. . . equal to an army of hardened veterans, tested 1n the f i r e
59of a hundred campaigns."
Indeed "only such a man" could triumph, fo r  the odds against 
success seemed overwhelming a t f i r s t .  The government had forces armed 
with jeeps, "Toirmy" guns, armored cars, modern machine guns, and a i r ­
planes. The army was not large but could be augmented by the po lice ,
57Baeza, La lucha, p. 225.
5 8 Ib 1d ., pp. 220-225.
88Castro, Flgueres, pp. 213-214.
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the communist brigades de chogue (shock brigades), and the marlachls 
from the coastal zones. Flgueres " . . .  only counted on reduced and 
weak armaments that he had been able to Import c landestinely ," and a 
few weapons In Guatemala th a t had yet to  be brought 1n. In the 
urban areas there was only "an 'army' without arms, . . . the c iv i l ia n  
population."®^
Through s k i l l fu l  ta c tic s  and hard, rapid a ttacks , the Army of 
Liberation gained more recru its  and more weapons. By capturing the 
a ir f ie ld  a t San Is id ro  del General, Flgueres gained several airp lanes  
and a landing spot fo r  the needed arms from Guatemala.
Flgueres counted on three " a l l ie s ."  The f i r s t  and most Impor­
tan t would be his In tim ate  knowledge o f the te r ra in . The second had 
to be speed and m o b ility . The th ird  would be ". . . the w il l  to 
a c t1on--the duty, the m o ra lity , the enthusiasm, the fe rv o r, the 
sacr1f 1c e --o f groups who were not professional combatants, who had 
never made war, nor p artic ip ated  1n Insurrectionary movements."
They were of varied backgrounds and experiences: "from the U n ivers ity ,
the lib e ra l professions. . .d v lc  In s t itu tio n s , non-Conmunlst unions, 
artisa n s , and especia lly  peasants." Brothers In arms, In te lle c tu a ls  
and peasants, churchmen and freeth inkers  fought together. " I t  was 
a m u lti-c lass  army and 1t would be the roots of the fu ture  L1beracl£n 
Naclonal. " 61
The main body o f revo lu tionaries was, o f course, Costa Rican, 
but the Army o f National L iberation  did receive valuable assistance
®°Baeza, La_ 1 ucha, pp. 219, 220.
6 l Ib 1 d ., p. 224.
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from ce rta in  foreign a l l ie s .  While In  e x ile  1n Mexico C ity , Flgueres 
had met other freedom fig h te rs , democrats who had been driven from 
th e ir  homes as he had been. These men, experienced 1n dealing with  
d ic ta to rs , convinced Flgueres th a t only revo lution  would end the 
th reat to Costa Rican democracy. He learned ta c t ic s , strategy and 
lo g is tic s  from these expert freedom fig h te rs , and gradually began 
acquiring an arsenal. When the r ig h t time came fo r ac tio n , Flgueres 
would be ready.
Flgueres, recognizing the value of having tra in e d , experienced 
men fig h tin g  beside his Inexperienced c iv i l ia n s ,  signed el Pacto del 
Carlbe (the Pact of the Caribbean) in  December of 1947, which pledged 
mutual support between the revo lu tionaries  o f Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, and Costa Rica. This pact pledged the commitment o f the 
signatories te f ig h t  fo r the destruction o f "the ru lin g  d ic ta to rs
63
In th e ir  countries and to reestablish  In them L iberty  and Democracy." 
The Costa Ricans, supported by these "braylslmos foreign leg ionnaires ,"  
"fought as H ons, as v ir tu a l w ild  beasts, demonstrating a combative­
ness and a contempt of th e ir  liv e s  t ru ly  heroic."®^ Winning b a ttle  
a fte r  b a t t le ,  the Flgueristas triumphed over the inept and poorly-led  
Calderonlstas 1n only fo r ty  days.
The 28th of A pril 1948 was e l "ofa de la  V ic to r ia ,"  celebrated  
1n a great parade by the v ic to rs , attended by thousands o f happy, 
destive Costa Ricans. " I t  was a day of jo y , o f applause and vivas
62Mar1o Jimenez R ., L «  pagos de Ja guerra de L1beracl6n Naclonal 
(San Jos£, Costa R1ca: E d ito ria l LlEeraclon Naclonal, 1953), pp. 31-33.
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Baeza, La lucha, p. 205.
®*Castro, Flgueres. p. 114. Chapter X I I ,  from which th is  quote 
was taken, 1s a most ly r ic a l description o f the Revolution.
to Flgueres, to his troops and th e ir  leaders, th a t would never be
65forgo tten . A true apotheosis."
The Revolution, despite the Hyth, was not considered a blessing  
by a l l  Costa Ricans. Much o f the b itterness th a t s t i l l  a ffe c ts  Costa 
Rican p o lit ic s  derives from the conduct of the c iv i l  war and the actions 
o f the Junta. The Myth conceals aspects o f the m ilita ry  phase that 
denigrate the L1berac1<Sn image. Through a combination o f good fortune, 
good leadership, and an inept opponent, the Army of National Libera* 
tio n  managed to achieve v ic to ry  in only six  weeks. The Myth n a tu ra lly  
stresses the second fe a tu re , good leadership, giving most o f the c re d it  
to Flgueres. Other accounts emphasize the good luck attending the 
Liberation Movement and the Incompetence o f the government forces.
The claim that the L iberation  forces were b r i l l ia n t ly  led 1s hard to 
answer since the m ilita ry  a b i l i t ie s  o f the L iberation  leadership were 
never c r i t ic a l ly  put to the te s t .  Regarding Flgueres' part in the 
f ig h tin g , his contributions apparently were more p o lit ic a l and 
symbolic than m ilita ry . According to Acuna, Rafael Angel Ramfrez, a 
Dominican who acted as Chief o f S ta f f ,  provided the crucia l m ilita ry  
planning. T a c tic a lly  subordinates such as Frank Marshall and Horado  
Ornes contributed s ig n if ic a n tly  1n sp ec ific  b a tt le s . Marshall In  
p a rtic u la r  possessed exceptional a b i l i t ie s  1n leading men under f l r e . 6^
The Mythic account of the combat phases o f the re v o lt can be 
challenged on a number of po ints. For example, the revo lu tionaries  
accused the government o f opening the h o s t i l i t ie s  when the police
6 5 Ib 1d .,  p. 143.
66Acuna, El 48 , pp. 195, 213-229, 231-234, 244.
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k il le d  Dr. Carlos Luis Valverde. The government rep o rt, to  the con­
tra ry , claimed th a t shots from the Valverde house k il le d  two p o lice ­
men f i r s t ,  prompting a return fu s illa d e  that k il le d  Valverde. The 
police had acted on information from an Informer to the e ffe c t  that 
a large cache of arms was concealed 1n the house. The au th o rities  
had not Intended th a t anyone be harmed, but the overzealous convnander
o f the police detachment tr ie d  to move 1n before the s itu a tio n  had 
68been c la r i f ie d .  Given the lack o f unbiased testimony, overreaction  
and incompetant leadership on both sides were probably the causes of 
the deaths of the policemen and Dr. Valverde.
From the government's point o f view the Revolution began when 
a squad o f po lice commanded by Rlgoberto Pacheco Tinoco was ambushed 
near La Lucha, Figueres' farm th a t served as the Revolutionary head­
quarters. The government detachment was Investigating  rumors that  
Flgueres was organizing an Insurrection when the ambush took the liv e s  
of Pacheco and two other men. This occurred on March 12, 1948, 
ac tu a lly  the day a fte r  the rebels had taken San Is id ro  del General, 
the f i r s t  m ilita ry  operation conducted by the rebels . Carlos Rechnltz, 
a Figuerista commander, made an In te res tin g  observation about th is  
Incident:
In Costa R1ca no scandal lasted more than a week and by the 12th 
of March the people began to be annoyed with so much shooting or 
to forget the abuses of March 1st. I f  the government had not 
committed the e rro r of sending to his death a so ld ie r o f great 
prestige , a l l  would have been d if fe r e n t ,  because no one would 
have had confidence 1n F l g u e r e s . 69
67See note 56 above.
68Acuna, £ 1 4 8 ,  pp. 149-154.
6 9 Ib 1 d ., p. 158.
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By daring to attack and k i l l  Pacheco, known to  be close to Caldenfn, 
Flgueres demonstrated his audacity and his conmltment to revo lution .
He began receiving converts shortly  th e re a fte r.
The myth makes much of the d is p a rity  between the two opposing 
forces, Flgueres* handful o f poorly armed men supposedly faced a 
tra in e d , well-equipped army of 1,500 troops, supported by several 
thousand laborers under communist leaders. U nfortunately, no de­
ta ile d  Inventory o f men and equipment 1s av a ilab le . Such Information  
as can be gleaned from various reports indicates th a t Flgueres enjoyed 
a much b e tte r position than the Myth Im plies.
The Army o f Costa Rica was ne ither modern nor well-equipped.
One report l is ts  "14 jeeps, 24 tormny guns, s ix  machine guns, two 
armored trucks, 200 tear gas b o m b s . A c c o r d i n g  to Plcado the army 
comprised only about 300 men with no combat experience and l i t t l e  
t r a i n i n g . T h e  o ffic e rs  In most cases were even worse, th e ir  com­
missions being p o lit ic a l appointments fo r services or lo y a lty  to the 
adm inistration . The ta c tic a l errors made by the Army attested to the 
general Incompetence of I ts  f ie ld  commanders; the fa ilu re  to  develop 
a successful strategy proved the ineptitude o f i ts  general s ta f f .
Several other factors hampered the government counter-measures 
against the rebels. Plcado and his m ilita ry  advisors overestimated 
th e ir  m ilita ry  strength and underestimated the c a p a b ilit ie s  o f th e ir
^German Arcln legas, Sntre la  1Ibertad ^  el_ mledo (Mexico:
Edlclones Cuadernos Americanos, 1952), p. 258,
^ B e l l , C r is is , p. 136, n, 14. Bell took th is  Information  
from Teodoro Plcado, El Pacto de la  Embajada de Mexico (Managua, 
Nicaragua: Ed1tor1al^entroamer1cana, 1&49), p .T .
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opponents. Calder6 n procrastinated u n til the tw e lfth  of A pril before
72he called  on his followers to jo in  in defending the government.
By then the F lguerlstas were receiving a steady flow o f arms and anmunl- 
tlon  from Guatemala and had consolidated th e ir  positions 1n the moun­
tains south of Cartago. Supposedly the government forces were re in ­
forced by several thousand Communists and workers from the banana 
regions. I t  1s doubtful that these reinforcements added e ffe c tiv e ly
to the m ilita ry  strength of the government since the M in is ter o f
73S ecurity , General Rene Picado, refused to arm them f u l ly .  A fte r  
the in i t i a l  b a tt le s , General Plcado had great d i f f ic u lty  1n resup­
plying his troops. Inexperienced and poorly le d , the government 
forces rap id ly  expended th e ir  ammunition, then had to re tre a t fo r  
lack of resupplies. Throughout the c o n f lic t ,  President Teodoro Plcado 
sought m ilita ry  assistance from several In tern atio na l sources, Including
the United States. Only Nicaragua granted any useful aid and then
74p rim arily  by lending troops, not m a te rie l. The United States 
prevented a purchase of v i t a l ly  needed arms and may have assisted the
72A guilar, Sus hechos, p. 209.
73 Ib id . Large qu antities  of r i f l e s ,  s t i l l  1n th e ir  cases, were 
reportedly found by the L iberation Amiy when i t  took over the army 
barracks In San Jos£.
^The m atter o f Nicaraguan assistance to Plcado 1s extremely 
confused. Somoza did send "volunteers" to augment the Costa Rican 
army, but there 1s no exact number or even an accurate estimate of 
the Nicaraguan complement. The New York Times reported large numbers 
o f Nicaraguan soldiers taking part 1n the c o n fl1 c t, but some o f the 
reports were so erroneous th a t the Times cannot be considered a 
re lia b le  source on th is  issue.
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75rebels. Flgueres had convinced his fe llow  ex iles  1n Mexico th a t  
Calderon would be the easiest "strongman" to topple. The poor show­
ing the government forces made 1n meeting the revolutionary challenge 
proved him r ig h t.
Flgueres probably had no more than a few dozen men with him at 
La Lucha when he raised the standard o f revo lt on March 11, 1948. 
Undoubtedly he had l is ts  o f po ten tia l combatants compiled during 
the years of revolutionary "gestation," upon whom he could depend to 
augment his forces rap id ly  once he openly declared the re v o lt.
Flgueres and his supporters had been busy fo r  several years try ing  
to amass arms In Costa Rica w ith re la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  success. Fortu­
nately fo r Flgueres, abundant war m aterial stockpiled 1n Guatemala 
awaited his re q u is itio n . Consequently, the f i r s t  and most important 
maneuver was the seizing of an a ir f ie ld  and planes to allow the 
tran sfera l o f arms to Costa Rica. The capture o f San Is id ro  del 
General and I ts  a irs t r ip  on the night o f March 11, 1948, established  
the required resupply point that the rebels held almost uninterrupted  
fo r the duration of the c o n flic t . From that point on Figueres and 
his forces never lacked fo r ammunition and other v ita l war m ateria l.
^ B e l l ,  C r is is , p. 142, n. 30. The United States Involvement
1s another unanswered question In the Revolution. Evidence given 1n 
the footnote c ite d  above Indicates that certa in  members of the U.S. 
Embassy may have aided the rebels. C erta in ly  the In ternational 
clim ate could have prompted U.S. disapproval o f Calderon because of 
his connections w ith Mora and the Communists. Masaryk o f Czecho­
slovakia had ju s t died under p\yster1ous circumstances, Czechoslovakia 
had become communist, and re la tio n s  w ith the Soviet Union were de­
te r io ra tin g . The setting  was r ig h t fo r  U.S. In terven tion ; the evidence 
that 1t  occurred has not ye t been revealed.
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By the end o f the c o n flic t  the Army o f National L iberation  possessed 
weapons equal to 1f  not superior to those a t  the disposal o f the 
government.
The leadership o f the L iberation  forces undoubtedly surpassed 
th a t o f the government. V ir tu a lly  a l l  o f the o ffic e rs  were excel­
le n t f ie ld  commanders. Much o f the superior m ilita ry  guidance came 
from a number of foreign combatants--leaders of the so-called  
Caribbean Legion. Ramfrez has already been mentioned; others Included 
the Hondurans, Jorge Rivas Montes, Mario Sossa Navarro, and Francisco 
Sanchez ("El In d io " ), and the Nicaraguans, Jose Marla Tercero and 
Adolfo Baeza Bone.7® Without the certa in  and p le n tifu l flow of arms 
from Guatemala, Flgueres would not have been able to expand and 
sustain the c o n flic t  so successfully; without the experience and 
a b i l i t y  of the foreign s o ld ie rs , he probably would not have been 
able to in f l i c t  such decisive defeats on his opponents. Costa Rica 
provided most of the troops, but Honduras, Nicaragua, and the 
Dominican Republic contributed much of the leadership . 77
One of the most e ffe c tiv e  stratagems used by the rebels was 
the constant dissemination of fa lse  Inform ation. The government 
never established an e ffe c tiv e  In te llig e n c e  network. The rebels  
played on the need fo r  accurate Information by operating clandestine  
radio stations that passed out reports o f non-existent troop movements,
76Acuna, 1 1 4 8 ,  pp. 163, 218.
77Charles D. Amerlnger, The Democratic L e ft 1n E x ile : the
A n tid ic ta to r la l Struggle In the Caribbean. 1945-195? (Coral Gables, 
F lorida: Uni vers I ty  o f MTanrT Press, 1974), pp. ^2-80.
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spread rumors and generally added to the confusion o f the au th o rl- 
78t ie s . With the advantage o f h indsight, a review o f New York Times 
reports on the c o n flic t  I l lu s tra te s  the effectiveness o f th is  ta c t ic .  
One rep o rt, based on " re lia b le  witnesses," had a troop o f several
hundred Nicaraguans moving "overland" from the San Juan River to  a
79railhead through te r r ito r y  that Is  almost inpenetrable jungle .
These newspaper reports ex h ib it a tendency to repeat any news unfavor­
able to  the government and to tre a t  Flgueres with considerable respect. 
Plcado*s claim that he operated a t a disadvantage with respect to 
the In ternational conminlty appears to be ju s t i f ie d .
In l ig h t  of the bad press the Calderonlstas received from the 
New York Times and the ruthless Image conveyed upon them by the Hyth,
1 t  Is  appropriate to mention a few accounts o f the ruthlessness o f 
the F lgueris tas . The d is p a rity  in casualties between the Army of 
National L iberation and the government forces raises doubts about the
manner 1n which the Flgueristas conducted the war. The rebels claimed
80only 67 dead; estimates o f the government numbered over 1,500.
In one b a tt le  alone, a t El T e ja r , the government a lleged ly  lo s t 190 men
81to the revo lu tio n aries ' loss of 14.
78 a .
Acuna, El 48 , Chapter XXV, "M1ster1osas transmlsiones de 
rad io ,"  pp. 31775257
^ New York Times. 31 March 1948, p. 17.
80Arclnlegas, E n tre , p. 257.
8 1 B e ll , C r is is , p. 148.
Given the absence of heavy a r t i l le r y  and a e ria l bombardment, 
one can only speculate about the reasons fo r  such extreme d i f f e r ­
ences In casualty ra tes . The b a tt le  a t  El T e ja r apparently Included 
an esp ec ia lly  brutal piece of work by some of the F lgueris tas .
Acuna reported th a t some eighteen government troops flee in g  the b a ttle
82
were captured and machine-gunned In the nearby v illa g e  o f Q uebradllla. 
Another Incident mentioned by Acuna was the shooting o f Cellmo 
Barrientos 1n Empalme. A campeslno o f the town accused him o f being
83a spy whereupon his captors dispatched him without b en e fit of t r i a l .
Neither does the ambush of Colonel Rlgoberto, the f i r s t  rebel a tta ck ,
r e f le c t  well on the Image th a t Liberacion has tr ie d  to m aintain.
Throughout the c o n f l ic t ,  the Flgueristas showed themselves quite
w illin g  to take any steps they thought necessary to obtain v ic to ry .
The government by contrast appeared almost feeb le . Despite the
hundreds of p o lit ic a l prisoners interned in the cap ita l during
the f ig h tin g , Liberacion i t s e l f  lis te d  only two o f I ts  follow ers as
y 84having been k ille d  1n San Jose.
By a l l  accounts, the Communists led by Manual Mora were the 
most dedicated of the forces supporting the government. As mentioned 
in Chapter Four, the Communists Intended to make the b a ttle  fo r San 
Jos£ a house to house la s t  ditch stand. Mora, to avoid the extreme 
loss o f l i f e  such fig h tin g  would e n ta i l ,  arranged a meeting w ith  
Flgueres 1n the no-man's land separating the opposing armies at
8^Acuna, E l 48, pp. 262-264,
8 3 Ib 1d . f p. 2 2 0 .
8 4 B e ll , C r is is , p. 152.
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Ochomogo on the road to Cartago. The meeting resulted 1n the so- 
ca lled  Pact o f Ochomogo, by which Mora agreed not to continue the 
f ig h t  In return fo r Flgueres' pledge to perpetuate the social le g is ­
la tio n  o f Calderon and promise not to persecute the workers who had
85supported the government. Flgueres la te r  regretted the agreement 
and Liberacion myths conveniently disregard the fa c t th a t Flgueres 
complied with only the f i r s t  part o f the bargain, the pledge to con­
tinue social reform. He la rg e ly  ignored the s tip u la tio n  not to
Of
punish his opponents.
Although qu ite  bloody by Costa Rican standards, the C iv il War 
of 1948 was moderate compared to s im ila r revo lts  in  Central and South 
America. The War of National L iberation  comported with Costa Rica's  
history  o f moderation. The L iberation  army cornnitted outrages but 
not wantonly; public works were sabotaged but not hotels and restau­
rants; some prisoners were m istreated, even k i l le d ,  but not many; 
property was damaged, but not excessively; and the whole a f fa i r  lasted  
only 40 days.
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY
Elections are the p ivotal events around which the action in the 
Myth revolves. The e lec tio n  o f 1942 prompted Calderon to seek sup­
port from the Communists. Most of the violence a ttr ib u te d  to the
85Acuna, E l 48, pp. 296-301. For the account of th is  meeting 
by Father Benjamin Nunez Vargas who set up the meeting, see A g u ila r, 
Sus hechos, pp. 388-394.
86Flgueres1 noncompllance with the agreement 1s discussed In  
the section on C iv il R ights, above.
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Calderonlstas—Llano Grande, La S ab an llla , la  Huelga de Brazos 
Caldos—were connected with p o lit ic a l campaigns. The act th a t most 
ju s t i f ie d  the armed re v o lt was the setting  aside of the e lection  
resu lts  1n 1948. Consequently, the Issue o f e lec to ra l In te g r ity  1s 
crucial to the mythic theme.
The e lec tio n  o f 1944 provided Llberaclonlsta mythmakers with  
ample m aterial fo r  attack on the Calderon regime. Even leaving  
aside the government sanctioned ( i f  not planned) vio lence, the e lec tio n  
of Plcado was c le a r ly  fraudulent. The extent of government manipu­
la tio n  o f the vote w il l  probably never be ascertained. Acuna con­
siders the government In tervention  merely a continuation of accepted 
po lIcy—Cortes had done the same fo r Calderon 1n 1940, so why should
07
not Calderon s im ila r ly  ass ist his successor?
The opposition considered the e lections o f 1946 a great v ic to ry ;
they had won nearly h a lf  of the seats In the Congress. Pressure on
Plcado Insured th a t the elections would be re la t iv e ly  peaceful and
honest, although, "of course there were Iso la ted  skirmishes, outrages
here and there , v io le n t Interventions by the au th o ritie s  1n one place
88or another but nothing to the extent of 1944." The e lections showed
87 ~w Acuna, E l 48, pp. 87-89; Aguilar also concludes that both 
parties  had committed numerous frauds but th a t the government, 
being responsible fo r  supervising the e le c tio n , had a decided 
advantage. The lopsided o f f ic ia l  resu lts --8 2 ,17 3  fo r Plcado to 
44,435 fo r Cort£s—substantiates A g u ila r's  conclusion. A gu ilar,
Sus hechos, pp. 96-98.
ftp
Caftas, Los ocho a n o s , p .  7 1 .
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✓ 89th a t, when l e f t  alone, the people rejected Calderon-communlsm.
The elections of 1946, however, were reasonably honest. Plcado
scrupulously followed the guidelines set down 1n the new E lectoral
90Code, even though the Code had not ye t been enacted.
Of p a rtic u la r  Importance 1n the Myth 1s the e lec tio n  o f 1948.
I t  ended the odious career o f the Calderon-corrmunists. F ir s t ,  Calderon
was defeated a t the b a llo t box; la te r  the forces of National L iberation
would triumph over him 1n b a tt le .  E lection day I t s e l f  resembled the
previous one; the Calderon forces once again employed th e ir  ta c tic s
of in tim idation  and fraud. But the e lec tio n  was monitored by the
new Electoral Tribunal. Canas describes e lec tio n  night as follow s;
Through the n ig h t, the radios furnish the good news, the hoped 
fo r  news th a t nobody served the oppressor, that fraud was de­
feated. And the night of February 8 , the m ajority  of Costa 
Ricans go to bed sm iling , peaceful fo r  the f i r s t  time 1n a 
long tim e, with a fee lin g  that 1s glorious but Ind efin ab le .
They have won.91
Calderon and his Communist henchmen were not yet ready to give
up th e ir  i l l -g o t te n  power. They in it ia te d  a new kind of golpe de
estado. F ir s t ,  Calderon denied his defeat. Second, the Communists
organized demonstrations to challenge the e lec to ra l figures and to
In tim idate  the Tribunal 1n Its  determination o f the e lec to ra l res u lts .
Th ird , the Calderonlstas pressured the Tribunal d ire c tly  by sending
89Baeza barely mentioned the elections o f 1946, and then 
only to point out that the Communists were concerned w ith re ta in in g  
control over the Congress. Baeza, La lucha, pp. 188-189; Castro 
Esquivel considered the e lections obviously fraudulent because 
the opposition did not win a m a jo rity . Castro, Flgueres. pp. 71-72.
90B e ll,  C r is is , pp. 115-116.
91Caftas, Los ocho a fto s , p .  112 .
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In d iv id u a ls , such as Manuel Mora, to  ta lk  to them. Next the Com*
munists tr ie d  to prepare the nation psychologically fo r the go!pe
by v i l i fy in g  Ulate and questioning the le g a lity  of the e le c tio n .
F in a lly , the Calder6 n-contro lled Congress annulled the e lec tio n s ,
c itin g  Ir re g u la r it ie s . Calderdn had accomplished his golpe de
estado, but . the annulment of the elections had been made In
an atmosphere of violence and the vote of the Calderonistas and
92Communists was sealed with blood."
F in a lly , Llberaclonistas had to ju s t i fy  th e ir  own re jec tio n  
of the e le c tio n . Just as the rev o lt was deemed a la s t re s o rt, so 
the Junta Fundadora was an extreme measure forced on the Flgueristas  
1n order to Insure the success of the Revolution.
During the f i r s t  chaotic days a fte r  the f a l l  o f the Calderon­
ls ta s , Santos Ledn Herrera served as Interim  president u n til the 
victo rious revo lutionaries could decide what to do. On the f i r s t  
of May 1948, U late and Flgueres signed a pact establishing a junta  
headed by Flgueres to govern with a le g is la t iv e  body fo r eighteen 
months. Had Costa Rica driven out one d ic ta to r  only to be seized 
by another?
The Immediate aftermath of the combat phase o f the Revolution 
was the most d i f f ic u l t ,  dangerous period. Calderdn and Plcado had 
f le d  to Nicaragua, taking much equipment and many weapons with them. 
Somoza, the President of Nicaragua and Calderbn's close fr ie n d , had 
his army poised to  Invade Costa R1ca and reclaim  1t fo r his fr ie n d .
97B ae za , La l u c h a , pp . 2 0 9 - 2 1 8 ;  t h e  q u o te  1s from  p .  2 1 8 .
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Many o f the young men who had fought hard and risked th e ir  liv e s  to
save the presidency fo r  U la te , opposed turning the nation over to
a man ". . . who had remained hidden 1n the Archbishop's Palace."
A "psychosis o f war" had been created by the f ig h tin g ; a strong
93respected hand a t the helm of state  was e ssen tia l. U late rea lized
that fo r the good of the nation , he should delay taking o f f ic e .  He
agreed to the formation of the junta which could and would provide
94the leadership and strength needed.
That e lec to ra l fraud 1s central to the theme of the Myth 1s 
Iro n ic  because the evidence ava ilab le  today lends credence to the 
Calderonista claim th a t the opposition deprived Calderon o f the pres i­
dency by fraud. This evidence is In s u ff ic ie n t to make a d e f in it iv e  
assessment o f g u i l t ,  but the Calderonlstas did have evidence to support 
the claim that they had been cheated.
The Calderonlstas based th e ir  charge on the unusually low tu rn ­
out a t the p o lls . The to ta l vote (99,541) was the lowest fo r a p res i­
den tia l e lection  since 1936 (88 ,324 )— down 27,000 from l944--desp1te  
an Increase 1n population o f over 160,000 1n the Intervening twelve 
years . 95  Calderon had been disposed tc -oncede the e lections to
9 3 Ib 1d . , p. 286.
94 Ib id . ,  p. 287. Castro, Flgueres, pp. 151-152. The terms 
of the Ulate-F1gueres Pact are lis te d  on pp. 152-153.
95The fig u re  fo r the 1948 e lec tio n  was taken from Acurfa,
El 48, p. 118; the other figures were taken from Samuel Stone,
Ca HTnastfa de los conqulstadores (San Jos6 , Costa R1ca: EDUCA,
Centroamericana, 1975), pp. 567, 577, 579. Aguilar believed that 
the Calderonlstas should share the blame fo r  the re g is tra tio n  d is ­
crepancies since they had tr ie d  to enro ll In e lig ib le  people and 
fa lse  names. A g u ila r, Sus hechos. pp. 160-166.
Ulate u n til reports began pouring 1n from Calderonlstas In the out­
ly ing regions th a t thousands of Calderon supporters had been pre­
vented from voting . Incorrect cedulas ("voter re g is tra tio n  cards"), 
fa u lty  re g is tra tio n  l i s t s ,  and po lling  stations crowded w ith U la tls tas  
who slowed the voting process were c ited  as ta c tic s  of the opposition. 
When Benjamin 0d1o, the head of the E lectoral Registry and a known
F1guer1sta, l e f t  San Jose to jo in  Flgueres 1n the mountains, the
96Calderonlstas were certa in  they had been cheated.
The E lectoral Tribunal I t s e l f  contributed to the Calderonlsta  
refusal to admit defeat. The antiquated, Inadequate procedures and 
f a c i l i t ie s  fo r ve rify in g  the vote prevented the Tribunal from complet­
ing I ts  task w ith in  the stipu lated  tim e. Not only did the Tribunal 
have to cope with the Incessant and numerous complaints o f fraud, 
but a mysterious f i r e  destroyed many of the b a llo ts . Instead of 
admitting being Incapable o f s a tis fa c to r ily  f u l f i l l i n g  its  d u ties , 
the Tribunal, over the opposition of one o f Its  three members,
decided to award the presidency to U la te , subject to confirmation
97by the Congress.
The Calderonistas In terpreted  the T ribu na l's  decision to 
mean that the Congress could make the f in a l determ ination; to the 
opposition, the T rib u n a l’ s decision meant v ic to ry . The Calderonlstas  
insisted  that f i r s t  they had been cheated a t  the p o lls , then they
96B e ll,  C r is is , p. 125. 0d1o became an o f f ic e r  In the Army o f  
National L iberation and subsequently held the post o f foreign m in ister  
on the Junta. The Calderonlstas had good reason to doubt his Impar­
t i a l i t y  as head of the E lectoral Registry.
97A g u i l a r ,  Sus h e c h o s ,  pp . 1 6 6 -1 7 4 .
had been denied a f a i r  hearing by the Tribunal. They argued that
since the Congress had the duty to confirm the Tribunal decision i t
98also had the r ig h t to n u l l i fy  th a t decision. Unfortunately, the 
Calderonlstas ruined th e ir  own argument when they took the process 
of n u ll if ic a t io n  a step fa r th e r . Had they merely set the decision  
aside and called  fo r  a new e lec tio n  as s tip u la ted  by law, they 
would have been w ith in  th e ir  con stitu tion a l r ig h ts . Instead, the 
Congress named Calderon president, giving the Flgueristas an Ideal 
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r re v o lt.
The Liberacion Myth o f the Revolution of 1948 blends fa c t and 
f ic t io n ,  accuracy and d is to r tio n , d e ta ils  and omissions 1n a dramatic 
story o f th re a t, reac tio n , and reso lu tion . The Myth emphasizes the 
th reat to Costa Rican values and tra d itio n s  emanating from the Calderon 
1sta domination of the government. The issue is  c le a r-c u t: overthrow
Calderon or su ffer under a Conmunlst dominated d ic ta to rsh ip . The 
events leading to and during the Revolution serve only to substan­
t ia te  Liberacion claims. La S ab an llla , la  Huelga and the other 
episodes highlighted In the Myth a l l  occurred, but not necessarily 1n 
the manner 1n which L lb erad on ls tas  have described them. Although 
Calderon and his supporters no doubt resorted to v io lence, were at 
times corrupt, and conmltted e lec to ra l fraud, the L1berac1on1stas 
also used violence and may have tampered w ith e lec tio n  returns. For 
th is  study, what 1s Important 1s that the emphasis, the omissions, and
®®Accord1ng to Acuna, the Calderonlstas claimed th a t since Cortes 
had demanded the Congress n u ll i fy  the 1944 e lections the opposition  
had set a precedent fo r n u ll i f ic a t io n . The Congress, feeing contro lled  
by Calderonlstas In 1944, refused Cortes' demand. Acuna, E l 48 , p. 134
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the d is to rtio n s  are patterned. The pattern th a t emerges from analy­
sis f i t s  closely the Image presented In la  levenda blanca--th e
p icture o f Costa R1ca as a non-vio lent* democratic country.
In the next chapter, we w ill  look a t how the fy th  has been
incorporated In to  the operations o f the Liberacion Naclonal as a
p o lit ic a l party .
CHAPTER S IX
THE MYTH AND LIBERACION NACIONAL
The Myth of the Revolution Is  a founding myth; i t  explains 
and ju s t i f ie s  the o rig in  of a p o lit ic a l party--L iberacion  Naclonal. 
Although L1beracl6n was not o f f ic ia l ly  Inaugurated u n til 1951, i ts  
p rin c ip le s , Its  leadership, and i ts  goals were forged in the turbu­
len t years of the 1940's. The same men who planned and executed 
the Revolution, who ruled the country by a junta fo r  eighteen months, 
were the founders of Liberacion Naclonal. According to the Myth, 
they created L1beracl6n Naclonal fo r  the same reasons they had led 
the Revolution and had governed by f ia t :  . . to create fo r the
Costa Rican Man conditions th a t would permit him to re a liz e  his  
f u l l  development through the proper use of the m aterial and s p i r i t ­
ual resources of our N ation ."* The name the group chose fo r I t s e l f  
during the Revolution--Movement o f National L1berat1on--had a double 
meaning. Not only would Costa Rica be lib e ra ted  from the clutches 
of the Calder6n-Commun1sts, but the nation would be lib e ra ted  from 
the fe tte rs  of archaic economic and social s tructu res . The L ibera­
tion Movement thwarted the th reat to Costa Rican democracy by
*Part1do Liberacion Naclonal, "Carta Fundamental de 1951" 
in Carta Fundamental (San Jos6 , Costa R1ca: Primer Congreso
Ideol6g1co, 1969), p. 39.
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overthrowing Calderon; the Junta began the process o f moderniza­
tio n  by consolidating the Revolution and In it ia t in g  v i t a l ly  needed 
reforms; Liberacion Naclonal would lead the nation to the f ru it io n  
of I ts  economic and social asp ira tions.
The founding of L1berad6n Naclonal composes the th ird  or the 
resolution phase of the Myth of the Revolution. The party is pre­
sented as the essential and natural culmination of the revo lu tion ­
ary struggle. As m ythicized, the creation of Liberacion f u l f i l l s  
the mythic theme and cor/orms to the cu ltu ra l lim its  that shaped 
the other parts of the story of the Revolution.
The creation of an a c t iv is t ,  w ell-organized p o lit ic a l party 
whose Ideology demanded socio-economic change, in te rjec ted  a new, 
p o te n tia lly  threatening element in to  the tra d it io n a lly  tranquil 
Costa Rican p o lit ic s . The Comnunlst Party , whose threat was part 
of the ra tio n a le  fo r overthrowing Calderdn, was also a c t iv is t  and 
committed to change. L1berad6n could not expect acceptance by the 
average Costa Rican 1f I t  only copied Its  defeated enemies. To 
overcome the apparent paradox o f being an Instrument o f change, 
yet remaining the protector of Costa Rican p o lit ic a l values, 
Liberacion had to be carefu l to p ro ject the proper Image, both 1n 
I ts  organization and 1n Its  operation. This chapter examines how 
Liberacion has carried  forward the mythic theme to Its  reso lu tio n , 
the founding of the party. The f i r s t  section sets out the mythic 
version of the creation o f L1beracl6n. The second section delineates  
the Image Liberacion has tr ie d  to c u lt iv a te  and assesses how closely  
i t  f i t s  the more ob jective  descriptions o f the party . The f in a l
section Is a b r ie f  look a t  how Llberacirfn has used the Myth fo r
s p ec ific  purposes, such as 1n e lectio n  campaigns.
THE FOUNDING OF LIBERACION NACIONAL 
With the return of consltu tlonal government (Figueres d is ­
banded the Junta and turned over the government to Ulate and the 
new Leg is la tive  Assembly in  November 1949), Figueres and his sup­
porters from the National L iberation  Movement knew that 1f the 
achievements of the Revolution were not to  be dissipated by the con 
servatlve U la tis ta s , th e ir  energy and p o lit ic a l s k i l ls  would have 
to be channelled Into  a new p o lit ic a l organization. Although they 
had accomplished much, Figueres and the Junta Fundadora made one 
serious ta c tic a l e rro r . Relying on the goodwill and good fa ith  of 
th e ir  opposition ist a l l ie s ,  they overlooked the need fo r good pub­
l i c i t y .  The Revolutionary leaders concentrated on rebuild ing the
Ca1der6 n-damaged nation and preparing fo r  economic and social ad­
vances. While they were engaged 1n these f r u i t f u l  labors, the pluto  
crats began to denigrate the p o lic ies  and actions o f the Junta. 
U late , envious o f the acclaim given Figueres and conscious of his 
own meager contribution to the Revolution, became the tool o f the
o ligarchy, pouring out the most v ic iou s , slanderous propaganda
2
against Figueres. The campaign of v i l i f ic a t io n  resulted In the 
conservatives' gaining a m ajo rity  1n the Constitu tional Convention. 
The C onstitution o f the Second Republic, so laboriously worked out
p
Alberto Baeza F lores , La lucha sin f in  (Mdxlco, D .F .: B.
Costa-Am1c, 1969), pp. 307-3107
by the Junta, was re jec ted . Even so, the constitu tion  f in a l ly
agreed upon Included many of the important provisions proposed by
the Junta. This very fa ilu re  i l lu s tra te d  the c a lib e r o f men which
comprised the Junta, fo r  what other v ictorious revo lutionaries
would have accepted the defeat of a cherished goal rather than
3
resort to force in v io la tio n  of th e ir  deepest principles?
The con stitu tion a l c r is is  taught the F1guer1stas a severe 
lesson. I f  the Revolution were to f u l f i l l  i ts  p o te n tia l, the 
Movemlento Liberacidn Nacional would have to reappraise I ts  s itu a tio n . 
From th is  reappraisal came a new p o lit ic a l p arty , Liberac1<$n Nacional-  
a modern, m u lti-c la s s , well-organized in s t itu tio n  based on a coherent 
Ideology which would embody the Ideals of democracy and social ju s tic e  
The defeat on the co n s titu tio n , and la te r  the poor showing made by 
the Partido Social Dem6 crata (the Figueristas had reverted to the 
pre-war appelatlon) In the elections fo r the new le g is la t iv e  assembly, 
made c lear the absolute necessity fo r a new party. E v id ently , the 
voters confused Social Dem6crata with the old a l ly ,  Union Nacional, 
fo r I ts  representation In the Assembly was minimal. On October 12, 
1951, the new party was founded with a name th a t would rec a ll those 
glorious days of the R evolu tion--Partido  L1berad6n Nacional.
The Carta Fundamental of the Partido Liberacion Nacional ex­
pressed the aspirations of the Costa Ricans who had supported the 
war against Calder^n-conrnunlsm. The "Preamble" explicated the
Arturo Castro Esquivel, Jos£ Figueres F e rre r, e l hombre y 
su obra (San Jos£, Costa Rica: Imprenta Torme, 1955), pp. 209-210.
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h is to r ic a l, In te lle c tu a l, and s p ir itu a l roots o f L1beracl6n. I t
is worth repeating here:
From the origins o f our H istory, there has existed the necessi­
ty of creating favorable conditions that would allow the Costa 
Rican man to re a lize  his fu l l  development through the proper 
use o f the m aterial and s p ir itu a l resources o f our nation.
The campaign of National Opposition was the vigorous manifesta­
tion of these forces and th e ir  aspirations, that culminated 1n 
the glorious War o f National Liberation of March and April 1948. 
This Epic constituted the great s a c rific e  of the Costa Rican 
people in th e ir  f ig h t  to reconquer national values which had been 
gradually lo s t, and made possible the rea liza tio n  of th e ir  con­
stant yearnings. To the Founding Junta of the Second Republic 
belonged the task of channeling these aspirations and setting  
down the basis fo r th e ir  re a liza tio n .
That sacrifice  demands the creation of a permanent social move­
ment that assumes the responsib ility  of carrying out th is  task.
To a l l  those aspirations, Imbedded w ithin the exigencies and 
Ideas about human d ignity  that c iv il iz a t io n  has come to accept, 
we want to give expression 1n the following principles that 
constitute the Fundamental Charter of the National Liberation  
Movement.4
In 1969, L1berad6n held Its  f i r s t  Ideological Congress 1n ac­
cordance with the newly promulgated Party Statutes of 1965. The Con­
gress drew up a new Carta Fundamental, setting out the goals and 
principles of the Party 1n greater d e ta il than 1n the f i r s t  charter. 
The "Preamble" to the second charter contained the same message.
We are the consequence of the great movement In it ia te d  1n 1940 
by the Center fo r the Study o f National Problems, that pro­
claimed, 1n the name of a new generation, the necessity of 
In it ia t in g  a peaceful Revolution 1n Costa R1ca, and that based 
I ts  postulates on the objective study of the national r e a lity ,  
pledged to find  s t r ic t ly  Costa Rican solutions to the problems.5
\ lb e r a c l6 n ,  Carta Fundamental, p. 49. 
c
Ib id .,  Carta Fundamental Numero Dos, p. 8.
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Llberaclon Is the d ire c t h e ir  to the Partido Social Democrata, 
the f i r s t  p o lit ic a l organization 1n Costa R1ca to base Its  programs 
and a c t iv it ie s  on thorough social and economic analysis. The Preamble 
to the revised Carta Fundamental reaffirm ed the s p ir itu a l and emo­
tio n a l source o f L lberaclon, the "armed uprising o f the Costa Rican 
people," who by the medium of revolutionary warfare signalled "the 
democratic w ill  of our n a t io n a lity ."  The stated objectives of the 
War o f National L1berat1on"--the respect fo r suffrage, the w e ll­
being o f the greatest number, and honesty In public adm ln is tra tion -- 
continue being the key to our national tra je c to ry  and to our aspira­
tio ns ."^
As the p o lit ic a l h e ir to the Revolution, Llberaclon considered 
I t s e l f  the protector of Costa Rican democracy. The Carta Fundamental 
re fle c te d  the L lberaddn concern fo r Ind ividual rights  which included 
not only c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  and open e le c tio n s , but the r ig h t to . . 
the maximum possible sa tis fa c tio n  of the necessities of food, housing, 
c lo th in g , health and education."^ C iv il l ib e r t ie s  and honest e lec ­
tions mean l i t t l e  to  the man whose fam ily lacks the requis ites  of 
l i f e .  To Insure the proper functioning o f a democratic society In  
the modern world, the government must attend to economic progress and 
to the proper d is tr ib u tio n  of the national wealth. Only a modem, 
permanent and Id eo lo g ic a lly  oriented p o lit ic a l party could provide
6 Ib ld .
^ Ib ld . ,  Carta Fundamental, p. 41.
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the leadership necessary to properly d ire c t the nation 's course.
Q
Only Uberacldn offered that kind o f leadership.
Two aspects o f Liberacidn made I t  the party o f progress. 
Liberadrfn established a permanent organization at a l l  levels  
o f Costa Rican society and 1n a l l  parts o f the country. That 
organization has continued to provide local leadership and to 
keep national leaders in touch with local problems. Second, 
Llberacidn was the f i r s t  party to d ire c t I ts  a c t iv it ie s  accord­
ing to the guidelines of a democratic s o c ia lis t ideology.
To f u l f i l l  the promises o f I ts  Carta Fundamental, L ibera- 
cion concieved and implemented many programs and p o lic ie s . Among 
the more outstanding were the in s ta lla tio n  of an autonomous, d is ­
interested Electoral Tribunal that would insure open and honest 
electio ns; the creation of a genuine c iv i l  service based on m erit 
to preclude corruption and nepotism 1n government; the renegotia­
tion  of the contract with United F ru it Company, which gave Costa 
Rica a larger share of the p ro fits  and increased the sa laries  and 
benefits o f the workers; the establishment o f the In s tltu to  
Nacional de V1v1enda y Urbanismo (National In s t itu te  of Housing 
and Urbanism) provided low cost, decent housing to the poor; 
and the implementation o f agrarian reform through the operation  
o f the In s tltu to  de Tlerras y Colonizaddn ( In s t itu te  o f Lands
Q
Ib id . ,  Carta Fundamental Numero Dos, pp. 9 , 11-13.
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and C olonization).®  Llberaclon achieved many more successes, and 
suffered some setbacks.
Through a l l  the d i f f ic u lt ie s  o f transforming Costa R1ca in to  
a modern nation , meeting the challenge o f Calderonlsta subversion 
(and an attempted Invasion by CalderOn from Nicaragua 1n 1955), 
overcoming the obstacles to change thrown up by the conservatives, 
UberaclOn Nacional maintained a steadfast comnitment to democratic 
processes and In s titu tio n s . Above a l l ,  the abiding respect fo r  
Costa Rican trad itio n s  of domestic t ra n q u il ity ,  honesty in govern­
ment and e lec to ra l in te g r ity , has guided the actions o f Llberacion, 
even at the expense of v ita l  programs and p o lic ie s . Liberacitfn has 
endeavored to f u l f i l l  i ts  re s p o n s ib ility : . . t o  in te rp re t and
to Improve th is  tra d it io n . . . 1n order to guarantee most e f f ic a ­
ciously the rights  of Costa Ricans and to provide to them b e tte r  
conditions of I 1f e ." l(^
MYTH AND IMAGE
L1beracl6n's concern fo r i ts  place in the h is to ric a l development 
of Costa R1ca is re flec ted  1n the image the party has tr ie d  to c u l t i ­
vate. L1beracl6n views I t s e l f  as the driv ing  force behind social and 
economic change in Costa R1ca. In mythic terms I t  1s the organizational
q
Carlos Araya Pochet, H ls to ria  de los partidos p o litic o s :  
llb erac lo n  Nacional (San JosO, Costa R1ca: Imprenta Antonio Lehman,
1968, Chapter I I I ,  "The Development o f Costa Rica during the 
Governments of L1beracl6n Nacional," is  a sunmation of the programs 
and p o lic ies  LlberaciOn considers Its  major achievements. The 
above examples are taken from th a t chapter, pp. 97-151.
^LlberaclOn, Carta Fundamental Numero Dos, p. 7.
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m anifestation o f a movement that sprang up from the unfocused but 
powerful yearnings of the Costa Rican people to fu l ly  develop the 
economic potentia l of the country and to share the rewards o f 
economic progress w ith a l l .
The Llberaclon Image, on the one hand, stresses that the party  
represents a break w ith the archaic forms and po lic ies  o f the pre- 
Revolutlon p o lit ic s . On the other hand, the socio-economic changes, 
so crucia l to the continued development o f Costa Rica, had to be 
effected w ith in  the lim ita tio n s  o f v a lid  Costa Rican tra d itio n s . 
Change did not ju s t i fy  d ic ta to rsh ip , the v io la tio n  o f the princip les  
o f open, com petitive e lec tio n s , and Individual r ig h ts . Improving the 
lo t  o f the peasant and the laborer would mean rais ing  the national 
economy as a whole, not simply taking from the rich  fo r the benefit 
of the poor. The f i r s t  change on the agenda had to be the creation  
o f a p o lit ic a l mechanism new to Costa R1ca--the modern p o lit ic a l  
party. By modern, L1berac1on1stas meant a permanently organized 
body, Independent of p e rso n a litie s , that would function continuously. 
A modem party su itab le  fo r  Costa R1ca would be democratic In I ts  
approach to national p o lit ic s  and in I ts  In terna l a f fa irs  as w e ll.
A modern party would seek solutions to national problems w ith in  a 
strong, c a re fu lly  devised Ideological framework that would estab­
lis h  a c lear set of goals and would designate the appropriate means 
to achieve them. Consequently, the party p a rt ic u la r ly  emphasizes 
th a t L1beracl6n 1s id eo lo g ica lly  o rien ted , organized on a perma­
nent basis, and fu l ly  democratic 1n Its  operation. The party affirm s  
I ts  conscious and e x p lic it  re je c tio n  of p o lit ic s  based on personality
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and fac tio n  th a t had characterized Costa Rican p o lit ic s  (and especia lly
the p o lit ic s  o f Calder6 n) u n til the Revolution of 1948. The founding
o f L1beraci6n 1n 1951 represents a dramatic change, but Llberaclon 
mythology also stresses that the break was the culmination o f a grow­
ing p o lit ic a l movement concerned w ith red irec tin g  and re v ita liz in g  
Costa Rican p o lit ic s . A sense o f con tinu ity  t ie s  the party to i ts  
h is to r ic a l antecedents--the a c t iv is t  branch o f the anti-Calderon  
Opposition. The essential ch arac te ris tics  o f  L1beracl6n are best 
expressed 1n its  founding documents--the Carta Fundamental de 1951 and 
the Carta Fundamental Numero Dos de 1969.
The image Llberaclon wants to p ro ject Is made c lear in  the
f i r s t  chapter o f the Carta Fundamental Numero Dos. Uberacion is a 
"permanent and e ffe c tiv e  instrument o f p a rtic ip a tio n  in p o lit ic a l  
l i f e . "  I t  1s governed by "democratic procedures" and s trives  to 
balance the power of the diverse groups th a t belong to the party .
The party structure Is  democratic and capable of being adapted to 
the changing contingencies of national conditions. Selection o f 
candidates fo r public o ff ic e  is  open and made only w ith the "consul­
ta tio n  of the greatest number o f the party members." Positions 
w ith in  the party are f i l l e d  on the basis o f "m erit, s u ita b i l i t y ,  
e th ic s , and Id e n tity  w ith the highest ideals of the P arty ." The party  
imposes sanctions on those "who act ccntrary to  the Ideological p rin ­
cip les of our movement." Those who defend or b en e fit from in teres ts  
that "c o n flic t w ith the p rinc ip les  of the Party or with the national 
In te re s t"  are "incompatible w ith leadership 1n the Party.
1l Ib1d- ,  pp. 12, 13.
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Llberaclon. then, stresses I ts  open and democratic organization  
and I ts  commitment to  conduct I t s e l f  w ith honesty and a tten tio n  
to i ts  Ideological p rin c ip le s .
Llberaclon makes much o f I ts  Ideological o r ie n ta tio n . Araya, 
fo r example, states th a t Llberaclon, "constitutes the f i r s t  force
in Costa Rican p o lit ic s  to estab lish  a democratic party , both
12ideological and permanent." The basic tenets o f 1Iberaclonismo
are lis te d  in  the Carta Fundamental, but the revised charter of 1969
contains a more succinct statement. The basic goal is :
The creation o f new social order, based on ju s t ic e , the law 
and the common good, making possible the f u l l  re a liz a tio n  
of human p o te n tia l. This order guarantees to each and every 
one of I ts  members human d ig n ity  and the security  of food, 
c lo th in g , housing, access to the land, hea lth , education, 
s a tis fa c tio n  of creative  opportun ities , work and ju s t  
incomes.13
Only the e ffe c tiv e  p a rtic ip a tio n  of the c itiz e n ry  can bring th is
goal of f r u it io n .  Consequently Llberaclon believes in:
. . . the democracy o f representation and p a rtic ip a tio n , that 
1s to say, 1n the free  play of ideas, In the law, the respect 
of m in o ritie s , public opinion, free  p o lit ic a l organizations, 
e lec to ra l l ib e r ty ,  the real q u a lity  of opportunity, the e ffe c ­
t iv e  d is tr ib u tio n  of wealth and power, the public control of 
government a c t iv i ty ,  the protection o f human rig h ts  and In  
general a l l  that 1s contained In the social democratic
t r a d it io n .H
Government, as L ib erac l6n sees 1 t ,  should be the primary 
force behind social and economic change. In fa c t ,  In the o rig in a l 
C arta , "government1' or the "State" Is  used synonymously to Id e n tify
12 /
Araya, L lberaclon, p. 187.
1\ib e ra c l6 n , Carta Fundamental Numero Dos, p. 15.
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with the S ta te , w ith no c lear d is tin c tio n  between the State and the
party being made. Undoubtedly, th is  1s p a rtly  due to the U b eradS n
commitment to government leadership In economic and social planning
and policy Implementation. I t  may be th a t L1berac1on1stas had 1n
mind the establishment o f a one-party dominant system lik e  the
Partido Revoluc1onar1o In s titu d o n a l (PRI) 1n Mexico. Although
LiberadAn has had greater success a t the po lls  than any other
Costa Rican party (four out o f seven presidentia l e lections and a
m ajority  1n the L eg is la tive  Assembly u n til 1974), 1t has never
approximated the p o lit ic a l control PRI has exercised in Mexico.
And at leas t in p r in c ip le , Uberacion adheres to the separation
o f powers b u ilt  in to  th e ir  con stitu tion : "We seek the autonomous
functioning of the powers of State w ith in  th e ir  own o rb its ,"  keeping
In mind the need fo r "adequate coordination" among the three  
15branches. Presumably the party provides the necessary coordination, 
but that 1s not stated e x p lic i t ly .
L1berad6n considers I t s e l f  a m u lti-c lass  party . Much of i ts  
e f fo r t  1s devoted to the protection and betterment of the poor.
Since L1berad6n rejects the princip le of class c o n flic t per se, 
democracy means " . . .  that the p o litic a l system 1s structured 1n 
such a way that d iffe re n t social sectors can partic ipate constantly 
and e ffe c tiv e ly  1n decision-making organs at a ll  le v e ls ."16 The party, 
then, works at a l l  leve ls , and especially with the campeslnos and the
15Ib1d., p. 16.
l6 Ib1d ., p. 25.
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workers, to Insure th a t they are adequately represented 1n the p o li­
t ic a l  l i f e  o f the society.
F in a lly , L1berad6n claims to be d iffe re n t because 1t has
rejected the old p o lit ic s  o f personality and special In te re s t.
Araya, surveying the h is to ry  of Costa Rican p o lit ic a l p a rtie s , says:
We can a ffirm  th a t there were Ideologies, but these were not 
channelled 1n an adequately structured way th a t would permit 
them to keep the Ideological aspects c lea r and pure, above 
personallstlc  leadership . ! 7
Llberaclon, to the contrary, 1s based on p rin c ip le s , programs, and 
theories developed through careful analysis and constant study.
The Center fo r the Study o f National Problems provided the in t e l ­
lectual foundations fo r the creation of an Ideological party.
Social Dem6crata gave the future  leaders of L1berad6n p o lit ic a l  
experience. The Revolution tested the m ettle  of the fu ture  p o lit ic a l  
leaders, and the Junta furnished an opportunity to  begin the Imple­
mentation of the theories developed by the in c ip ie n t L1berac1on1stas. 
Through th is  period of p o lit ic a l gestation the emphasis was placed 
on Ideas, programs, and p o lic ie s , not p erso n a litie s . L lberaclon, 
according to the Myth, has always been a party dedicated to the f u l ­
f illm e n t o f ideological goals through democratic procedures. The 
p arty , therefore  Id e n tif ie s  with no single Ind iv idual as have other 
parties  such as Republlcano Nacional (Calder6n ).
UberaciOn claims to be permanent, democratic, and Id eo lo g ica l. 
I t  1s a l l  th ree , but these terms have special meanings when opera­
tio n a lize d  by LlberaclOn as a functioning p o lit ic a l  party . Opponents
^Araya, Llberaclon. p. 188.
consider the Llberaclon Image to be a facade th a t hides the machina­
tions of power-hungry scoundrels; L1berac1on1stas believe th a t the 
Image re fle c ts  the r e a l i ty  o f a modern p o lit ic a l party s tr iv in g  to 
achieve I t s  goals fo r  the national In te re s t. The operational r e a l i ty  
of Llberaclon d if fe rs  somewhat from the Image projected by the Myth, 
I f  Llberaclon 1s not merely a vehicle fo r  the self-aggrandfzement 
of Its  leaders, neither does I t  epitomize p a rtic ip a to ry  democracy. 
Nevertheless, a p o lit ic a l  myth, 1f  I t  1s to be believed , must not 
diverge too ra d ic a lly  from the experience of the group to which i t  
perta ins . An examination o f two important party a ttr ib u te s , organi­
zational permanence and democratic operation , shows that the appear­
ance o f conformity to the mythic Image 1s extant in the way Llbera­
clon conducts I t s e l f  as a p o lit ic a l  party ,
Partido Llberaclon Nadonal 1s p rim arily  an e lec to ra l organiza­
tio n ; i ts  main objective 1s to secure e lec tio n  of the candidates 1 t  
offe rs  fo r public o ff ic e . Despite Llberaclon pretensions to being 
the vanguard o f social and economic change, b as ica lly  1 t  1s oriented  
toward the conduct of e lection  campaigns. This goes d ire c tly  to the 
question of permanence as a p o lit ic a l  organization.
Organizational permanence 1n L1beracl6n 1s maintained In two 
ways. The sm all, continuously functioning national o ff ic e  1n San 
Jos6 conducts most of the p arty 's  business between campaigns. Second 
a measure of organizational con tin u ity  1s maintained by the re la t iv e  
s ta b i l i ty  of the party membership, the leadership 1n p a r tic u la r .
The party statutes do not specify how often the various organs 
of the party are to meet--w1th the exception of the National Assembly
IQ
which "must meet a t least once a year . ' 140 According to an o f f ic ia l
a t the Llberaclon national o f f ic e , the cantonal bodies—cantonal
assemblies and executive convnlttees—fo r a l l  practical purposes
do not e x is t between election  campaigns. The municipal frac tio n
(Llberaclon members on the municipal councils) 1s the o f f ic ia l
representative of the party in the cantons in non-campaign years.
The National P o lit ic a l Comnittee and the Tribunal of Honor are also
Inactive  during non-campaign years. The ostensibly permanent organs
of the party are geared to campaign a c t iv ity ,  not continuous opera- 
19tio n . This 1s not to say that the party 1s completely dormant 1n
non-campaign years, but that the a c tiv ity  that does occur 1s ad hoc
and inform al. Regular functioning o f the elaborate apparatus set
fo rth  In the party statutes apparently happens only fo r the purpose
of winning elections.
This observation 1s not new. English found much the same
s ituation  1n 1966, when he conducted a series o f Interviews with
party leaders at the local le v e l. When asked about party sponsored
a c tiv it ie s  1n non-election years, only 23.6 percent said that such
20a c tiv it ie s  took place In th e ir  cantons. To a lesser degree the 
same was true of the national organization. English found that the 
national organs such as the National Executive Committee met regularly
IQ y /
Partido Llberaclon Nacional, "Estatutos Partido Llberaclon 
Nacional," mimeographed (San JosO, Costa R1ca, 1973). A rtic le  25.
19Conversations with Sr. V ictor Manual Arias 1n his o ff ic e  
a t the national o ffic e  of Liberation 1n San JosO, Costa R1ca.
^^Burt H. English, LlberaclOn Nacional In Costa R1ca (Gaines­
v i l l e ,  F lorida: University o f Florida Press ,~T971), p. 80.
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21only during campaigns. Nearly ten years la te r  the s itu a tio n  was
the same, with a small group o f permanent party o f f ic ia ls  and employ-
22ees carrying on most o f the party work.
Nevertheless, a new party does not simply appear every four 
years. There 1s a strong measure o f con tinu ity  in the leadership  
of the party . For example, English notes that 26.9 percent of his
sample o f local leaders had occupied the same party o ffice s  fo r at
23leas t two campaigns. Undoubtedly an even greater number had held 
a v a rie ty  o f positions that were not accounted fo r in  his fig u re  which 
did not measure movement among positions. In 1975, I found th a t 85 
percent o f the local leaders who responded to my questionnaires had 
held at leas t one other party o f f ic e ,  and 62 percent had held two or 
more. The minimum time o f membership in the party fo r the e n tire  
sample was six  years (a t  least one campaign), and over 50 percent 
had been 1n the party fo r  more than twenty years. A more or less 
stable network of In d iv id u a ls , experienced 1n party a f fa irs  and cam­
paigns, is  ready to bring the party to f u l l  operational status every 
four years.
The Llberaclon claim to permanence 1s, therefo re , va lid  i f  
one keeps in mind the special meaning which attaches to the term.
There 1s l i t t l e  evidence that Llberaclon expends much energy In
2 1 Ib id . ,  p. 69.
22 Senor A rias , the party o f f ic ia l  d te d  above, said that even 
the P o lit ic a l Consulttee would not be formed u n til the year before the 
e le c tio n , and consequently he could not provide a l i s t  o f  I ts  current 
members.
^E n g lish , L1beraci6n, p. 81.
p o lit ic a l proselytlsm or membership recruitm ent per se. Nor does
the party appear to act as a conduit fo r  p o lit ic a l demands. Those
seeking the sa tis fa c tio n  o f sp ec ific  demands generally go d ire c tly
24to the government o f f ic ia ls  concerned, not to the party . Since 
the party apparatus is  evidently  used to win e lec tio n s , other 
functions appear to be tan g en tia l.
What does democracy mean 1n the context o f Llberaclon party  
p o litics ?  The party statutes estab lish  procedures fo r the selec­
tion  of party o f f ic ia ls  that should s a tis fy  most d e fin itio n s  o f 
democracy. From the lowest levels  of party a c t iv ity  to the highest 
leadership positions, the avowed p rin c ip le  of com petitive e lections  
is  the basis fo r party organization. Yet also found in the statutes  
are the means by which a few Ind ividuals occupying p ivo ta l positions  
can e ffe c t iv e ly  control the party. Llberaclon has 1n fa c t  been domi­
nated by the same small group o f men since Its  founding. The d iv e r­
gence of the operational structure from the formal structure is  best 
seen In the party recruitment patterns.
24The hypothesis that p o lit ic a l parties  act as mechanisms of 
In te re s t aggregation has been challenged by Anthony King 1n his per­
ceptive a r t ic le ,  " P o lit ic a l P arties : Some Sceptical R eflections,"
In Comparative P o lit ic s :  Notes and Readings, 4th e d it io n , eds.
Roy C. Macrldls and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, I l l in o is :  Dorsey 
Press, 1972), pp. 249-250. In Costa R1ca, L1berad6n does not per­
form th is  function except 1n the most general way through the re ­
cruitment of Ind iv iduals  to f i l l  policy-making positions 1n the 
government. For Inform ation on In te re s t a rt ic u la t io n  In Costa Rica 
see Dana Ulnthrop Murphy, "Costa Rica, 1953-1970: the Evolution o f
a Working M u lti-P a rty  System 1n the Post-Revolutionary Era" (Ph.D. 
d is s e rta tio n , U n ivers ity  o f Washington, 1975), Chapter 4 " In te res t  
A rtic u la tio n ,"  pp. 161-242; Dorothy Stetson, " E lite  P o lit ic a l Cul­
ture In Costa R1ca" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , Vanderbilt U n ivers ity , 
1958), p. 45.
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There are usually two types of recruitm ent In a p o lit ic a l  
party where there are com petitive e lections fo r public o ff ic e . Per­
haps the distinguishing a ttr ib u te  o f p o lit ic a l parties  1s that they 
o ffe r  candidates fo r  e le c tio n . The process by which a party selects  
the Ind iv iduals  1t  sponsors 1n an e lec tio n  Is called  recruitm ent.
For our purposes th is  process w il l  be called  candidate recruitm ent.
The party must also f i l l  positions In Its  own hierarchy. To d is t in ­
guish th is  process from the selection o f candidates, we w il l  re fe r  to 
selection  of party o f f ic ia ls  as party recruitm ent. The two procedures 
are not necessarily the same, although in the case o f Llberacion  
both types of recruitm ent share an Important common t r a i t ,  control 
from above.
Taking candidate recruitm ent f i r s t ,  1t 1s c lear that the
highest o f f ic ia ls  In Llberaclon exert considerable control over the
selection of candidates to f i l l  the party s la te s . The presidentia l
e lections can be dea lt w ith e a s ily . The question of democratic
procedures 1n the selection o f presidentia l candidates 1s almost
moot, despite the rather extensive a tten tio n  paid to th a t action 1n
the party statu tes . To date, only four d iffe re n t men have run fo r
president on the L1beracl6n slate in the seven elections that have
25been held since the Revolution. Figueres ran twice In 1953 and 
1970, and won both times. O rllch was defeated 1n 1958 and won In
25Luis Alberto Monge won a primary e lec tio n  fo r  the presiden­
t ia l  nomination on March 15, 1977. Monge 1s the Secretary General 
o f the party which Indicates th a t the pattern o f national dominance 
over the recruitm ent o f presidentia l candidates 1s s t i l l  1n e f fe c t .
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1962. Oduber repeated Or! 1 ch's performance by losing 1n 1966 and 
winning 1n 1974. Figueres, O rH ch, and Oduber were known as the 
tres  qrandes in Llberaclon u n til O rllch 's  death 1n 1969. The
e lection  o f 1978 was the f i r s t  1n the party 's  h istory  th a t one of
27these three men was not the p arty 's  candidate. Luis Alberto  
Monge headed the Llberaclon t ic k e t  and was defeated.
The selection process fo r the candidates to make up the party  
l i s t  fo r  the L eg is la tive  Assembly Is contro lled by the national 
leadership. A study of the 1970 National Convention revealed that 
the decisions on the composition of the party s la te  fo r each pro­
vince were made by the top o f f ic ia ls ,  Oduber and Figueres in p a r t i-
28cu lar. In almost every case the National Convention merely a f ­
firmed the decisions as to who would be on the l i s t  and what position  
on the l i s t  each nominee would take. Most of the disagreements 
about spec ific  nominations th a t arose were c o n flic ts  between Oduber 
and Figueres and were resolved by compromise. The delegates to the 
Convention took part p rim arily  as Indicators o f strength between 
two grandes. In one Instance, an I n i t i a l l y  successful delegate 
re v o lt regarding the candidates on the Puntarenas b a llo t  was
^®Ne1l M. C u llinan , "Candidate Recruitment w ith in  the Costa 
Rican 'P artido  L1beracl6n N a t io n a l ( P h .D .  d lssera tlo n . U n ivers ity  
o f Georgia, 1971), p. 57.
27An In te res tin g  occurrence 1n the summer of 1976 Indicates  
a waning of Figueres1 power 1n the party. He t r ie d  to  have the 
L eg is la tive  Assembly amend the Constitution to allow him to run 
fo r  president again. Within the L1berad6n delegation I t s e l f  his 
proposal was defeated by a vote o f 22 to 4. La NacWn (Costa 
R1ca), 8 July 1976, p. 12A.
^®Cull1nan, "Candidate Recruitment."
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u ltim a te ly  overturned due to pressure th a t Oduber exerted on the
candidate concerned.
The power o f the national leaders 1s not absolute. Oduber
exercised his au tho rity  through control over the party apparatus
which he was Instrumental 1n changing 1n order to consolidate power 
29in his hands. Figueres derived his power from his status as 
founder o f the party , his popularity with the voters, and his con­
tro l over party finances.'*® Lower ranking members have on occasion 
challenged the decisions of Oduber and Figueres w ith no serious 
repercussions. To make th e ir  decisions acceptable in the face o f 
opposition, the party leaders often have had to use considerable
s k ill  1n ca jo ling  and convincing th e ir  follow ers to comply. Although
31at times o u trig h t coercion has been used, the leadership of 
Llberaclon is  not d ic ta to r ia l .  But ne ither do the lower level 
functionaries have much d ire c t Influence on the candidate re c ru it ­
ment process. Culllnan concludes that the hierarchy o f assemblies
Ib id . ,  p. 71. Following the defeat o f Oduber in 1966, the 
party underwent extensive reorganization to make I ts  operations more 
e f f ic ie n t  and b e tte r coordinated. The most Important change was the 
creation of the cantonal coordinator (one per canton) who would be 
responsible fo r  conducting a l l  a c t iv it ie s  w ith in  his ju r is d ic tio n  
and who would be responsible d ire c tly  to the national headquarters. 
From 1966 u n til a t leas t 1970, Oduber decided on the appointments 
(and removals) of a l l  cantonal coordinators.
30 Ib id . ,  pp. 220-221. Apparently Figueres gained control over 
the party finances by Investing party bonds (which are sold 1n a n t ic i­
pation o f government campaign reimbursements) In Miami, the disposi­
tio n  of which only he could e f fe c t .
31 Ib id . ,  pp. 168-169. Culllnan re la tes  a fascinating  conversa­
tio n  he had with a party o f f ic ia l  who admitted threatening an in flu e n -  
c1al local party leader w ith physical violence to stop the man from 
opposing a p a rtic u la r  party decision. Such Incidents are re la t iv e ly  
uncommon.
th a t do go through the whole process of e lec tin g  delegates to
the higher assemblies 1s prim arily  a le g itim iz in g  mechanism th a t
gives the lower leve ls  a sense of p a rtic ip a tio n  1n the selection
32o f party candidates.
The national leadership undoubtedly s t i l l  dominates party  
a f fa ir s ,  but that dominance may be s h iftin g  from personalism to 
In s t itu t io n a liz a t io n , In response to the question on my question­
n a ire , “Who do you believe has power in  Llberaclon^" 61 percent o f 
those local leaders who answered the question lis te d  specific  party  
po s itio n , while only 39 percent named spec ific  ind iv idu a ls . T h ir ty -  
three percent gave no answer. Although th is  evidence 1s In s u ff ic ie n t  
to v e r ify  the in s t itu tio n a liz a t io n  o f power, that the party Secretary  
General Luis A lberto Monge has achieved a position o f prominence 1n 
the party second only to Oduber and Figures indicates that control
over the party apparatus may now be a function of party position .
33A ranking o f party o f f ic ia ls  1n 1966 lis te d  Monge as th irte e n th .
Heman Garrin held the tw elth position . Monge became the Secretary
General In 1970; by 1977 his strength in the party was such that he
defeated Garr6 n In a primary e lec tio n  fo r the pres iden tia l nomination
34by a vote of two to one. Monge's success has been a ttr ib u te d  to
35his Influence over the party apparatus. He 1s part o f the
3 2 Ib 1d ., p. 203.
33Engl1sh, U b erac io n . p. 164.
34la  Nacl6 n (Costa R1ca), 15 March 1977, p. 1A.
35 Personal In terv iew  with an o f f ic ia l  o f the Costa Rican 
Embassy In  Washington, D .C ., 20 September 1976.
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generation who fought 1n the Revolution and founded L ib era tio n , 
so his r is e  In the party may not be especia lly  s ig n ific a n t.
Figueres, Oduber and other founding fathers w ill  have to pass 
from the scene before In s t itu tio n a liz a t io n  o f the party Is re a lly  
tested .
Party recruitm ent operates 1n a s im ila r  fashion. At the 
highest le v e ls , the leadership has remained v ir tu a lly  unchanged 
since the founding o f the party . How the top positions w il l  be 
f i l l e d  as the present generation o f leaders leaves the party Is  a 
matter o f conjecture. Recruitment fo r lower level positions 1s 
also contro lled  by the national leadership. According to Juan Carlos 
Fernandez (National Executive Secretary a t the time he was in te r ­
viewed, Secretary of Organization now), the national o ff ic e  decided 
the composition of every coirmlt tee down to the d is t r ic t  le v e l. Sug­
gestions and recommendations by the local leaders were considered, 
but the f in a l decision belonged to the national leaders, usually  
Fernandez h im s e lf.3® A L1berad6n deputy, commenting on the party  
organization In 1975, said:
For me, th is  1s the fa ilu re  of the present s tru c tu re , i t  1s not 
fu n ctio n a l. I t  1s a structure th a t goes from the top down and 
does not come from the grassroots th a t re a lly  give sustenance 
and nourishment to a l l  the s tru c tu re .37
A young local leader (the head o f a municipal fra c tio n ) complained
that the most powerful members o f the party , who "have occupied the
36Cull1nan, "Recruitment," p. 143.
37Personal In terv iew  a t the L eg is la tive  Assembly b u ild in g ,
Son Jo s l, Costa R ica, July 1975.
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key positions fo r years," should be removed from o ffic e  to allow
38"the young leaders" th e ir  chance.
I t  1s not only outsiders and a few disgruntled Llberaclon* 
1stas who have raised the question of democracy 1n the party. On 
two occasions the party has suffered the defection of substantial 
numbers amid charges th a t the top leadership was perverting the 
democratic princip les o f the p arty . In both instances the c a ta ly ­
t ic  Issue was the selection of the party 's  candidate fo r  the 
presidency. Jorge Rossi led a break from the party in 1958 a fte r  
he lo s t the party nomination to the long-time frien d  o f Figueres, 
Franciso O rlich  (a lso  known as one of the tres grandes) .  Rossi 
claimed that he le f t  LIberaclOn to form his own Partido Indepen- 
diente because he had been denied equal opportunity to gain the 
LiberaciOn cand idacy.^  Both Llberaclon and Rossi's party lo s t  
th a t e le c tio n . Since the Partido Independlente and I ts  leaders 
rejo ined the UberaciOn fo ld  in the next e le c tio n , the dissidents
evidently  decided the question of democracy 1n the party was not
40as Important as winning e lec tio ns .
The second defection has had a more las tin g  e f fe c t .  When 
Figueres decided to run fo r a second term 1n 1970 (a t  the time a
From questionnaire, "Porque tlenen el poder?" re fe rrin g  to 
those who have more power than others in the party.
39James L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, Series 1n 
P o lit ic a l Science No. 2 (Boulder, Colorado: U niversity  of Colorado
Press, 1962), p. 23.
^ S ln c e  the combined vote of Llberaclon and Independlente 
(118,000) was greater than th a t of the opposition party ( 1 0 2 , 0 0 0 )
I t  1s generally conceded th a t LlberaclSn would have won had there  
not been a break 1n the ranks.
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second term was a llo w ab le ), Rodrigo Cara2 0 , the head o f the Legis­
la t iv e  Fraction and a protege of Figueres, announced he would 
challenge Figueres In the primary e le c tio n . A fte r being soundly 
defeated, Carazo charged that the e lec tio n  had been fraudulent and 
l e f t  the party. He and his supporters subsequently formed th e ir  
own party , Renovacl6 n Democratlca, on whose t ic k e t he ran fo r  
president In 1974. Renovaclon Democratlca claims to be devoted
to p artic ip a to ry  democracy and 1s dedicated to the renovation of
41Costa Rican p o lit ic s  as a whole. Although L1berac1onistas con­
sider Carazo an opportunist whose Indictment of U b erad o n  1s ju s t  
sour grapes, Carazo has continued to  campaign on a platform  of 
p o lit ic a l reform and honesty 1n government. The real te s t of his 
s in c e rity  w il l  come when he a c tu a lly  takes o f f ic e . C learly  
L1berad6n has been challenged by I ts  own members fo r not conform­
ing to I ts  own democratic ethos.
On the other hand, most o f the rank and f i l e  L1berac1on1stas 
appear to be content w ith the operation o f the party . I t  has been 
observed th a t the lower ranking party o f f ic ia ls  have more positive
The party statu tes of RenovadSn Democratlca emphasize the 
equal p a rtic ip a tio n  o f the party members a t a l l  le v e ls . The basic 
u n it 1s called  a nucleus, a small group o f Ind iv iduals  who fee l a 
certa in  a f f in i t y  fo r  each other (work, philosophy, neighborhood, 
e tc .)  and who want to work fo r  the party as a u n it . Equality  among 
nuclei and between the nuclei and any other leve l of the party  
organization Is  guaranteed. A ll members can express themselves 
fre e ly  without fear of censure. Whether or not Renovaclon does in
fa c t function th is  way is  another m atter. Partido Renovad6 n 
Democr&tlca, "Estatutos," mimeographed (San Jos6 , Costa Rica: 
Partido Renovaclon Democr&t1a, n .d .) .  In terview  w ith L 1c. Rodrigo 
Carazo Odlo 1n his o ff ic e  1n San Jose, Costa R1ca, July 1975.
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a ttitu d es  toward democracy In  the party than do the national leaders. 
For example. English found th a t the local leaders tended to con­
sider the party more open and less fa c tio n a l1zed than did the national 
42leaders. A study o f p o lit ic a l a ttitu d es  In Costa R1ca concluded 
th a t, In general, follow ers were more supportive o f the p o lit ic a l  
system than leaders, and th a t there were no d iscern ib le  differences
{other than party preference) between Llberaclon follow ers and the
43followers of the opposition p a rtie s . One observer commented that 
the apparent discrepancy between party operations and the perceptions 
of the lower ranking party functionaries 1s due to the way in which 
they define democracy. Party concern fo r  the l i t t l e  man and economic 
reform convinces lower ranking o f f ic ia ls  that Liberac1&n is in fa c t
democratic. P a rtic ip a tio n  by the lower leve ls  1n decision-making is
44not considered especia lly  Important. The elaborate process of
r a t if ic a t io n  o f candidate selection may give the p a rtld a rlo  a sense
of being an active  p articp an t, thereby rein forc ing his perception of 
Llberaclon as a democratic party.
A f in a l observation on Llberaclon democracy should be made. The
party considers I t s e l f  to be a m u lti-c lass  and m ulti-reg ion  party. In
terms o f the vote 1n the national e lec tio n s , support fo r  Llberaclon  
apparently does cut across class and regional lin e s . Two separate
4 2 Engl1sh, L lberaclon. p. 8 6 .
^ M a rlo  Carvajal Herrera, " P o lit ic a l A ttitudes and P o lit ic a l  
Change In Costa Rica: A Comparison o f the A ttitudes  o f Leaders and 
Followers with Respect to  Regime Values and Party Id e n tif ic a tio n "
(Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , U n ivers ity  of Kansas, 1972), pp. 189, 218.
* 4Cull1nan, "Recruitment," p. 205.
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voting studies using aggregate data o ffe r  s im ila r find ings. One
study concludes that the links between the vote and such variables
as urbanization and economic development are not s ta t is t ic a l ly
s ig n ific a n t. The author proposes that e lections are la rg e ly  symbolic
outputs o f an e l i t e  dominated government. This conclusion may be
a b it  strong fo r  the analysis he proffers but his data support the
contention that voting 1n Costa Rica does not fo llow  rea d ily  d1s-
45cern lb le  patterns of socio-economic c h a ra c te ris tic s . The other 
study avowedly tr ie s  to re fu te  the Trudeau conclusions, but the 
s ig n ific a n t corre lations c ited  give l i t t l e  more understanding of 
Costa Rican voting than did Trudeau's s ta t is t ic s . The author 
"proves" that the w ealth iest cantons tend to vote fo r  the conser­
vative  p arty , the poorer the canton the higher the vote fo r the 
Calderonlsta p arty , and those 1n between tend to vote fo r L ibera- 
cion, none o f which are new Ins ig h ts . Llberaclon draws votes 
from a l l  segments o f society; 1n th is  sense 1 t  1s m u lti-c la s s .
The m u lti-c lass  Image breaks down when the party organiza­
tion  1s examined. The data English complied 1n 1966 on the socio­
economic ch arac teris tics  o f the party organization Indicates  
that L lberacl^n 's leadership Is drawn from a more re s tric te d  group 
than the party admits. Twelve (11.7%) o f the 103 persons English
45 Robert H. Trudeau, "Costa Rican Voting: I ts  Socio­
economic Correlates" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n . U n ivers ity  o f North C arolina, 
1971), pp. 187-196.
^Jerome R. B ldlnger, "The Ecological Basis o f Costa Rican 
Voting Patterns: 1958-1966" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , Georgetown Univer­
s ity ,  1972), pp. 285-292.
191
Interviewed had only a primary school education and three (2.9%)
had gone to trade school. This means th a t 85.4 percent had a t
47leas t some schooling a t the secondary le v e l. At the time he
conducted his research only about twenty percent o f those e lig ib le
48attended secondary school. Anyone who goes beyond primary school 
Is  part o f a se lect group. Another In d ic a to r o f class 1s occupa­
t io n . Only 10.7 percent o f the leadership worked 1n occupations 
th a t could be ca lled  p ro le ta rian  (lab o rers , servants, and a rt is a n );
5.94 percent had upperclass occupations (u n iv e rs ity  professors, 
lawyers, physicians, other professionals, businessmen, landowners, 
merchants, and u n ivers ity  students). Another 21.2 percent held
49white c o lla r  jobs (teachers, o ff ic e  workers, and public employees).
One occupation— the small farmer, who supposedly 1s the backbone o f 
Costa Rican democracy--was completely unrepresented 1n the party  
hierarchy. The party leaders English Interviewed tended to be 
re la t iv e ly  well-educated with backgrounds In white c o lla r  or high 
status professional occupations. Although 1t has not been demoi- 
strated em p iric a lly , our Impression o f occupational status 1s th a t  
white c o lla r  workers fee l th a t they have more In common with the higher 
status occupations than they do w ith blue c o lla r  workers.
^ E n g lis h , L lberaclon. p. 169.
48Gerald Fry, "Educational Problems Related to the Economic 
Development o f Costa R1ca," Public and In te rn a tio na l A f fa ir s , 4 
(Spring 1966), p. 76. That fig u re  has not changed s ig n ific a n tly  
since 1966; In 1972, the percentage o f e llg lb le s  enrolled in secon­
dary schools was 22 percent. UNESCO S ta t is t ic a l Yearbook. 1974, 
p. 135.
49 *English, L lberaclon, p. 58.
In 1975 the s itu a tio n  appeared to be much the same. Of those
party leaders who answered my questionnaires, 71 percent had attended
secondary schools and 42 percent had received a t  le a s t a few years
o f education a t the un ivers ity  le v e l. In terms o f occupations,
again the higher status jobs predominated, w ith 60 percent e ith e r
professionals, adm inistrators (the m ajority  were headmasters o f
schools), or businessmen. Adding those engaged 1n a g ric u ltu re 50
brings the fig u re  to 71 percent. Only two respondents lis te d  blue
c o lla r  occupations, a truck d rive r and a p lan t boss (a self-made
man o f humble beginnings). The party may defend the in te res ts  and
concerns of the campeslno and the laborer, but the lower class 1s
51seldom recru ited  fo r  the party hierarchy.
The operational re a lity  of L1berac1on Naclonal fa l ls  some­
where between the disparagement of I ts  enemies and the encomium of 
i ts  supporters. The accusation that L1berad6n Is the p o litic a l 
tool o f a coterie o f opportunists may be too strong, but the e v i­
dence refutes the L1berad6n claim to be a paragon of partic ipatory  
democracy.
As already observed, the party 1s e s s e n tia lly  a mechanism 
fo r  winning e lec tio n s . Once the campaign 1s over, the party
50Of the four respondents who lis te d  ag ricu ltu re  as th e ir  p r i ­
mary occupation, two had fin ished secondary school and two had com­
pleted primary school. None mentioned the s ize  o f th e ir  a g ric u ltu ra l 
operation , but considering th e ir  education 1t  1s doubtful they could 
be considered campeslnos, or even o f the so-called  yeoman farm group.
51This s itu a tio n  may not be e n t ire ly  the fa u lt  o f the party  
organization . Being a p o lit ic ia n  takes time and usually  some fin a n ­
c ia l resources, comnodltles th a t campeslnos and laborers ra re ly  enjoy.
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organization 1s v ir tu a lly  dormant fo r  three years, then 1 t  begins 
to gear up fo r  the next campaign. Such functions as In te re s t a r t ic u ­
la tio n  and aggregation and p o lit ic a l s o c ia liza tio n  are performed only 
In te rm itte n tly , i f  a t a l l .  The socio-economic composition o f the 
party leadership has Included few laborers , small farmers, rural 
laborers , or other lower class persons. At the same tim e, e lec to ra l 
support fo r  the party has cut across class and region to a fa r  
greater extent than the socio-economic p ro f ile  o f the L1berac1on 
party leadership re f le c ts .
Given the party emphasis on e le c tio n , the recruitm ent pro­
cess 1s o f p a rtic u la r  Importance. Contrary to party mythology, 
the grassroots o f the party hierarchy play a more symbolic ro le  
than an In f lu e n tia l one 1n the recruitment process. Recruitment 
o f candidates and recruitm ent w ith in  the party hierarchy Is  con­
tro lle d  by the top leadership. Part o f the reason fo r  th a t control 
derives from the continuance 1n power o f the founders o f the p arty ,
. especia lly  Jos! Flgueres and Daniel Oduber. The formal structure  
established by the party statutes reinforces th e ir  control by con­
centrating decision-making au th o rity  In the National Executive 
Cormrittee, on which Flgueres and Oduber have served since the be­
ginning o f the party . S t i l l ,  the national leaders apparently try  
to consider local concerns and to give local leaders some autonomy 
In  local m atters. As the present leaders, Flgueres in  p a r t ic u la r ,  
pass from the p o lit ic a l scene, perhaps the party w il l  move closer 
to  the Ideal o f p a rtic ip a to ry  democracy 1t has espoused. Neverthe­
les s . although operational r e a l i ty  does diverge from mythical Image, 
Llberacl& i seems to be a permanent, r e la t iv e ly  democratic p arty .
194
USE OF THE MYTH BY LIBERACION 
The Revolution o f 1943 involved Costa R1ca as a whole; the 
Myth o f the Revolution 1s the preferred h is tory  o f only one part 
o f the society. Since L1beracl6n competes w ith other p o lit ic a l  
parties  fo r e le c to ra l support. 1 t has a vested In te re s t 1n having 
I ts  version o f the shared experiences o f th a t period accepted as 
the correct one.
Evidently L1beracl6n believes that the Myth has some p o lit ic a l  
u t i l i t y ,  fo r  on occasion 1t has used references to the Revolution 
In I ts  campaigns. A survey o f campaign advertisements In two lead­
ing Costa Rican newspapers revealed some In te res tin g  examples o f the
52Myth as a campaign device. Only during the 1962 campaign were
frequent references made to the Revolution. The use o f the Myth
appears to depend upon who opposes Llberaclon fo r  the presidency.
In 1962 Ca1der6n Guardia was the leading opposition candidate.
Llberaclon printed photos o f armed gangs roaming the s treets  of
San Jos£, reminding the voters that Ca1der6n had once been a great
th re a t to Costa Rican democracy, thwarted only by the v a lia n t
e ffo rts  o f the L lberaclonlstas. The party broadcast "Glories and
Tragedies o f the Country," ", . . a  series o f radio programs about
53some notable events o f the recent h is tory  of Costa R1ca."
52La Nac1<$n and La Republlca were selected. Since the purpose 
o f th is  exercise Is  11Tustra 11 ve on ly , the survey was re s tr ic te d  to  
the month of January (the la s t  month before the e lec tio n  when cam­
paigning 1s mo^t Intense) fo r  the e lec tio n  years o f 1962, 1966, and 
1968. La Nad on was also surveyed fo r  January 1958.
53La Republlca, 7 January 1962, p. 7. A p o lit ic a l advertisement. 
There were f iv e  programs 1n the s e rie s , covering such events as Llano 
Grande and a large demonstration o f women on 2 August 1947.
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Ant1-calderon1smo was the basic theme o f the newspaper advertisements
during th a t campaign. Ca1der6n himself ran only 1n 1962. In 1958.
1966, and 1970 other themes predominated; l i t t l e  reference was made
to the Revolution. In fa c t, 1n 1970 L1beracl6n tr ie d  to appeal to
Calderonlstas by publishing public statements th a t disparaged
Calderon which were made 1n the 1940*s by the Unlflcaclon candidate.
A p a r t ic u la r ly  In te res tin g  use of the Myth was made by the Partldo
Independlente, a Llberaclon s p lin te r  party In the 1958 e lec tio n s .
Independlente castigated Llberaclon fo r  betraying the Ideals o f the
54Revolution while In o ff ic e  under Flgueres.
Thus 1t seems th a t LlberaclOn lim its  use o f the tyyth 1n
p o lit ic a l campaigns to sp ec ific  purposes. The Revolution Is not
necessarily a symbolic weapon to be wielded ind iscrim inate ly  1n
55every Instance without regard to u t i l i t y .
Another example o f the use of the Myth In Costa Rican p o lit ic s  
can be found In  the annual pres iden tia l message to the L eg is la tive  
Assembly. Reporting on his f i r s t  term as president, Flgueres re a f­
firmed the goals and Ideals of the Revolution. He recallec* the 
"glorious labor" o f the men and women o f the National L iberation  
Movement and reminded the dlputados o f the "corruption of our 
customs" under the venal former government. During his speech he
5\ a  Nacltfn, 19 January 1958, p. 8.
55Th1s conclusion 1s based on a lim ite d  survey o f only one type 
o f campaign l i te r a tu r e .  A broader study, including pamphlets, radio  
programs, public speeches, and other campaign m atter, might reveal 
a greater re lian ce  on the Myth than newspaper advertisements In d ica te .
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re ite ra ted  the ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r the revo lt and catalogued the
benefits o f the Llberaclon regime. Three years la te r ,  Flgueres
once again used the Myth to ju s t ify  his adm inistration .5®
We are scarcely ten years from a c iv i l  war that cost two thou­
sand liv e s , given almost exclusively In  the defense o f e lectoral 
rights and adm inistrative honesty.5'
Flgueres then reminded his opponents that twice he and LIberaclOn
had given up power despite the d ire  and grossly unfair accusations
o f Inc ip ien t d ictatorship being made against them. The two Interim
presidential messages {1956 and 1957) contain no mention of the
Revolution.58
Again 1t appears that the Myth Is Invoked 1n certain Instances 
but has not become a un iversally  applicable campaign to o l. Extend­
ing the review of presidential messages to the other LIberaclOn 
presidents, Orllch and Oduber, may uncover s im ilar symbolic employ­
ment o f the Myth. One could also examine presidential proclamations, 
speeches, and ceremonial orations. What kinds of a c t iv it ie s  are 
ju s t if ie d  by reference to the Revolution? Are revolutionary t ra d i­
tions and princ ip les , used to gain support fo r certain a c tiv it ie s
55JosO Flgueres, Mensaje del seno? Presldente de Jâ  Republlca 
don JosO Flgueres y  contestacT6n del senor presldente de la  AsambTea 
Legislative L ie . don Gonzalo J. FacTo {San Jos6» Costa Rica:
Imprenta Naclonal, 1955'.
5^JosO Flgueres, Mensaje del senor Presldente de la  Republlca 
don Josfe Flgueres y  contestaclOn del seTfor Presldente de~ la  AsambTea 
Legislative Dr. don Alvaro Montero~Fad1l la  (San Jos6, Costa Rica: 
Imprenta N a c lo n a l,1 9 5 8 ) ,p. 8 .
CQ
In 1949, the Junta turned over the presidency to llla te  and 
1n 1958, a t the time o f th is speech, Llberaclon was relinquishing  
the o ffic e  to Mario Echandl and the Partldo Union Naclonal.
or to  excuse lack of a tten tion  to other problems? The le g is la t iv e
branch may be studied 1n the same way. Baker has shown th a t partisan
considerations are extremely Important In the L eg is la tive  Assembly,
/  59p a rtic u la r ly  w ith respect to Llberaclon. Is  the Myth ever used 
to e l i c i t  party support and 1 f  so 1n what ways and fo r  what sp ec ific  
types o f leg is la tio n ?
The Myth o f the Revolution is  d e f in ite ly  a part of Costa Rica's  
p o lit ic a l consciousness. L1berac1&n has tr ie d  to keep its  version 
a liv e . Establishing the Importance o f the Myth today to Llberaclon  
as a weapon 1n I ts  p o lit ic a l arsenal w il l  require a great deal of 
fu rth e r research.
^C hris topher Baker, "The Costa Rican L eg is la tive  Assembly:
A Prelim inary Evaluation o f the Decisional Function," 1n Latin  
American Leg islatures: Their Role and In fluen ce , ed. Weston H. Agar
(New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 93-94.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
The ob jective  of th is  study has been to fin d  some new Insights  
In to  Costa Rican p o lit ic a l c u ltu re . Part o f the study concentrated 
on the Myth o f the Revolution qua myth to document the existence and 
composition of the Myth. I t  was necessary to show th a t the Llberaclon  
version o f the Revolution o f 1948 Is  not only mythic 1n form (dram atic), 
but mythic 1n substance (patterned) as w e ll. The la t te r  aspect re ­
quired comparing the L1beracl6n treatment of events w ith other h is to r i­
cal accounts. A ttention was also paid to m anifestations of the Myth 
in the organization and operation of Llberaclon as a p o lit ic a l party. 
That the L1beracl6n version of the Revolution constituted a myth as 
defined Is c le a r. The leading characters are depicted 1n heroic  
dimensions, the n a rra tiv e  1s dram atic, and h is to ric a l accuracy 1s 
subordinated to the mythic theme. Does the Myth of the Revolution 
t e l l  us anything about the p o lit ic a l cu ltu re  o f Costa Rica?
The Myth of the Revolution Is more than simply the preferred  
h is to ry  o f Llberaclon Naclonal. The p o lit ic a l  myths o f L iberation  
reveal much about the values and Ideals o f the party as a p o lit ic a l  
subgroup. What L1berac1on1stas have chosen to emphasize, om it, and 
d is to r t  among the events and a c t iv it ie s  leading to , during, and 1n 
the aftermath o f the Revolution presents a p a rtic u la r  Image o f
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L1beracl6n as a p o lit ic a l party . Not c o in c id e n ta lly , the values and 
ideals  Imbedded 1n the Myth, which are those held by L1berac1on1stas, 
correspond to p o lit ic a l values a ttr ib u te d  to Costa Ricans In general. 
There are no substantial c o n flic ts  between the societa l Image embodied 
1n la  leyenda blanca and the party Image embodied 1n the Myth of the 
Revolution. The la t te r  substantiates the former.
THE MYTH AND THE COSTA RICAN POLITICAL CULTURE
The p o lit ic a l ambience one fee ls  1n Costa R1ca d if fe rs  from 
that sensed in neighboring countries. The most tangib le d ifference  
1s the absence of armed soldiers who are so unavoidably noticeable  
1n public places 1n other Central American countries. Kidnappings 
and assassinations, so prevalent 1n Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, are not a part o f Costa Rica's d a lly  l i f e , *  nor does one 
fe e l the ominous presence o f a dominant army as in Somoza's Nicaragua.
Costa Rica Is  no oasis of t ra n q u ility  and prosperity . The
problems attendant to any nation struggling to  make I ts  way 1n the 
contemporary world— crim e, poverty, economic growth--occur 1n Costa 
R1ca. Costa R ica's government under both Llberaclon and other ad­
m in istrations has suffered Instances o f fraud and scandal. Costa 
R1ca 1s fa r  from finding the answers to  a l l  I ts  problems. Neverthe­
le s s , there are a t  leas t three re la t iv e  c e rta in tie s  1n post-Revolutlon
*The most recent Instance o f p o lit ic a l violence In San Jos6 
occurred In June 1977 when G.W. V illa lo b o s , a would-be pres identia l 
candidate, f ire d  on the v i l l a  of Robert Vesco, a wealthy fin a n c ie r  
who was try in g  to estab lish  residence 1n Costa Rica to  avoid being 
extrad ited  to the United States fo r  t r i a l .  V illa lo b o s  accused Vesco 
o f being a corruptive Influence In Costa Rican p o lit ic s .  Washington 
Post, 10 June 1977, p. A 28.
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Costa Rican p o lit ic s . The use o f violence fo r p o lit ic a l ends 1s m ini­
mal; e lections take place on schedule ever*y four years; and the trans­
fe r  o f power from the e le c to ra lly  vanquished to the e lec to ra l v ictors  
proceeds without d i f f ic u lty .  I f  behavior re fle c ts  values, as the 
concept o f p o lit ic a l cu lture  proposes, then nonviolence 1n p o lit ic s ,  
e lecto ra l p o lit ic s ,  and the peaceful tran sfer o f power are s ig n i f i ­
cant p o lit ic a l values 1n the p o lit ic a l cu lture  o f Costa Rica. To
the l i s t  one can add a commitment to  c iv i l  r ig h ts , espec ia lly  fre e -
2
dom of speech. These values come through c le a r ly  In the emphasis 
and omissions o f the Myth.
The Myth o f the Revolution is  about v io le n t deeds: a government
was overthrown by force and people died 1n the en terp rise . The revo lt  
vio la ted  the princ ip les  o f nonviolence, e le c tio n s , and peaceful succes­
sion simultaneously. The care with which L1berac1on1sta mythmakers 
have exaggerated the use of violence by the Calderonlstas and expunged 
any reference to s im ila r  actions by F lguerlstas Indicates that violence 
1s considered an unacceptable p o lit ic a l action . According to the Myth, 
the Flguerlstas turned to violence only when a l l  other options, except 
surrendering to  d ic ta to rs h ip , were closed. Once the th re a t o f d ic ta to r­
ship was removed, Flgueres proved the Liberacldn commitment to non­
violence by disbanding the army. The v io le n t ant1-government campaign 
carried  on by the Flguerlstas p r io r  to the Revolution 1s Ignored rather  
than ju s t i f ie d  1n L1berac1on1sta l i te r a tu r e .  The Myth devotes fa r  more 
atten tion  to why the Flguerlstas believed rev o lt necessary and to the 
benefits th a t Costa R1ca has reaped because o f the Llberaclon v ic to ry
2
See A11sky's comments on the press In Costa Rica. Marvin 
AHsky, "The Mass Media 1n Central America," Journalism Q uarterly  
(F a ll 1955) pp. 481-482.
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than to g lo rify in g  the actual f ig h tin g . Given the value Costa Ricans 
alleged ly  place on nonviolence, th is  approach 1s sensible fo r  1t 
ju s t if ie d  the re jec tio n  o f Calderon and a t the same time deflects  
atten tion  from L lberacionlsta delinquencies. The dichotomy between 
the v io len t Calderonlstas and the peace-loving Flguerlstas could 
hardly be more c le a rly  drawn. The violence-prone Calderonlstas 
epitomize e v i l ;  the L1berac1on1stas who had to be pushed to the 
extreme before resorting to arms stand fo r  the best In the Costa 
Rican tra d it io n . By Id e n tify in g  themselves so self-consciously with  
Costa Rican tra d itio n s  and emphasizing so strongly th is  contrast, 
the L1berac1on1stas a ffirm  the depth of the emotional attachment 
to the p r in c ip le , 1 f not always the fa c t ,  o f nonviolence.
According to the Myth, the reason fo r the revo lt was the annul­
ment of the 1948 e le c tio n . Since Flgueres had been planning to revo lt 
fo r  some tim e, c a ta ly s t might be a more accurate word. The evidence 
indicates th a t Flgueres had only been w aiting fo r  the r ig h t moment 
to ac t. But the Myth does not tre a t  the n u ll if ic a t io n  o f the e lection  
as a c a ta ly s t; 1t 1s the raison d 'e tre . The government had weathered 
several c rises , most notably the Huelga de Brazos Caldos, but annulling  
the e lection  created a c r is is  the government could not rid e  out. This 
was one governmental action th a t Flgueres knew would a lien a te  most 
Costa Ricans. Apparently, the a lien a tio n  was severe enough to allow  
Flgueres to lead a successful re v o lt. The war was over too quickly  
to provide an accurate measure o f the extent to  which Flgueres was 
supported, but the re la t iv e  ease w ith which the Junta took charge a f te r  
the Calderonlsta defeat suggests th a t many Costa Ricans supported the 
ouster of Calder6n and his supporters. Perhaps Flgueres could have
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led a successful re v o lt a t another time fo r a d iffe re n t ra tio n a le . The 
L1berac1on1 sta iqythmakers make c lear that they consider the n u ll i f ic a ­
tion  o f the election to be a ju s t and s u ffic ie n t cause. Flgueres had 
correctly  judged the fervour o f the Costa Ricans' regard fo r the 
electora l process. The Uberaclonlstas mythmakers reaffirm  that 
fervour by making the desecration of elections the heart of the 
revolutionary ra tio n a le .
An essential goal of e lectora l p o litic s  1s the peaceful trans­
fe ra l of power. The Myth 1s about a transfera l of power through 
violence, but i t  stresses th a t the event was an anomaly 1n Costa Rican 
p o lit ic s , brought about by extreme and unusual circumstances. One 
of the primary objectives o f Llberaddn has been to prevent the re ­
currence o f such events. Since the Revolution, no defeated Incumbent 
party has refused to relinquish the government to Its  opponents.
The most questionable action of the U beraclon lstas , given the 
rationale  proffered by the Myth, was the ru le  by Junta. The revo lt 
was ju s t if ie d  by refusal of the Calderonlstas to relinquish power.
How then could Uberaclonlstas explain the refusal to turn the govern­
ment over to the elected choice, Ulate? The Myth presents the decision 
to allow the Junta to rule fo r eighteen months as a jo in t  agreement 
between Flgueres and Ulate fo r the good of the nation and stresses 
the m utuality of the decision. To do otherwise would imply that 
Flgueres had seized power I l le g a l ly .  Consequently, any misgivings 
Ulate may have had are omitted. The p rinc ip le  of peaceful transfera l 
o f power remains In v io la te .
The question of the convnltment to c iv i l  rights  deserves some 
comment. The Constitution o f 1871 and the Constitution o f 1949 both
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contain an extensive 11st o f Ind iv idual r ig h ts . One o f these rig h ts  1s 
the protection from ex post facto  laws and special courts. The special 
courts established by the Junta v io la ted  th is  p ro h ib itio n . The Junta 
argued th a t the old con stitu tion  was no longer 1n force and the th reat 
o f counter-revolution required extreme measures. This argument has 
m erit since the Calderonlstas, supported by Nicaragua, did Invade 
Costa R1ca la te  1n 1948, and there were ju s t claims against former 
government o f f ic ia ls .  I f  one accepts the Myth as the f u l l  account, 
the special courts never existed because there Is  no reference to 
them 1n the Llberaclon l i te r a tu r e .  This omission implies a desire to 
avoid having to ju s t i fy  the v io la tio n s  o f rig h ts  guaranteed by Costa 
Rican co n stitu tio n a l tra d itio n s .
L lberaclonlsta mythmakers could have chosen to g lo r ify  the 
m ilita ry  aspects of the Revolution. The achievements o f the Army of 
National L iberation  were Impressive. I f  the casualty figures are 
co rrec t, the v ic to ry  o f National L iberation was almost miraculous.
The te r r o r is t  campaign also was well conducted and 1n some cultures  
might be considered a source o f p ride . That the Myth plays down the 
v io le n t a c t iv it ie s  o f the L iberation  Movement and emphasizes the 
comnltment o f Llberacltfn to democracy underlines the values and Ideals  
L1berac1on1stas most esteem.
Analysis of the Myth also corroborates observations th a t have 
been made about some o f the t r a its  o f the Costa Rican c u ltu re . The 
Myth as the p arty 's  "c lear p icture  of I t s e l f  In I ts  best moments" 
conceals more than ju s t  Llberaclon v io la tio n s  o f  p o lit ic a l  values.
Costa Ricans are said to be p o l i t ic a l ly  ap a th e tic , and susceptible to
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personal 1s t lc  p o lit ic s .  So long as democratic procedures appear to
be follow ed, Costa Ricans appear re la t iv e ly  unconcerned w ith substantive
4
output by the government. The Myth glosses over the appearance o f those 
t ra its  1n U beraclon lstas and In the society a t  large during the three  
phases of the Revolution.
Rodriguez and 8 arahona have asserted th a t Costa Ricans are p o l i t i ­
c a lly  apathetic . Their observation c o n flic ts  w ith the L1berac1on1sta 
claim  th a t the Revolution was "the armed uprising of the Costa Rican
5
people." The evidence Indicates th a t re la t iv e ly  small numbers of 
Costa Ricans were a c tiv e ly  Involved 1n the re v o lt and c e rta in ly  the 
f ig h tin g  was confined almost exclusively  to the region along the Pan 
American highway between Cartago and San Is id ro  del General. Apparently 
most o f the populace remained passive. The defeated Calderonlstas 
suffered few physical rep risa ls  and those who lo s t property and cap ita l 
due to the Junta tribu na ls  u ltim a te ly  regained most o f th e ir  lo s t  
possessions. The passions aroused by the Revolution seemed to have 
dissipated rap id ly .®  Since the Revolution, p o lit ic a l a c t iv ity  by the
mass o f Costa Ricans has generally  been lim ited  to the e lection
3
See Chapter Three.
*Ne1l Michael C u llln an , "Candidate Recruitment w ith in  the Costa 
Rican 'Partldo  L1berac1dn Naclonal'" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , U n iversity  
of Georgia, 1971), p. 205.
®Carta Fundamental Numero Dos, p. 8 .
®Calder<Sn and his fo llo w ers , supported by Somoza o f Nicaragua, 
did t ry  to  overthrow the U b erac lo n ls tas—once 1n 1949 and again In  
1955— but the attempts were half-hearted  and quickly fa ile d . No 
g u e r illa  movement developed nor did the Calderonlstas conduct a 
te r r o r is t  campaign. By 1962, they were once more a leg itim ate  part 
o f the Costa Rican p o lit ic a l  m ilie u .
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campaigns every four years. Examination o f Llberaclon as a party 
reveals a s im ilar practice; most o f the party's organs are dormant 
1n noncampaign years and few party-related  a c t iv it ie s  are repeated 
by Uberaclonlstas except during election  years.^ Many people p a r t ic i­
pate 1n campaign a c t iv it ie s  such as public ra ll ie s  and party parades, 
and most c itizens vote (usually around 80 percent o f the e le c to ra te ). 
But these a c tiv it ie s  seem to be more a form of entertainment than an 
expression o f p o lit ic a l demand. The leading candidates 1n each e lec­
tion since the Revolution have been moderates; radical candidates of 
e ith e r the le f t  or the r ig h t do not do well 1n Costa Rican elections.
Rodriguez claims that the apathetic nature of Costa Ricans has 
resulted 1n a su sc ep tib ility  to personalism In the Costa Rican c it iz e n . 
Llberadon lsta  claims notwithstanding, the Revolution was as much the 
personal triumph of Jos^ Flgueres as 1t was an expression o f antipathy  
fo r  Ca1der6n Guardia. Flgueres dominated every phase of the re v o lt, 
from the actual opposition to the founding of Llberaclon Naclonal. 
Further he has dominated the party u n til only recently . The party 
also has been most successful a t the polls when Flgueres was Its  
candidate fo r the presidency. Out of seven elections Llberaclon has 
received a t least 50 percent four times, but 1n each e lection  the
y 8
percentage fo r Llberaclon has declined. Only Flgueres has won
^Burt H. English. LlberaclOn Naclonal 1n Costa R1ca: The De­
velopment o f a P o lit ic a l Party ItTa Transition Society (GalnesvlTTe, 
Florida: University o f F lo r 1da~Fnessi 1 9 7 1 ) ,p. 8 6 .
®In 1958 LlberaclOn lo s t by 41% to 46% but only because a faction  
th a t broke from the party 1n disagreement to the O rllch candidacy 
carried about 10% of the vote with I t .
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substantial m ajo rities . Now th a t he can no longer be a presidential 
candidate, Llberaclon may have trouble surviving. The opposition 
parties have usually been organized around ind ividuals. So fa r  none 
has achieved the organizational s ta b il i ty  o f Llberaclon. With 
Llberaclon apparently on the decline, the next four years w ill  be 
crucial In the development o f the party system In Costa Rica.
F in a lly , although the Myth describes Its  partisans and th e ir  
countrymen as cormltted democrats, the rank and f i l e  L1berac1on1stas 
as well as the average c itize n  seem to be sa tis fied  with form rather 
than substance in the exercise of th e ir  p o lit ic a l r ig h ts . Llberaclon 
1s and has been controlled by its  leadership. To date, no faction  
opposed to the national leadership has been successful In taking 
control o f the party apparatus. Party revolts have resulted e ith e r  
1n cap itu la tion  or the s p lit t in g  o f the faction from the party. The 
major reorganization of Llberaclon accomplished In the mld-1960's was 
planned and directed la rg e ly  by Daniel Oduber, one o f the so-called  
trium vira te . Input Into the dec1sion-making process of the party by 
the lower level fo r candidate selection and party policy formulation  
appears to be lim ited  s t r ic t ly  to local Issues th a t do not concern 
the national leadership. Yet an a ttltu d ln a l study comparing o f f ic ia ls  
with the rank and f i l e  found the lower levels more content with the
®The e lection  o f 1970 1s an exception to the general decline 
In the Llberaclon vote. Flgueres was allowed to run fo r a second 
term and won with about 54%. The Constitution has been changed 
to preclude any second presidential terms.
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status quo than th e ir  leaders . * 0 So long as certa in  forms are followed, 
most notably e lections free  from overt m anipulation, the L lberaclonlsta  
and his opposition counterparts evidently  are s a tis fie d  th a t Costa Rica 
1s Indeed the model o f democracy fo r  Central America.
SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON COSTA RICAN 
POLITICAL CULTURE
Costa Rican p o lit ic a l  culture as a f ie ld  o f Inquiry has hardly  
been touched. The few studies o f a ttitu d es  and p o lit ic a l o rientations  
that have been completed are a beginning, but many deta iled  Investiga­
tions on a va rie ty  o f questions need to be accomplished before we can 
approximate an understanding o f the Costa Rican p o lit ic a l mind. A 
study on the e l i t e  p o lit ic a l culture 1n Costa R1ca found a sense o f  
complacency extant 1n many leaders regarding the d u ra b ility  o f the 
p o lit ic a l status quo.** A s im ila r  complacency is manifest 1n the 
conventional wisdom on Costa Rica expressed 1n most o f the lite ra tu re  
published 1n the United States. The blindness o f the Calderonlstas 
to the po ten tia l fo r  revo lt In th e ir  countrymen led to  tra g ic  conse­
quences. Hany, perhaps most, of the assumptions about the Costa Rican 
p o lit ic a l cu lture  so casually expressed 1n the lite ra tu re  may be v a lid . 
For the most p a rt, however, they remain untested.
*°Kar1o Carvajal Herrera, " P o lit ic a l A ttitudes and P o lit ic a l  
Change 1n Costa R1ca: A Comparison o f the A ttitudes o f Leaders and 
Followers w ith Respect to Regime Values and Party Id e n tif ic a tio n "
(Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , U n iversity  of Kansas, 1972), p. 218. Trudeau 
reaches a s im ila r  conclusion. Robert Henry Trudeau, "Costa Rican 
Voting: Its  Socio-economic Correlates" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , Univer­
s ity  o f North C aro lina, 1971), pp. 187-188.
**Dorothy McBride Stetson, " E lite  P o lit ic a l Culture in  Costa 
Rica" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n , Vanderbilt U n ive rs ity , 1966), p. 8 8 .
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The e ffe c ts  o f the Revolution of 1948 on Costa Rican p o lit ic s  
were obviously profound. The e ffec ts  have been mere pervasive than 
simply realign ing p o lit ic a l cleavages. According to Stetson, "One 
o f the most Important agents o f so c ia liza tio n  1n Costa R1ca was a 
'g rea t even t,' the Revolution or C iv il War o f 1948.1,12 She found 
a high co rre la tio n  between the strength o f partisan a f f i l ia t io n s  and 
experience with the Revolution. This 1s a fa c to r th a t has la rg e ly  
been ignored In  studies on Costa Rican voting patterns. Stetson's  
findings point up the c e n tra lity  of the Revolution to p o lit ic a l  
research 1n Costa R1ca.
F ir s t ,  much remains to  be done on the mythology o f the Revolu­
t io n . This study recounts only the Llberaclon version. Undoubtedly 
the Calderonlstas, the U la tls ta s , and other an ti-L lberac lon  groups 
see the Revolution 1n a d iffe re n t l ig h t .  S im ilar studies could be 
conducted from a v a rie ty  of perspectives. A ttltu d ln a l surveys would 
provide v ita l  information on the depth and breadth o f acceptance o f 
the myths o f the various p a rtie s . Such surveys should Include 
partisan and nonpartisan respondents. Comparisons o f the penetration  
of mythic adherence might reveal patterns o f a ttitu d es  th a t correspond 
to other s ig n ific a n t p o lit ic a l patterns such as voting re s u lts . In te r -  
generational corre lates among and across partisan lines  would measure 
the e ffe c ts  of p o lit ic a l trauma as the process o f s o c ia liza tio n . 
V e rtic a l d if fe re n tia t io n  among and across partisan lines  might also  
be examined. Another variab le  worth examining 1s the content o f mythic 
narra tive  th a t may vary considerably by s o c ia l, educational, or
l 2 I b 1 d . ,  p .  1 80 .
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occupational le v e l. An ob jective  o f such research would be to  Is o la te  
values, a tt itu d e s , and orien tations o f Costa Ricans as Costa Ricans 
express them.
A broader research subject 1s la  leyenda blanca. I f  1 t 1s a
v a lid  characterization  o f the Costa Ricans1 se lf-im age, the White
Legend l ie s  a t the core o f the p o lit ic a l cu lture  o f Costa R1ca. John
Rllsmandel has already In it ia te d  the research on one part o f the
13legend— the yeoman fanner and land tenure. Other research might 
pursue the questions o f ra c ia l homogeneity, educational opportunity, 
and the standard o f liv in g  as compared with other Central American 
countries. One approach might be to  compare and contrast the Costa 
Rican self-im age with a set o f socio-economic Ind icators to  measure 
how closely Image approximates r e a l i t y .  R ep licative  studies con­
ducted 1n such countries as Uruguay might lead to hypotheses about 
directions o f p o lit ic a l change or s ta b i l i ty  In countries of s im ila r  
reputation. Do changes 1n self-im age precede s tru ctu ra l change, does 
the converse more accurately describe the re la tio n s h ip , or are s e lf -  
image and structure bound 1n a mutually re in fo rc in g  process?
To conclude, I  wish to point out th a t Costa R1ca 1s Ideal fo r  
research on p o lit ic a l c u ltu re . F ir s t ,  the country 1s small and most 
areas are now accessible by road, a t le a s t 1n the dry season. Second, 
Costa Rica appears to  enjoy a re la t iv e ly  homogeneous c u ltu re . Except 
fo r the Blacks concentrated on the A tla n tic  coast, there seem to be 
no major cu ltu ra l d iv is io ns . Th ird , the country Is  remarkably open.
13John Norman Rllsmandel, NCosta R1ca: Self-Im age, Land Tenure, 
and Agrarian Reform" (Ph.D. d is s e rta tio n . U n ivers ity  o f Maryland, 1972).
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People do not seem to be a fra id  o f speaking th e ir  minds, even to  
strangers. The several Investigations c ited  1n th is  study ind icate  
th a t Costa Ricans may be f a i r ly  receptive to  survey research. The 
Ticos are a source o f c u ltu ra l research that should be used to the 
fu l le s t .
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APPENDIX A
The questionnaire from which some of the Information used In th is  
study was taken was designed and administered w ith another research 
pro ject in mind. Consequently, only data and statements th a t bore on 
th is  study are used.
O rig in a lly , I had Intended to conduct a l l  the interviews 1n 
person, but I encountered serious d i f f ic u lt ie s  In obtaining a 11st of 
the L1berac1dn o f f ic ia ls  th a t I wanted to In terv iew . By the time I 
managed to obtain the l i s t ,  time and finances d ic ta ted  my changing the 
Interview  schedule to one su itab le  fo r  m ailin g . Because the mall ques­
tio nn aire  1s re la t iv e ly  unconmon 1n Costa R ica, I t r ie d  to structure  
the questions as much as possible. In some cases I am certa in  th a t the 
questions were misunderstood. I  sent out 108 questionnaires and re ­
ceived 36 responses. Although I  considered the number o f responses and 
the data co llected In s u ff ic ie n t fo r  the o rig in a l research p ro je c t, I 
was able to glean Information from the mall questionnaires th a t I l lu s ­
tra tes  a number o f points 1n the present analysis and supports some of
my assertions.
An English tran s la tio n  of the questionnaire In I ts  e n tire ty  
fo llow s.
Questionnaire
Everything th a t you say Is  con fidentia l and w il l  be used fo r  academic 
purposes only.
1. How old are you?
2. What Is  the la s t school vou attended?
a. How many years did vou attend the school?
b. Did you receive a degree? What Is  1t?
3. What 1$ your occupation?
4. What was your occupation before jo in in g  the party? ( I f  1 t 1s
d if fe r e n t ,  why did you change jobs?)
5. Are (o r were) your parents L1berat1on1sts?
6 . I f  you have ch ild ren , 1s I t  Important to you th a t they be 
L lberatlon ls ts?
a. I have no ch ild ren .
b. Yes.
c. No.
7. When did you jo in  L1berac1dn?
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8 . Why did vou ,1o1n the party? (Mark the reason most Important to  
vou.)
a . I  wanted to get ahead 1n p o lit ic s  and L1beracl6n o ffe rs  the best 
opportunity fo r  th is .
b. U beracldn Is  the best party fo r the Country.
c . Llberacldn goals and Ideals best re f le c t  my own.
d. My parents are (o r were) L1berat1on1sts.
e. I  don 't know.
f .  Other (e x p la in ).
9. Your present position In the party is  ___________. How did you
achieve th is  position?
a. Appointed.
b. Elected.
10. Why do you believe you were appointed/elected? (Mark the facto r  
most Im portant.)
a . I have worked hard fo r  the party.
b. I have many supporters In  the party .
c. I have much Influence In the community.
d. I have much Influence with the leaders o f the party .
e. I was the best q u a lifie d  person.
f . 1 don't know.
g. Other (e x p la in ).
11. Have you held other positions 1n the party? No, Yes ( I f  yes, on 
the 11st below mark the positions you have held, the order, and the 
time in o f f ic e .)






3. Executive Committee of the Youth.
4 . Coordinator.
b. P ro v in c ia l.
1. Assembly.
2. Executive Conmlttee -
3. Youth.
c . National .
1. Assembly.
2. Tribunal o f Honor.
3. Executive D ire c to r .
4 . Youth.
d. Other (e x p la in ).
12. What are the most important duties o f your o ffice?
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13. (For the Cantons) Do you make contact with the other cantonal 
bodies o f the party?
a. Often.
b. At tim es, but not often.
c . Only during the campaign.
d. Rarely.
e . Never.
14. Can you perform your duties as you wish or do you receive e x p lic it  
Instructions from your leaders?
a. As I  wish.
b. I receive e x p lic it  instructions.
c. Other (exp la in ).
15. What would happen 1 f you disagreed w ith your Instructions?
a. I always obey iny Instru ctio ns .
b. I would refuse to comply.
c . I would request a meeting with my leaders.
d. I would take the m atter to a higher le v e l.
e . I don't know.
f .  Other (exp la in ).
16. What would happen 1f you ignored your instructions or refused to 
obey them?
a. Nothing would happen.
b. I would receive a reprimand.
c. I would receive a sanction from the party.
d. The matter would be re ferred  to  the Tribunal of Honor.
e . Other (e xp la in ).
17. What would you do 1 f a subordinate disagreed with your Instructions?
a. I would ask fo r a meeting with him.
b. I would re fe r  the matter to a higher le v e l.
c . I would demand th a t he obey my Instru ctio ns .
d. Nothing.
e. Other (e x p la in ).
18. What would you do 1 f he Ignored or disobeyed your Instructions?
a. I could do nothing.
b. I  would re fe r  the m atter to ny leaders.
c . I  would re fe r  the m atter to the Tribunal of Honor.
d. I would punish the subordinate.
e . Other (exp la in ).
19. How much time per month do you usually work fo r  the party?
20. Have you achieved your goals and In te res ts  as a member o f Llberacltfn?
a. Yes.
b. More or less.
c . No.
21. Do you want to hold higher posts In the party?
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22. How often does your organization o f the party usually meet?
23. What happens during a typ ica l meeting? For example:
a . Who usually attends the meetings?
b. What topics are discussed?
c. Who partic ip a tes  In the discussions?
d. How are decisions made?
24. In many organizations* some have more power than others. Who do 
you believe has power 1n L1beracl6n?
a. At the national level.
b. At the local leve l.
25. Why do they have power?
26. In many parties  around the world, one party function 1s to  transm it 
to the government the problems and necessities of the people* or a t  
least those of the party members. Does L1beracl6n function In th is  
manner7
a. No.
b. At times but 1t 1s not very im portant.
c. I t  1s a very Important function.
d. I  don 't know.
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